State and Local Public Finance Professor Yinger Spring 2019

State and Local Public FinanceProfessor YingerSpring 2019 Lecture 5 Public Sector Costs: Policy

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Class Outline • Baumol’s Disease • Evaluating Policies to Promote Productive Efficiency • The Role of Competition

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Baumol’s Disease • Today we will discuss ways to promote productive efficiency in the public sector. • Before turning to this topic, however, we will gain some perspective on it by discussing something called “Baumol’s Disease.” • This is a misnomer—it’s not really such a bad thing!

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Baumol’s Assumptions • In 1967, an economist named Baumol (my micro professor) analyzed a 2-sector economy. • His model has four key assumptions: • One sector has productivity gains, the other does not • The labor market is competitive, so the wage in each sector must equal MRP (also called VMP). • Labor is mobile between sectors. • The demand for goods in the unproductive sector is inelastic (as estimated for local governments!)

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Baumol’s Conclusions • Wages rise with labor productivity in the productive sector • but also must rise in the unproductive sector because of labor mobility. • This leads to some startling conclusions: • The relative cost of goods in the unproductive sector steadily rises. • Employment steadily shifts into the unproductive sector.

S1 Wage S S0 W1 W0 MRP1 MRP MRP0 L0 L1Labor L1 L0Labor Sector with Productivity Gain Sector without Productivity Gain State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Mobility Between Sectors • First, what happens in the labor market when productivity rises [MRP=(PQ)(MPL)]:

MC1 MC1 $ MC0 $ P1 MC0 P1 P0 P0 Demand Demand Q1 Q0Q S1S0S Sector with Productivity Gain Sector without Productivity Gain State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Responses to Price Increases • Second, consider what happens in product markets when labor costs rise: Big change in P Little or no change in P

S1 S1 S0 Wage W1 MRP2 W0 MRP1 MRP0 MRP1 L0L2L1Labor L1 L0L2Labor Sector without Productivity Gain Sector with Productivity Gain State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Net Impacts in Labor Markets • Third, go back to labor markets to consider price increases MRP=(PQ)(MPL)]:

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Leviathan? • Spending and employment in state and local government have been steadily rising for decades. • Some commentators say this is evidence of leviathan—of increasing inefficiency by bureaucrats. • Their policy prescription is to boost accountability programs and privatization.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Interpreting Baumol’s Disease • But a more likely explanation is that these trends reflect “Baumol’s Disease,” • Which is nothing more than an inter-sector shift as productivity gains make a society richer. • In this view, the cost of the public sector does increase over time, but this trend just preserves levels of local public services—and we can afford it!

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Other Examples of Baumol’s Disease • Baumol’s disease does not apply only to public services. • Several scholars have applied it to the arts: • Technology cannot replace the actors in one of Shakespeare’s plays. • A column in the New York Times applies it to higher education: • Mankiw, “Three Reasons for those Hefty College Bills” http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/upshot/three-reasons-for-those-hefty-college-tuition-bills.html?hpw&rref=upshot&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=well-region&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=bottom-well&_r=0

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Boosting Productive Efficiency • Regardless of the role played by “Baumol’s Disease,” productive efficiency is a good thing. • So how can public officials lower costs and hence cut taxes (or raise service quality without raising costs)? • The answer: • Observe • Experiment • Evaluate!

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Step 1: Use Your Judgment • Formal evaluation of programs or management reforms are usually not available. • Thus, it is appropriate for you (when you become public officials!) touse your own judgment: • to select programs and reforms that appear to have worked in other places; • to design new programs and reforms.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Step 2: Use Evaluation Studies and Principles • But evaluation should always be in the back of your mind. • Search for evaluations of the programs or reforms you are interested in. • Make an honest judgment about the quality of existing evaluations. • Informally apply basic evaluation principles to programs and reforms you are considering. • Implement formal evaluations whenever possible!

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Further Reading • For more on evidence-based policy making, see • Commission on Evidence-Based Policy Making, “The Promise of Evidence-based Policy Making.” https://www.cep.gov/content/dam/cep/report/cep-final-report.pdf . • Sara Dube and Darcy White, “ Key Findings from 50-State Assessment of Evidence-Based Policy Making.” http://www.routefifty.com/2017/01/key-findings-50-state-assessment-evidence-based-policymaking/135042/?oref=rf-home-latest-top . • Gordon Berlin, “Comments to the Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking.”https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/CEP_comments_MDRC_111416.pdf.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy The With-Without Principle • What is the basic problem facing someone wanting to evaluate any public program? • What you want is to know how one place differs with and without the program. • What you observe is either (a) what the world is like after and before the program or (b) what one place is like with the program and another is without it. • Thus, you cannot be sure that the effects you observe are not due to non-program differences over time or across places.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Approaches to Program Evaluation • The two ways to solve this problem are: • random assignment • statistical control • Random assignment insures that differences across time and place are not correlated with program. • Statistical controls can account for observable (and some unobservable!) differences across place or time.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Random Assignment • Random assignment is the preferred method in most cases. • It provides results that are intuitively compelling and scientifically sound. • If you believe in cutting costs, become an advocate for evaluation using random assignment! • However, results from a random assignment study may not apply to different circumstances. • A random-assignment finding that lower class size boosts student performance (holding teacher quality constant) does not imply that student performance will improve if low-quality teachers are hired to bring class sizes down.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Random Assignment Examples • Random assignment has been used to study (among other things): • Welfare-to-work programs • Unemployment insurance • Job training • Income maintenance • Housing assistance • Electricity pricing • Education (e.g. Charter Schools) • Early childhood development • Criminal justice policy • Child health and nutrition

