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Rumsfeld's
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1. Summary of Lessons Learned PREPARED TESTIMONY BY SECDEF DONALD H. RUMSFELDGENERAL TOMMY R. FRANKS SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEEJuly 9, 2003
2. Rumsfeld’s “Key Lessons So Far” Include: The importance of:
Speed & ability to get inside enemy’s decision cycle & strike before he is able to mount a coherent defense
Jointness & ability of U.S. forces to fight, not as individual de-conflicted services, but as a truly joint force—maximizing the power & lethality they bring to bear
Intelligence & ability to act on intelligence rapidly, in minutes, instead of days & even hours
Precision & ability to deliver devastating damage to enemy positions, while sparing civilian lives & the civilian infrastructure
3. Rumsfeld’s Other Lessons & Observations The Plan was adaptable and flexible
Allowed Gen Franks & team to turn difficulties into opportunities
Example: inability of forces to enter from the north was disappointing, but
Keeping 4th ID in the Mediterranean created element of surprise
Iraq did not expect attack to begin until 4th ID arrived in Kuwait
Lessons Learned process began before the war did
JFCOM team provided immediate feedback
CENTCOM could apply “lessons” in real time & improve coalition performance in this war
21st century overmatching power is more important than “overwhelming force”
Force used to be measured in terms of mass (numbers of troops)
Now need advanced capabilities & use them in innovative & unexpected ways
4. Franks: Things That Worked Jointness: a maturing of joint force operations
From Southern/Northern Watch Ops & OEF experiences
Integration of ground maneuver, spec ops, precision lethal fires & non-lethal effects
Precision munitions: a force multiplier
C2: unprecedented situational awareness
Equipment readiness
Training state of the troops
Combined and joint, too
Coalition support & “Strategic Anchors”
“Cooperative Security” relationships paid high dividends in basing, staging & over flight rights
DoD/CIA synergy using integration of liaison officers facilitated teamwork
Worked well during OEF & paid great dividends in Iraq
5. Franks: Areas RequiringAdditional Work Fratricide prevention
Suffered from lack of standardized combat ID (7 systems)
Commanders overcame shortcomings “on the fly”
Deployment planning & execution cumbersome
Need to improved to meet 21st C operational demands
Coalition information sharing: must improve at all levels
Human intelligence: requires continuing focus
Comms bandwidth: requires continuing focus
Global Hawk: hi-alt, long loiter, beyond line-of-sight multi-sensor UAV will be further developed
Need to include laser designation & precision weaponry delivery
Integrated common operating picture (COP): very powerful but need further development
Tracking systems were previously Service-unique
Workarounds developed, but need integrated, user-friendly, C4I architecture for blue & red air, ground & maritime forces
Strategic lift & tanker aircraft availability were stretched
6. Advanced Technologies: Critical & Showing Even More Promise C2 of air, ground, naval, & SOF from 7,000 mi. away: “unique experience in warfare”
Permitted unprecedented real time situational awareness & connectivity
Precision-guided munitions: a force multiplier
Low collateral damage was fundamental factor to achieving objectives
Armed Predator: demonstrated great potential
will be a high payoff system in the future
Blue Force Tracking/ enhanced C4I systems: increased lethality and decreased response time
Transformational technologies