City-County Consolidation: Reshaping the Local Government Landscape

1. City-County Consolidation:Reshaping the Local Government Landscape Suzanne M. Leland Associate Professor University of North Carolina at Charlotte

2. City-County Consolidation • When a county and the cities within a county merge to form a single government entity • Boundary lines of the jurisdictions become coterminous • Most visible and comprehensive change in the local government landscape

3. Consolidation Trends: The Exotic, Evergreen issue… Long odds… • 100+ attempts since 1970, only 19 passages (total of 37 governments) • Slightly more than 1% of all county governments • Political Infeasible? 85% fail rate on referendum • Ten cases enacted by the legislature (New Orleans, UniGov) • Twenty-seven by referendum (KCK, Louisville)

8. The C3 project • What factors affect the outcome of an effort to consolidate two local governments?

9. What factors affect the outcome of an effort to consolidate two local governments? • Base Model: Rosenbaum & Kammerer (1974) • C3 Model: Draws from Messinger (1989), Johnson & Feiock (1999), & Feiock& Carr (2000).

10. Base Model: Rosenbaum & Kammerer • Two-Case Comparative Study Design • Jacksonville (passed) vs. Tampa (failed) • Rare Sequence of events in Jacksonville became Rosenbaum and Kammerer (R & K) model

11. Base Model: Rosenbaum & Kammerer • The Crisis Climate • Rapid population changes or major demographic shifts • Dramatic change in the ethnic or social base/under representation • Physical blight in the core city. • Decline in the quantity or quality of public services. • Economic decline in the city, especially when compared to the suburbs. • Rapid infusion of population into unincorporated areas • Demands for Government Response: • Annexation • Economic Development • Tax Shifts

12. Base Model: Rosenbaum & Kammerer Decision for Public Officials • Effective or Appropriate Response to Demands for Change: • Annexation • Economic Development • Tax Shifts No Consolidation

13. Power Deflation Base Model: Rosenbaum & Kammerer Decision for Public Officials • Accelerator Event: • Scandal • Lost Leader • Exo-Criticism • Exo-Crisis • Community Emergency • Emergence of Consolidation Entrepreneurs • Civic Elites • Mass Media • Chamber of Commerce Ineffective or Inappropriate Response to Demands for Change

14. Base Model: Rosenbaum & Kammerer Revolutionary Consolidation City-County Consol. Charter Referendum • Creation of Study Commission • Civic Elites • Mass Media • Chamber of Commerce Decision for Citizens YES! NO! No Consolidation

15. C3 Model: Enhanced R & K Model

16. The Crisis Climate • Rapid population changes or major demographic shifts • Dramatic change in the ethnic or social base/underrepresentation • Physical blight in the core city. • Decline in the quantity or quality of public services. • Economic decline in the city, especially when compared to the suburbs. • Rapid infusion of population into unincorporated areas • Demands for Government Response: • Annexation • Economic Devt. • Tax Shifts • Accelerator Event: • Scandal • Lost Leader • Exo-Criticism • Exo-Crisis • Community Emergency • Emergence of Consolidation Entrepreneurs: • Civic Elites • Mass Media • Chamber of Commerce Ineffective or Inappropriate Response to Demands for Change Decision for Public Officials Revolutionary Consolidation! • Effective or Appropriate Response to Demands for Change: • Annexation • Economic Development • Tax Shifts City-County Consolidation Referendum • Creation of Study Commission • Civic Elites • Mass Media • Chamber of Commerce Decision for Citizens No Consolidation

17. Rosenbaum & Kammerer: Problems • Institutional Context Missing (Leland & Thurmaier 2004) • Elite Role Unclear (Feiok & Carr 2000, & Fleischman 2000) • Discussion of Charter Incomplete (Johnson & Feiock (1999) • Discussion of Charter Campaign Incomplete (Leland & Thurmaier 2004, 2005)

18. The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns (Leland & Thurmaier 2004) • Looks at Institutional Context • Development and Constitutional Politics • Role of Elites • The Devilish Details of C3 Charters

19. The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns

20. The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns Institutional Framework: Does not significantly affect the ability of consolidation proponents to obtain passage Crisis Climate: No support found for R&K that it is required to obtain passage Governmental Response for Demand for Change: Difficult to identify the govt. response if there is no evidence of a crisis Power Deflation: Without a crisis, there is little chance for power deflation (lack of citizen confidence in governing structure). Accelerator Events: Not required.

