Einführung in die Theoretische Philosophie: Sprachphilosophie

1. Einführung in die Theoretische Philosophie: Sprachphilosophie Nathan Wildman nathan.wildman@uni-hamburg.de

2. Kripke’sA Puzzle About Belief

3. The Plan • A Quick Review of Kripke’s Objections to Descriptivism • Kripke’s Positive Story • Causal Theory of Reference • Rigid Designation & the Meaning of Singular Terms • A return to the Naïve Theory & the Six Puzzles • Kripke’s new Puzzle about Belief • Some conclusions about Singular Terms

4. 3 + 1 Distinctions Three dimensions upon which statements can vary: • Semantic – Analytic vs. Synthetic • Epistemic – A priori vs. A posteriori • Metaphysical – Necessary vs. Contingent Two roles descriptions can play: • Fixing reference of singular terms • Giving meaning of singular terms

5. Descriptivism Detailed Descriptivist theory of proper names : • Every name ‘n’is associated with a description D that x believes is true of n • Speaker x believes that Dis satisfied by a unique individual • If y satisfies D, then y is the referent of ‘n’ • If nothing satisfies D, ‘n’ doesn’t refer • The sentence ‘n is D’ is known a priori by x • The sentence ‘n is D’ as uttered by x expresses a necessary truth NOTE: SIMPLIFIED FOR PRESENTATION

6. Descriptivism Detailed (C) D must be chosen in such a way that there is no circularity (i.e. no use of the notion of reference) CIR: For any theory of proper names T, if T tells us that a name n is associated with a description d that expresses a cluster of properties φ, either: (i) φ must not include the property being called n, (ii) φ does include the property being called n but it is possible to eliminate being called n from φ, or (iii) T is circular

7. Descriptivism Detailed If φ includes the property is called the name ‘n’, then that theory would amount to telling us that a person P has the property is called the name ‘n’ just in case S is the referent of n Aristotle is called ‘Aristotle’ iffhe’s called ‘Aristotle’ If one was determining the referent of a name like ‘Glunk’ to himself and made the following decision, ‘I shall use the term ‘Glunk’ to refer to the man that I call ‘Glunk’,’, this would get one nowhere. One had better have some independent determination of the referent of ‘Glunk’. [Kripke, N&N, p. 295]

8. Modal Objection to (6) …it is a contingent fact that Aristotle ever did any of the things commonly attributed to him today, any of these great achievements that we so much admire. [KripkeN&N, p. 296] • If a description D gives the semantic content of a proper name n, then the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘if n exists, then n is D’ is necessary • It is possible that n exists and fails to satisfy D • Therefore, ‘if n exists, then n is D’ is contingent • Therefore, (6) is false

9. Semantic Objection to (3) Does ‘Gödel’ refer to Gödel, or to Schmidt? • From (3), if a description D gives the semantic content of a proper name n, then the thing that satisfies D necessarily is the referent of ‘n’ • Possibly, an object a satisfies D, but is not the referent of n; instead, object b is the referent of n • Therefore, what satisfies Dmight not be the referent of ‘n’ • Therefore, (3) is false

10. Knowledge Objection to (2), (4), & (5) (5) The sentence ‘n is D’ is known a priori by x Even if we are competent users of the name, we’re not in a position to know the following a priori • If anyone is Gödel, he discovered the incompleteness • If anyone discovered incompleteness, he is Gödel (4) If nothing satisfies D, ‘n’ doesn’t refer It seems possible that the referent of ‘n’ exists despite the fact that there is nothing satisfies D – ‘Gödel’ would still refer to Gödel, even if nobody proved the incompleteness of arithmetic!

11. Knowledge Objection to (2), (4), & (5) (2) Speakerx believes that D is satisfied by a unique individual The descriptions people actually associate with proper names simply aren’t specific enough! F ‘Feynman’ means ‘The famous physicist’ Fails to distinguish Feynman uniquely from Einstein, Gell-Mann, Hawking, etc.

12. The Plan • A Quick Review of Kripke’s Objections to Descriptivism • Kripke’s Positive Story • Causal Theory of Reference • Rigid Designation & the Meaning of Singular Terms • A return to the Naïve Theory & the Six Puzzles • Kripke’s new Puzzle about Belief • Some conclusions about Singular Terms

13. Where from Here? If descriptivism is wrong, two new questions: Reference: What determines what (if anything) a name refers to? • The causal theory of reference Meaning:What is the meaning of a name? • Names are rigid designators • A reversion to Millianism (i.e. the Naïve theory)?