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Statistical Studies • Random assignment is not always feasible. • The best statistical studies: • Must have extensive data to ensure that differences aren’t due to unobservable factors. • Must have comparable treatment and control groups based on observable factors, which often requires new “matching” methods. • May have multiple observations over time so they can “difference out” unobservable factors.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Statistical Studies, 2 • High quality research designs include: • Difference in differences: Is the change over time in a key outcome greater in the treated location than in a comparable location where the program was not implemented. • Regression discontinuity: Were outcomes significantly different for people who were just above an eligibility cut-off (and hence participated in the program) than for those who were just below the cut-off (and hence did not get in).

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Competition and Costs • You all learned in micro-economics how private prices are driven down by competition. • With some important qualifications, the same lesson applies in the public sector. • Three issues are particularly important.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Provision vs. Production • Issue 1: The distinction between provision and production • Each unit of government is legally obligated to provide certain services, i.e. to ensure that these services are available. • In many cases, however, the unit of government responsible for provision does not actually have to produce the service itself.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Production Examples • Production Arrangements Include: • Contracting out to a private firm • Contracting out to another government agency • Outsourcing, i.e. purchasing from a private company • Use of vouchers to finance private production • Intergovernmental cooperation (to gain economies of scale)

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Competition vs. Privatization • Issue 2: The Distinction Between Competition and Privatization • Competition generates incentives to cut costs so as to maintain business, funding, or reputation. • Privatization substitutes private incentives (profit) for public incentives (public service). • They do not necessarily go together.

Public Private Monopoly Public Agency Private Electric Company No-bid Contract Competition Charter Schools Public School Vouchers Private School Vouchers Bids & Contracts State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Alternatives to Public Delivery by One Agency • Consider the following ways to move away from delivery by a single public agency:

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy The Benefits and Costs of Privatization • Although competition is likely to cut costs, the impact of privatization on costs is not so clear: • Private firms are probably more likely to innovate because it boosts their profits. • But private firms are also more likely to cut corners or to neglect social concerns—if their contract allows—in order to boost profits.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Defining Performance • Issue 3: The Need for a Clear Definition of Performance • The key to harnessing competition and private firms’ desire for profits is to write a contract that: • Specifies performance standards • Provides clear incentives to meet those standards

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy The Requirements for Successful Privatization • Contracting out to private firms can work well if: • The relevant market is competitive and bidding is possible • The performance objectives can be clearly specified in the contract • A firm’s performance can be monitored • Financial rewards and/or penalties can be written into the contract, too.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Incomplete Contracts • The2016 Nobel prize in economics was awarded to Oliver Hart (my graduate school classmate!) for his work on contracts. • A key concept in his work is the notion of incomplete contracts. • If the contract cannot be fully specified, particularly with respect to the quality of service, then it matters who controls decisions that impact production costs. • If the government is the provider contracting with a private producer, then the government can approve or deny a money-saving policy, based on its impact on service quality. • With privatization, the firm has the control rights and can implement money-saving policies even if they damage service quality (at least service quality that is not completely specified in the contract). • Hart and his co-authors argue, for example, that privatization is not a good idea for prisons because contracts are inevitably incomplete.

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Documenting Cost Savings • Big Problem Number 1: • Cost savings are almost impossible to document. • Cost savings only exist when full costs are lower, holding performance constant. • But many costs are hidden. • And performance usually cannot be measured. • Beware of cost-savings claims!

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy The Role of Politics • Big Problem Number 2: • Contracting to private firms often yields political benefits (i.e., campaign contributions from the firms in the industry) even when it does not boost efficiency. • In the case of services with well-funded lobbying activities and/or voiceless beneficiaries, contracting is likely to go too far. • Be careful with this tool!

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy The Role of Politics, Continued • Loss of Sovereignty • Politicians desperate for short-term savings may go too far. • “First, ‘compensation event’ clauses require the government to pay the contractor when certain triggering events occur, such as an emergency road closure. • Second, non-compete clauses prevent the government from building or repairing competing infrastructure. • Third, adverse action clauses allow the contractor to retain the right to object to government decisions that affect the profitability of the contract.” • Source: Matthew Titolo, “Leasing Sovereignty: On State Infrastructure Contracts,” University of Richmond Law Review, 2013, pp. 631-693. http://lawreview.richmond.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Titolo-472.pdf

State and Local Public FinanceLecture 5: Public Sector Costs: Policy Further Reading • A Nice Overview: • http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/business/when-privatization-works-and-why-it-doesnt-always.html?_r=0 • Examples of Privatization that Went Wrong • Private Prisons: • https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/us/private-prisons-escapes-riots.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news • http://www.thenation.com/article/end-abuse-in-our-privatized-immigrant-only-prisons/ • Private Highway: • http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/how-virginia-paid-more-than-250-million-for-a-road-that-never-got-built/2015/05/30/39a1a222-062d-11e5-a428-c984eb077d4e_story.html?tid=hpModule_13097a0c-868e-11e2-9d71-f0feafdd1394&hpid=z12

State and Local Public Finance Professor Yinger Spring 2019