1 / 29

Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems Mohamed G. Gouda & H. B. Acharya

Presenter Aly Farahat Ph.D. Student Automatic Software Design Lab Computer Science Department Michigan Technological University. Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems Mohamed G. Gouda & H. B. Acharya.

kim-sparks
Download Presentation

Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems Mohamed G. Gouda & H. B. Acharya

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Presenter Aly Farahat Ph.D. Student Automatic Software Design Lab Computer Science Department Michigan Technological University Nash Equilibria in Distributed SystemsMohamed G. Gouda & H. B. Acharya Automatic Software Design Lab

  2. Automatic Software Design Lab • A Nash-Equilibrium is a property of stable states in a game. It means that no player should try to perturb this state (make a move) from this point as it may decrease its gain

  3. Automatic Software Design Lab Contents • Definitions • Characterization • Taxonomy

  4. Automatic Software Design Lab Definitions

  5. Automatic Software Design Lab Nash Equilibrium • Origins Concepts from Game Theory • Goal Characterizing a state from which local actions might eventually lead to no gain

  6. Automatic Software Design Lab Terminology • Stabilization: All distributed system computations are finite • Fixed-Point: Termination state in a distributed computation (no processes are enabled) • Equilibrium Point: Fixed-Point! • Local Perturbation: Transitions on a process local states while in a Fixed-Point

  7. Automatic Software Design Lab Gain Function • A set G of local functions, one per process i G={ g.i } • g.i is defined only at equilibrium states and undefined elsewhere

  8. Automatic Software Design Lab Nash Equilibrium A Fixed-Point s is a Nash Equilibrium wrt {g.i} iff For every process i, for every local perturbation, there exists a fixed-point s’ such that g.i(s’)<= g.i(s)

  9. Automatic Software Design Lab Intuitively • In a Nash-Equilibrium s, no process i has the incentive to perturb its equilibrium as it might decrease its gain function. • In a non Nash-Equilibrium ns, there exists a process j that would necessarily increase its local gain g.j by perturbing ( by a specific perturbation) its equilibrium.

  10. Automatic Software Design Lab Illustration

  11. Automatic Software Design Lab Characterization of Nash Equilibria

  12. Automatic Software Design Lab Sufficient Conditions Theorem 1: s is a Nash Equilibrium wrt {g.i} if any of the following is true: 1- g.i has its maximum at s, for all i. 2- For every local perturbation pi from s there exists a stable state s’ reachable by the actions of i such that g.i(s’)<=g.i(s) Why are these conditions unnecessary?

  13. Automatic Software Design Lab Sufficient Conditions (Cont’d) Theorem 2: ns is not a Nash Equilibrium wrt { g.i } if: There exists i with a second fixed point s’ directly reachable from s by a local perturbation of i. Why this is not necessary?

  14. Automatic Software Design Lab Absolute Nash Equilibrium(Sufficient Conditions) Theorem 3: s is a Nash Equilibrium w.r.t. any set of gain functions if: For every i, for every perturbation pi the system has a local action that returns it to state s.

  15. Automatic Software Design Lab Construction of Gain Functions Theorem 4: For any stabilizing distributed system: • A set of constant gain functions { g.i | g.i=ci} makes every fixed-point a Nash-Equilibrium

  16. Automatic Software Design Lab Construction of Gain Functions (Cont’d) Theorem 4(b): For any stabilizing distributed system: If there are two fixed points, s and s’, different only in one local variable of process j. We can make s’ a non-Nash Equilibrium by forcing a local perturbation from s’ to s with g.j(s’)<g.j(s)

  17. Automatic Software Design Lab Taxonomy based on Nash Equilibira

  18. Automatic Software Design Lab • Relatively Perturbation-Proof Systems • Relatively Perturbation-Prone Systems • Absolutely Perturbation-Proof Systems • Absolutely Perturbation-Prone Systems (empty)

  19. Automatic Software Design Lab Relatively Perturbation-Proof • A stabilizing system is relatively perturbation-proof iff: • There exists S={ g.i } such that every fixed-point is a Nash Equilibrium w.r.t S

  20. Automatic Software Design Lab Maximal Matching Bidirectional Ring m.i==i-1 && m.(i-1)==i-2  m.i:=i m.i==i+1 && m.(i+1)==i+2  m.i:=i m.i==i && m.(i-1)!=i-2 m.i:=i-1 m.i==i && m.(i+1)!=i+2  m.i:=i+1 g.i=0 if m.i==i g.i=1 otherwise Process i should match with one of its neighbors, otherwise it should keep its value to i.

  21. Automatic Software Design Lab Nash Equilibrium of Matching • If m.i !=i, and m.i is a fixed-point, then g.i=1. This is a maximum! From theorem 1(a), it is a Nash-Equilibrium • If m.i==i, g.i=0. But no perturbation will break a match, hence, m.i == i is restablished. • “Bidirectional Matching” is relatively perturbation proof

  22. Automatic Software Design Lab Relatively-Perturbation Prone • A stabilizing system is relatively perturbation-prone iff: • There exists S={ g.i } such that some fixed-point is a non-Nash Equilibrium w.r.t S • Use Theorem 4(b) to design such systems

  23. Automatic Software Design Lab Absolutely Perturbation-Proof • A stabilizing system is absolutely perturbation-proof iff: • For every S={ g.i }, every fixed-point is a Nash Equilibrium w.r.t S • Use Theorem 3 to design such systems

  24. Automatic Software Design Lab A subclass of absolutely perturbation proof systems Theorem 5: If a stabilizing system has only one fixed-point, it is absolutely-perturbation proof Why?

  25. Automatic Software Design Lab Absolutely Perturbation-Prone • A stabilizing system is absolutely perturbation-prone iff: • For every S={ g.i }, there exists a non-Nash Equilibrium fixed-point w.r.t S • Use Theorem 4(a) to show that no such system exists: we can always construct a set of gain functions to make every fixed-point a Nash-Equilibrium

  26. Automatic Software Design Lab Why?? Partial Order among Classes

  27. Automatic Software Design Lab Further Investigations • Given a set of gain functions, automatically transforming a perturbation-prone to a perturbation-proof system • Identify the perturbations leading to other equilibria with higher gains • Applicability of this concept to set of states rather than states (consider the notion of invariant) • How to come up with gain-functions representing the system progress properties

  28. Automatic Software Design Lab Further Readings • John F Nash, “Equilibrium point in n-person games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 36(1):48-49, 1950. • A. Arora & M. G. Gouda, “Closure and convergence: a foundation of fault-tolerant computing.” In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference On Fault-Tolerant Computing Systems

  29. Automatic Software Design Lab Thank you!

More Related