14. Causal Theory of Reference Reference: What determines what (if anything) a name refers to? It’s in virtue of our connection with other speakers in the community, going back to the referent himself, that we refer to a certain man Baptism: how a name first comes to refer to a thing: • by ostension– point at it and say ‘I name that ‘n’’ • by description – describe it (a la ‘Hesperus’) The causal chain: after baptism, the name can be transmitted to othersvia suitable causal links

15. Causal Theory of Reference An utterance of a proper name ‘n’ refers to x iff • the utterance is at the end of a sequence of utterances of ‘n’the first member of which is an initial baptism of ‘n’; and • every other member of which is ‘properly linked’ via a causal chain to the previous member

16. Causal Theory of Reference This is my friend Harry Adamson

17. Causal Theory of Reference • When Harry was born, his parents named him ‘Harry Adamson’. This was a baptism! • They told their friends & family, who came to use ‘Harry’ to refer to Harry in virtue of standing in a causal connection to the initial baptizer's usage • My usage of ‘Harry Adamson’: refers to Harry in virtue of my standing in a appropriate causal connection to previous proper users of ‘Harry’ • You usage of ‘Harry Adamson’ refers to Harry because you’re part of the causal chain too!

18. Causal Theory of Reference A Potential Problem Case: ‘Madagascar’ Gareth Evans – The Causal Theory of Reference • Originally used to refer to part of mainland Africa • Marco Polo misunderstood and used the term to refer to an island off the coast of Africa • Was there a new baptism? • Can there be unknowing baptisms? • Does ‘Madagascar’ refer to Madagascar?

19. Rigid Designation Names are rigid designators – they refer to the same thing in every possible world • Regardless of how different the object might be! • Serena Williams & The Brave Little Toaster • Adam@ & Noah@, ‘Adamwn’& ‘Noahwn’ • Chisholm’s ‘Paradox’

20. Necessary A Posteriori The necessarya posteriori The ancients believed the Morning Star (Phosphorous) and the Evening Star (Hesperus) were distinct stars, though they are the planet Venus. • ‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’ is a posteriori • Empirical discovery of it’s truth • ‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’ is necessary • Names are rigid designators which necessarily co-refer

21. Necessary A Posteriori Perhaps Ancients said: PPossibly, Hesperus is not Phosphorous • Sis epistemicallypossible for yiffy’s evidence doesn’t rule it out • Sis metaphysically possible iffS might be the case PE For all we know, Hesperus is not Phosphorus • True, depends upon available astronomical information PM Possibly, Hesperus is not Phosphorus • False, determined by rigid designation & necessity of =

22. Contingent A Priori The contingenta priori Suppose we fix the reference of ‘meter’ by claiming that 1 meter is the length of stick S at time t0. • It is a priori that S is 1 meter long– ‘1 meter’ is a rigid designator, the reference of which is fixed as the (actual) length of S at t0! • It is contingent that S is 1 meter long– S could have been longer or shorter than it was at t0!

23. The Plan • A Quick Review of Kripke’s Objections to Descriptivism • Kripke’s Positive Story • Causal Theory of Reference • Rigid Designation & the Meaning of Singular Terms • A return to the Naïve Theory & the Six Puzzles • Kripke’s new Puzzle about Belief • Some conclusions about Singular Terms

24. The Puzzles (AGAIN) • Frege’sPuzzle: How can two identity statements differ in cognitive value, if the terms involved refer to the same thing? • Predicational Puzzle: How can two predicational statements differ in cognitive value, if the singular terms involved refer to the same thing? • Substitution Puzzle: How can a = b but ‘S believes that a is F’ not mean the same as ‘S believes that b is F’?

25. The Puzzles (AGAIN) • Empty Names Puzzle: how can ‘a is F’ be meaningful when ‘a’ stands for a non-existing or fictional entity? • Law of Excluded Middle: How can it be that, for any formula ϕ, (ϕ V ϕ)? • Negative Existentials Puzzle: How can ‘a does not exist’ be true?

26. The Puzzles Note that (1) – (3) concern cognitive value Meanwhile, (4) – (6) concern talk of non-existents • It was the failure of the Naïve theory to solve the first three puzzles that pushed us towards giving it up • Kripke’saim in A Puzzle About Belief: Show that the failure to address (1) – (3) isn’t a failure of the Naïve theory. • These are puzzles, not objections!

