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Public Goods and Social Contracts

Public Goods and Social Contracts. Karl Sigmund University of Vienna and IIASA, Laxenburg. Evolutionary games with cultural transmission. Simple cases. Prisoner‘s Dilemma . Example : Mutual A id Game . Example : Mutual A id Game . Mutual A id G ame.

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Public Goods and Social Contracts

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  1. Public GoodsandSocialContracts Karl Sigmund University of Vienna and IIASA, Laxenburg

  2. Evolutionarygameswithculturaltransmission

  3. Simple cases

  4. Prisoner‘s Dilemma

  5. Example: Mutual AidGame

  6. Example: Mutual Aid Game

  7. Mutual AidGame • For 2-player groups, PD game Reciprocationhelps (sometimes) toovercomethesocialdilemma • But whatifmorethan 2 players? • Manyeconomicexperiments in gamelabs

  8. Herrmann, Thöni, Gächter (Nature 2009)

  9. Peer Punishment (self-justice) Players canimposefine After everyround (at an owncost) leverage

  10. Fehr andGächter (Nature 2002)

  11. Costly Peer Punishment Tobe a punisheriscostly Opportunityforsecond-order free-riders (whocontributeto Mutual Aid, but not topunishment) They do betterthanpunishersiffree-riders around (andequallywellif not)

  12. Peer Punishmentvanishes Infinite population Strong selection Stationarydistribution: 100 percentfreeriders

  13. Peer Punishmentvanishes

  14. Optional Mutual AidGame

  15. Optional Mutual AidGame

  16. Optional Mutual Aid

  17. Optional Public Good game

  18. Optional, withpeerpunishment

  19. Peer Punishment

  20. Peer Punishment

  21. VoluntaryvsCompulsory Games

  22. Peer punishment? Reputation effects (Hauert, Hilbe, Barclay) Consensus (Boyd, Gintis, Ertan, Puttermann…) Asocialpunishment (Herrmann, Gächter, Nikiforakis…) Hardlyanysecondorderpunishment Little peerpunishmentoffreeriders (Guala)

  23. Peer punishment? Counter-punishment, asocialpunishment John Locke (Twotreatises on government, 1689): ‚…resistance (bydefaulters) manytimesmakesthepunishmentdangerous, andfrequentlydestructive, tothosewhoattemptit‘.

  24. Pool punishment Sanctioninginstitutionreplacesself-justice Yamagishi (1986): Players contributetopunishmentfunds beforethe Mutual Aidgame Defectorspayfine Bistabilityifcompulsory

  25. Optional Pool Punishment

  26. Optional Pool Punishment

  27. Competition of pool with peer Second orderfreeriders, Free riders, Non-participants, Peer punisher Pool punisher: withoutsecondorder punishment stationarydistribution

  28. Competitionofpoolwithpeer

  29. Without or with second order punishment Sigmund, DeSilva,Hauert, Traulsen (Nature 2010)

  30. Mutual coercion, mutuallyagreed Whether in conditionsofanarchy (peerpunishment, i.e. self-justice) Orifinstitutionsprovidethesanctions, voluntaryparticipationpromotescooperation self-committment No rational deliberation, just sociallearning

  31. Du ContratSocial Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) ‚L‘hommeestnélibre, et les hommessont partout dans les fers.‘

  32. Experiments? Experimental Economics (2013) The evolutionofsanctioninginstitutions. An experimental approachtothesocialcontract (withBoyu Zhang, Cong Li, Hannelore DeSilva, Peter Bednarik)

  33. Other experiments on Peer vs Pool Traulsen, Röhl, Milinski (Proc. Royal Soc. B, 2012) Kamei, Putterman, Tyran (preprint 2011) Markussen, Putterman, Tyran (preprint 2011) ‚Formal‘ vs. ‚Informal‘ sanctions

  34. On offer: Peer Punishment • Players seenumberoffreeriders • Can decide: Punishfreerider? Itcosts a punisher 0.5 MU (Monetaryunits) tosubstract 1 MU from a freerider

  35. On offer: Pool Punishment Alternatives: • Contributenothing (Freerider) • Contribute 1 MU to Mutual Aid Game (2nd orderfreerider) • Contribute 1 MU to Mutual Aid Game AND 0.5 MU toPunishment Pool (punisher) (foreach 0.5 toPunishmentPool, eachfreeriderisfined 1 MU) Twoversions: First andsecondorderpunishment

  36. 25 practicerounds • 5 rounds (a) Mutual Aidwithoutpunishment • 5 rounds (b) Mutual Aidwithpeerpunishment • 5 rounds (c) Mutual Aidwithpoolpunishment • 10 roundsfullgame: choicebetween (a),(b),(c) and (d) (noparticipation)

  37. 50 roundsexperiment 9 groupsof 12-14 play first-order version 9 groupsof 12-14 playsecond-order version

  38. 50 roundsexperiment 9 groupsof 12-14 play first-order version 9 groupsof 12-14 playsecond-order version 6 end upwithpeerregime: 3 fromeachversion 6 end upwithpoolregime: all second-order

  39. Parallel histories

  40. Time evolution

  41. Contributionto Mutual Aid

  42. Sociallearningofsocialcontract • Decisionstoswitch: 70 percenttohigherpayoff • Decisions NOT toswitch: 76 percenthad optimal payoff • After optimal payoff: 81 percentdo not switch

  43. Sociallearningofsocialcontract ‚sociallearner‘ ifat least 90 percentofdecisions canbeexplainedasswitchingtowardshigherpayoff, orstickingwith optimal payoff • 80 percentofplayerssociallearners

  44. Sanctioninginstitutions

  45. Self-domestication? Blumenbach (1752-1840): Humansas ‚themostperfectdomesticanimal‘ Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989) ‚Verhausschweinung‘ (Fatbelly, soft skin, neoteny, infantility)

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