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Module 1: Evolution and Economics. The Development of Economic Systems. From an Evolutionary Perspective…. Isolate the basic biological aspects. Explore how it has been altered throughout a species’ (our) evolutionary heritage. economics.
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Module 1:Evolution and Economics The Development of Economic Systems
From an Evolutionary Perspective… • Isolate the basic biological aspects. • Explore how it has been altered throughout a species’ (our) evolutionary heritage.
economics 2. The branch of knowledge (now regarded as one of the social sciences) that deals with the production, distribution, consumption, and transfer of wealth; the application of this discipline to a particular sphere; (also) the condition of a state, etc., as regards material prosperity; the financial considerations attaching to a particular activity, commodity, etc.
Game Theory and Biology:Optimal Foraging Theory E = 500 cal. T = 15 min. E = 250 cal. T = 5 min. ?
Game Theory and Biology:Optimal Foraging Theory Eaten: Only
Game Theory and Biology:Optimal Foraging Theory Eaten: Only
Game Theory and Biology:One-on-One Interactions • John Maynard Smith: • Hawk-Dove Models
D H ½ Food D H
D H ½ Food Nada D H
D H ½ Food Nada D Food H
D H ½ Food Nada D ½ Food Minus Cost Food H
Relative Fitness • Graph
Game Theory and Biology:One-on-One Interactions • Tit-for-Tat strategy cooperates with cooperators and defects on defectors.
T H ½ Food T H
T H ½ Food Minus Cost ½ Food T H
D H ½ Food Minus Cost ½ Food D ½ Food Minus Cost H
D H ½ Food Minus Cost ½ Food D ½ Food Minus Cost ½ Food Minus Cost H
Game Theory and Biology:Why Begin Cooperating? E = 4000 cal. T Alone = N/A T w/Help = 30 min. E = 500 cal. T = 20 min. ?
Evolutionary Game Theory:Ultimatum Game Player 1 Player 2 Or Player 2 can refuse the offer, and no one gets any money. Player 1 can then give as much or as little of the money as he or she wants to Player 2. Player 2 can approve of the amount given, and both keep the money.
Quichua • Individual farmers of the Amazon Basin.
Lamalera • Whale hunters from Indonesia.
Kazakh • Pastors of Mongolia.
Au and Gnau • Foraging peoples from New Guinea.
What Explains the Variation? Social Dependency Social Integration
Using the Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma • First Mover: Plays “blindly” • Second Mover: Plays with knowledge of first mover’s behavior.
Using the Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma • 1) How would you play as a first mover? • 2) How would you play as a second mover if your partner cooperated? • 3) How would you play as a second mover is your partner did not cooperate?
Predictors of Cooperation:A World in a City Social Dependency Inverse of Median Income Social Integration N’bhd Quality
Predictors of Cooperation:In-Class Study #1 Social Dependency Risk Taking Behavior Social Integration Trusting People
How to Maintain Cooperation?:Punishment • Moralistic Punishers • Prosocial individuals who also punish. • Selfish Punishers • Individuals who are generally selfish but punish other selfish individuals.