27. The Plan • A Quick Review of Kripke’s Objections to Descriptivism • Kripke’s Positive Story • Causal Theory of Reference • Rigid Designation & the Meaning of Singular Terms • A return to the Naïve Theory & the Six Puzzles • Kripke’s new Puzzle about Belief • Some conclusions about Singular Terms

28. The Millian spirit of Naming & Necessity Mill on proper name: A proper name simply refers to its bearer, and has no other linguistic function Millianism: For all names n and m, if n & m co-designate, then the semantic value of n is identical to the semantic value of m • A consequence: co-referringnames are substitutable in all contexts SUB: For all names n & m , if n & m co-designate, then the proposition expressed by ‘Φn’ = the proposition expressed by ‘Φm’

29. The Millian spirit of Naming & Necessity Two potential problem cases • Modal Contexts – Necessarily, n is F • Belief Contexts – x believes that n is F SUB-B: For all names n & m, if n & m co-designate, then sentences of the form ⌜x believes Fn⌝and ⌜x believes Fm⌝have the same truth-value

30. The Millian spirit of Naming & Necessity SUB-B is false • ‘Tom believes Tully denounced Catiline’ – True • ‘Tom believes Cicero denounced Catiline’ – False So it seems clear that co-designative proper names are not interchangeable in belief contexts. It also seems clear that there must be two distinct propositions or contents expressed by ‘Cicero denounced Catiline’ and ‘Tully denounced Catiline’. How else can Tom believe one and deny the other? And the difference in propositions thus expressed can only come from a difference in sense between ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’. Such a conclusion agrees with a Fregean theory and seems to be incompatible with a purely Millian view. [Kripke, APB, p. 243]

31. The Millian spirit of Naming & Necessity Supports an argument for Fregean view? • Co-designative names are not interchangeable in belief contexts • Failure of interchangeability of proper names arises from a difference in the defining description the speaker associates with these names • Therefore, different names have different descriptions (i.e. senses) associated with them

32. The Millian spirit of Naming & Necessity Three Problems for ‘Fregean’ View • Community-wide senses or idiolect senses? • Former don’t seem fine-grained enough • Latter give rise to problems (e.g. we can’t say, ‘Everyone knows that Aristotle was a philosopher’) • Impoverished senses (the sense of ‘Feynman’ & ‘Gell-man’ are the same for most speakers) • Mates' puzzle: even synonyms don't seem to be substitutable in all belief contexts! • Whoever believes that doctors are wealthy believes that physiciansare wealthy • Whoever believes that doctors are wealthy believes that doctors are wealthy

33. The Millian spirit of Naming & Necessity FOR Ia: After further thought, however, the Fregean conclusion appears less obvious. Just as people are said to have been unaware at one time of the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus, so a normal speaker of English apparently may not know that Cicero is Tully, or that Holland is the Netherlands. For he may sincerely assent to ‘Cicero was lazy,’ while dissenting from ‘Tully was lazy,’ or he may sincerely assent to ‘Holland is a beautiful country,’ while dissenting from ‘The Netherlands is a beautiful country.’ In the case of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus,’ it seemed plausible to account for the parallel situation by supposing that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ fixed their (rigid) references to a single object in two conventionally different ways, one as the ‘evening star’ and one as the ‘morning star.’ But what corresponding conventional ‘senses,’ even taking ‘senses’ to be ‘modes of fixing the reference rigidly,’ can plausibly be supposed to exist for ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ (or ‘Holland’ and ‘the Netherlands’)? Are not these just two names (in English) for the same man? Is there any special conventional, community-wide ‘connotation’ in the one lacking in the other? I am unaware of any. [Kripke, APB]

34. The Millian spirit of Naming & Necessity FOR Ib: …according to the view we are now entertaining, one cannot say, ‘Some people are unaware that Cicero is Tully.’ For, according to this view, there is no single proposition denoted by the ‘that’ clause, that the community of normal English speakers expresses by ‘Cicero is Tully.’ Some—for example, those who define both ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ as ‘the author of De Fato’—use it to express a trivial self-identity. Others use it to express the proposition that the man who satisfied one description (say, that he denounced Catiline) is one and the same as the man who satisfied another (say, that his speech was Greek to Cassius). There is no single fact, ‘that Cicero is Tully,’ known by some but not all members of the community. [Kripke, APB]

35. The Millian spirit of Naming & Necessity Kripke isn’t trying to refute the Fregeanaccount Rather he is trying to show that problems about belief (and/or belief ascription) arise without invoking a Millianprinciple of substitution Upshot: puzzles about belief by themselves can’t be used against the Millianaccount – they are genuine puzzles, rather than an objection to the Naïve view!