21. What accounts for successful cases? Development and Constitutional Politics • Getting a charter commission and charter proposal is first part of the process • Getting to a charter commission is about development politics—spurred by economic development elites who want • streamlined processing, • holistic planning, and • economies of scale for development.

22. The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns Development and Constitutional Politics • Proposing a charter and getting it passed is about constitutional politics • The heart of the issue is convincing voters that the current government structure is broken! Only consolidation can fix it! • Requires a shift in argument from Economic development politics to Constitutional politics: a much higher standard to meet!

23. The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns The Role of Elites • Civic elites who have pushed the process to the point of a consolidation study commission, even to the point of a draft charter, need to shift perspectives to constitutional politics. • Constitutional politics requires a professional political campaign with disciplined campaign message, broad-based support of good government groups and charter members. • Significant opposition from key elites—particularly the sheriff—can spell doom for the referendum effort.

24. The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns The Devilish Details of C3 Charters • Taxes • Debt Assumption (or not!) • Council Structure • Chief Executive(s) • Minor Municipalities • Law Enforcement

25. The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns The Devilish Details of C3 Charters • Taxes • Separate districts (urban and rural) common • Pledges to freeze (or reduce) tax growth helpful • Debt • Avoiding assumption of debt helpful • Removing municipal utilities from merger helpful

26. The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns The Devilish Details of C3 Charters • Council Structure • Mixed district and at-large helpful • Preserving minority representation essential • Chief Executive(s) • Chief Elected officer often appoints chief administrative officer • Issue: how is government professionalization increased?

27. The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns The Devilish Details of C3 Charters • Minor Municipalities • Usually exempted from forced consolidation • Always able to vote on consolidation referendum (Dual Majority often) • Have yet to know of a minor municipality that opted into a consolidated government

28. The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns The Devilish Details of C3 Charters • Law Enforcement • Single most volatile issue in consolidations • Successful cases include situations where • Previous law enforcement consolidation was accepted and comfortable for elected sheriff • Sheriff responsible for court protection and jail administration • Unsuccessful cases often have sheriff opposed • Vocal, independent voice capable of opposition leadership • Law enforcement unions can rally behind sheriff, with $$

29. C3 Model Findings(Leland & Thurmaier 2004, 2005) • Most consolidations fail, at least on first attempt • A crisis climate is a foundation, necessary but insufficient cause for consolidation • Persistence of elites more important than a catalytic or accelerator event • Professional campaign based on constitutional politics is very important (no poison pills) • Law enforcement support or neutrality is essential

30. Conclusions: • The larger the percentage of the county covered by the major municipality, the more likely consolidation will pass • The smaller the net change in population (over the past ten years) the more likely consolidation will pass

31. Conclusions: • Exclusion of minor municipalities not significant if dual maj. not required • Having an elected sheriff, not significant—more about power arrangements • Economic decline (Unemployment) not significant • State Delegation Approval Required, not significant • Level of fragmentation within the county, not significant

32. Predicted Results for Combinations of Consolidation Campaigns Strength of Pro-consolidation campaign Strong Arguments (Economic Development) Weak Arguments (Efficiency, equity) Strength of Anti-Consolidation Campaign Strong opposition Louisville Kansas City Jacksonville Even Odds Des Moines Wilmington Fail Weak opposition Favorable Odds Athens Augusta Columbus Lafayette Fail Knoxville Sacramento Tallahassee Source: Adapted from Leland and Thurmaier (2004), p. 316

33. Common Elements Across Successful Consolidation Referendum: • The ability of civic elites to define the economic development vision for the community and then successfully convince the average voter that the existing political structure was inadequate to support and implement that vision and that the solution lay in consolidation.

34. Survey of Academics for UniGov Consensus that Consolidation would: • Improve technical efficiency of services • Improve economic development for the region • Reduce urban-suburban inequalities • Encourage uniform service provision • Not result in lower taxes • Not result in employee dissatisfaction

35. Academics Surveyed Disagreed on whether consolidation would improve: • Accountability • Diversity of elected officials • Citizen Participation/Involvement

36. Thank you for your time! Questions? Comments?