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Smart Card Introduction. Pieter Hartel. ( Read: K. M. Shelfer, J. D. Procaccino, Smart Card Evolution, CACM 45(7):83-88, Jul. 2002; D. Huseman, The Smart Card, IEEE Concurrency 7(2):24-27, Apr. 1999; D. Praca, C. Barral, From smart cards to smart objects,
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Smart Card Introduction Pieter Hartel ( Read: K. M. Shelfer, J. D. Procaccino, Smart Card Evolution, CACM 45(7):83-88, Jul. 2002; D. Huseman, The Smart Card, IEEE Concurrency 7(2):24-27, Apr. 1999; D. Praca, C. Barral, From smart cards to smart objects, Computer Networks, 36(4):381-389, Jul. 2001; Ch14 of R. Anderson, Security Engineering, Wiley, 2001)
Overview • Past: Phone card • Present: Java Card • Future: Multi function card
History • Dethloff (1968), Arimura (1970), Moreno (1974) • First chip by Motorola & Bull (1977) • France Telecom phone card (1984) • Java Card (1995) • SCIA: 2.8 Billion cards (2000)
Form factors 53.98 mm 85.6 mm 0.76 mm
What makes the card smart? • CPU (8-bit, 16/23 bit) • Memory (RAM, ROM, EEPROM/Flash) • I/O channel (Contact/Contact less) • Cryptographic co-processor • On card devices (Fingerprint, display) • Standards (ISO 7816, GSM, EMV, VOP, CEPS)
A variety of terminals • Embedded system • Standards (ISO 7816, PC/SC, OCF)
Applications • Bank card (*) • GSM SIM card > 200 Million (EU) • Health card > 100 Million (D, F) • Pay-TV > 100? Million (*) • ID card > 5 Million (USA) • Transport (HK) • Campus card (UK,…)
Considerations for use? • Value to be protected • On-line / off-line -- Mondex • What do we trust? • Management & flexibility • Tamper resistance • Mobility • Cost
Security features • Symmetric crypto fast • Asymmetric crypto slow • Hardware random number generator • Hardware tamper resistance (passive, active)
Research issues How many cards do you Have? Own? • Who owns the card? • Which logo? • Backups? • Privacy? • Attacks
Attacks – not specifically on smart cards • Operational problems: • Blackmail • Burglary • Bribery • Software bugs • Hardware attacks
Attacker classification (IBM) • I: Clever outsiders • II: Knowledgeable insiders • III: Funded Organisations
Low cost attacks (I) • Stop cancellation messages • Block EEPROM writes by isolating Vpp • Single step the processor
Sophisticated attacks (II or I) • Focused Ion beam • Microscope • Milling • Deposit conductors & Insulators • Can be rented for few hundred $ per hour
Protection • Know what to protect • Procedures • Protocols • Know who your opponents are • Security by obscurity does not work
Software • Java Card (to be continued) • Smart Cards for Windows • Basic card • Mondex • Proprietary
Future • Display • Biometrics • 32-bit CPU • Large memory • Battery • Comms
Communication • ISO 7816-4: typically 9600 bps • USB: PC based • Bluetooth: power www.fingerchip.com
Displays • Plastic/ glass • Emissive/ non-emissive • Refresh/ bi-stable • Segment/ dot-matrix/ graphic • Problems: connections, yield, power, thickness
Clock & Power • Cristal 0.6 mm/ MEMS • Problems: thickness, power density, when to recharge
Conclusions • Affordable tamper resistance technology • Versatile technology • Getting it right is difficult
Assignment • Do you have a problem that smartcards can help solve? • Each to write idea(s) on post-it • Group post-its • Give the requirements • Sketch a specification • Calculate the cost