36. General Principles • Assent indicates belief: Jones assents to ‘Cicero was bald’, so Jones believes that Cicero was bald, he assents to ‘Tully was not bald’, so Jones believes that Tully was not bald. Disquotation principle (D): If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to ‘P‘, she believes that P Note: distinct disquotation principles for each language! (French) disquotationprinciple: Si un orateur francais normal, à la reflexionconsent sincerement‘P’, puis elle croit que P

37. General Principles • Failure to assent indicates lack of belief – Jones fails to assent to ‘Tully was bald’, so it is not the case that Jones believes that Tully was bald Strengthened disquotation principle (SD) A normal English speaker (who is not reticent) will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to ‘P’ if and only if she believes that P

38. General Principles • A true sentence remains true when we translate it into another language … of course we ordinarily allow ourselves to draw conclusions, stated in English, about the beliefs of speakers of any language: we infer that Pierre believes that God exists from his sincere reflective assent to ‘Dieuexiste.’ [Kripke, APB] Principle of Translation (T) If a sentence P in language L expresses a truth in L, then any translation of P into any other language L*also expresses a truth in L*

39. General Principles D + Millainism entails an absurdity • Jones believes that Tully was bald; & • Jones believes that Tully was not bald. SD + Millainism entails a contradiction • Jones believes that Tully was bald; & • It is not that case that Jones believes that Tully was bald. Kripke is going to derive similar undesirable results without Millianism

40. Case 1: Pierre & London Suppose Pierre is a normal French speaker who lives in France and speaks not a word language except French. He has heard the famous distant city, London (which he calls ‘Londres’) though he himself has never left France. On the basis of what he has heard of London, he is inclined to think that it is pretty. So he assents to the French sentence: ‘Londresestjolie.’

41. Case 1: Pierre & London Later, Pierre moves to a part of London with fairly uneducated inhabitants (Highbury), so he must learn English by direct method, without using any translation Eventually, he starts to pick up English. In particular, everyone speaks of ‘London’, where they all live. Pierre's surroundings are unattractive, so he is inclined to assent to the English sentence: ‘London is not pretty.’

42. Case 1: Pierre & London • Pierre sincerely assents to 'Londresestjolie' • Pierre croit que Londres est jolie. (By French version of D) • 'Pierre believes that London is pretty' is a translation into English of the French sentence in (2) • Pierre believes that London is pretty [by (2), (3), & T] • Pierre sincerely assents to 'London is not pretty' • Pierre believes that London is not pretty (By English version of D) • Pierre believes that London is pretty and believes that London is not pretty [by (4)and (6)]

43. Case 1: Pierre & London • Pierre sincerely assents to 'Londresestjolie' • Pierre croit que Londres est jolie. (By French version of D) • 'Pierre believes that London is pretty' is a translation into English of the French sentence in 2) • Pierre believes that London is pretty. [by 2), 3), & T] • Pierre is not disposed to assent to 'London is pretty' • Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. (By English version of SD) • Pierre does and does not believe that London is pretty [by 4)and 6)]

44. Case 1: Pierre & London There are a limited number of possible responses to this argument: (a) Reject(3) (b) RejectDisquotation (c) RejectTranslation (d) Accept (7), and endorse the argument The puzzle is that none of the responses look acceptable

45. Case 1: Pierre & London Against (d): We can't accept the conclusion, since Pierre is rational – we shouldn't take him to believe something and its negation [Pierre] lacks information, not logical acumen. He cannot be convicted of inconsistency: to do so is incorrect. [Kripke, APB] • There seems to be some sense in which Pierre's beliefs are inconsistent – they can't both be true. But there's also a sense in which his view of the world is coherent

46. Case 1: Pierre & London Against (c): we can't reject T, since the whole point of translation is to preserve meaning – if two sentences mean the same thing, then they're true under the same circumstances. Quine might dispute this point, but perhaps we can come back to it in the very last week…

47. Case 1: Pierre & London Against (b): We could try to reject D, but the principle does seem self-evident. Would we merely restrict it? If so, to what cases? Suppose we refused to use Dto infer from Pierre's assent to 'Londresestjolie' that Pierre believes that London is pretty. Presumably, we'd then have to think that Pierre used to believe that London is pretty, but changed his mind. But whendid he change his mind?

48. Case 1: Pierre & London Alternatively, we might think that Pierre never believed that London was pretty. But why not? Does what he believes now somehow weirdly depend depends on what happens later in his life? ▪ Suppose on the other hand that we refused to use Dto infer from Pierre's assent to 'London is not pretty' that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. Why wasn't he able to acquire this belief? We'd count anyone else in a similar state of mind as believing that London is not pretty. What’s special about this case?

49. Case 1: Pierre & London Against (a): We can't reject (3) without implausibly ruling that no sentence containing a name has a translation in any other language. Furthermore, a similar paradox arises without (3) or T! This brings us to Case 2: Peter & Paderewski

50. Case 2: Peter & Paderewski Suppose Peter learns the name ‘Paderewski’ as picking out a famous pianist. This leads Peter to assent to: ‘Paderewski had musical talent’ Later, in a different context, Peter learns of someone called ‘Paderewski’ who was a Polish nationalist leader and Prime Minister. Peter is skeptical of the musical abilities of politicians so, using ‘Paderewski' as a name for the statesman, Peter assents to, ‘Paderewski had no musical talent’