Political Science 345: The Legislative Process Class 18: Executive-Legislative Relations

1. Political Science 345:The Legislative ProcessClass 18: Executive-Legislative Relations Professor Jon Rogowski

2. The Legislator-in-Chief? • The legislative process ordinarily is not complete once Congress passes a bill • President’s signature required • Or, both chambers override his veto • New laws introduced by MCs • Budgets proposed by president • Treaties and appointments presented for ‘advice and consent’

3. A system of separated powers Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776): “That the legislative and executive powers of the state should be separate and distinct from the judicative…” • Constitution provides each branch with distinct and separate powers • Madison, Federalist 48: “A mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which led to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands.” • Madison, Federalist 51: “Ambition must be made to counter ambition.”

4. Formal powers of the president • Treaties • Nominations • State of the Union • “Take care that laws be faithfully executed” • Executive orders • Signing statements • Budget proposals • Economic Report of the President

5. Separated, but also shared • Eisenhower, 1959: “By the Constitution, I am part of the legislative process.” • Article II says nothing about veto power • Article I, Section 7: If the president does not approve, he must return the bill unsigned within ten days (excl. Sundays) to the chamber in which it originated. Must state his objections and Congress must consider them. • Nominations and treaties require ‘advice and consent’ of the Senate • Nominations: simple majority (but filibuster…) • Treaties: two-thirds

6. Presidential power and Congress • How much influence do the president’s powers afford him over the nation’s policymaking? • “Weak remains the word with which to start” (Neustadt 1960). • “Presidential power is the power to persuade” (Neustadt 1960). • “The essence of a President’s persuasive task is to convince such men that what it White House wants to them is what they ought to do for their sake and on their authority.”

7. Interbranch bargaining • More from Neustadt: “Power is persuasion and persuasion becomes bargaining.” • Passing legislation requires bargaining between Congress and the president • When is the president advantaged relative to Congress? • Some built-in advantages (i.e., first-mover) • Other times the balance of power is determined by political conditions (i.e., public support)

8. Presidential Vetoes: The Basics • Two types of vetoes • Regular veto (“veto message”): within 10 days, president returns bill to Congress, with message explaining his objections • Pocket veto: president refuses to sign the bill within 10 days, during which time Congress adjourns at the end of its 2nd session • A bill that is not signed or vetoed within 10 days while the Congress is still in session becomes law, without the president’s approval • A regular veto can be overridden by two-thirds vote of each chamber (2/3 of those present & voting) • A pocket-vetoed bill must be reintroduced in the next session • Often the vetoed legislation is revised by Congress and passed in a form that satisfies the president

9. Veto Tally by President

10. Veto Overrides

11. Veto Bargaining (VB) • VB theory is applicable to a wide range of strategic interactions, not just presidential vetoes • With complete information about ideal points, vetoes never occur • Implication 1: it is impossible to infer anything about the extent of veto power from the frequency of vetoes • Implication 2: when we observe vetoes in the real world, this suggests incomplete information • With complete information, we don’t get much beyond what we know from Pivotal Politics • The important contribution of VB is showing what happens with uncertainty • In the real world, some situations look more like complete info, other more like uncertainty

12. Veto Override and Legislative Coalitions • How does the possibility of a veto affect the size of legislative coalitions?

13. Going Public and the Bully Pulpit • Theodore Roosevelt: “I suppose my critics will call it preaching, but I have got such a bully pulpit!” • But Madison in Federalist 49 views “going public” as a wrongheaded presidential strategy • When do presidents go public? • What effect might it have?

14. Executive Power and War War is “the true nurse of executive aggrandizement…In war, the honors and emoulments of office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that laurels are to be gathered; and it the executive brow they are to encircle. The strongest passions and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.” (Madison 1793, Helvidius IV)

15. War and Presidential Influence

16. Bargaining and policy outcomes • Policy changes affect both the nation as a whole and MCs’ constituencies • MCs have better information about the local implications; presidents have better information about the national implications • When MCs place greater weight on the national (relative to local) implications of policy, greater accommodation to president • Implications beyond war?

17. Other bargaining chips • Carrots and sticks • Favorable decisions from bureaucracy • Where to situate military bases, award defense contracts, etc. • Casework • Patronage and symbolic gestures

18. Other sources of conflict • Partisanship? • Divided govt is typically is norm • Presidents and Congress serve fundamentally constituencies • Operate on different electoral cycles • Timing matters • Organization and accountability

19. Unilateral Action • Emancipation proclamation • Withdrawal of public lands for national parks system • Internment of the Japanese in WWII • Creation of major agencies: EPA, FDA, Peace Corps • Creation of international organizations: IMF • Imposition of regulatory review • Military tribunals for “enemy combatants” • Domestic Spying/Terrorist Surveillance

20. The President’s Arsenal • Executive orders • Directives issued to officers of the executive branch requiring them to take an action, stop an activity, alter policy, change management practices, etc. • Proclamations • Target individuals and groups outside governments, usually ceremonial • But Nixon used for price controls, Ford to pardon draft evaders, Carter to tax oil • National security directives • Unlike executive orders and proclamations, classified • Usually dealing with security or foreign policy, but sometimes domestic matters • Examples: aid to Contras, invasion of Grenada • Executive agreements • An alternative to treaties • Make international commitments on trade, immigration, environment

21. Patterns of EOs Source: Krause and Cohen 1997

22. Limits to Unilateral Power • “Congressional policy announced in a statute necessarily prevails over inconsistent presidential orders.” • Justice Marshall in Little • Things quickly get murky. • Assessing “consistency” more art than science. • Ambiguity works to the president’s advantage. • Limits to unilateral action are as wide or as narrow as Congress and the courts permit • But limits are not self-enforcing • What one president does, the next may undo

23. v p f m f v p m Equilibrium Policies Outcomes I II III IV V Gridlock 2f-m 2v-m Status quo

24. The Nature of Discretion • d reflects judicial reversals of the president’s actions • Based on constitutional and statutory interpretation • Judicial policy preferences can be incorporated into the model (wait for next class) • d may be directional, allowing only presidential actions that move policy toward the congressional median • The relevant median may be that of the enacting, not the current, Congress • Vague laws enhance d

25. EOs and the Courts Source: Howell and Ahmed 2013

26. v p f m f v p m Limits to Unilateral Power: d Outcomes I II III IV V Gridlock d Status quo q

27. Conclusion • The legislative process generally requires agreement between the legislature and the executive • Each uses its institutional and constitutional advantage to try to get the policy it wants • Relative degree of influence shaped by institutional and political conditions • Executives sometimes able to unilaterally achieve their policy goals • Next: the courts