Dr. Yuan-Chieh C hang/ 張元杰博士 Visiting scholar, Tsing Hua University, Beijing

1. The determinants of academic entrepreneurial performance in Taiwan: the institutional and resource-based perspective Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang/張元杰博士 Visiting scholar, Tsing Hua University, Beijing Associate Professor, Institute of Technology Management National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu

2. Research Outline • Introduction • Research Gap and Objectives • Conceptual background • Institutional perspective • Resource-based perspective • Methods • Findings • Discussion & Conclusions

3. Introduction • Science has emerged as an alternative engine of economic growth • Universities as the engine of regional economic development • Academic researchers have more freedom to exploit research outcome.

4. The Previous Research • Focus on a few elite universities • Ignores academic researchers who might play active role • Tend to focuses on academic spin-offs • Tend to be more qualitative in nature (Rothaermel et al., 2007)

5. Research Question • What do strategic factors contribute better academic entrepreneurial performance? • patenting • licensing and • equity participation?

6. Institutional Perspective • Pursue their goals to be congruent with societal values (Scott, 1987) • IPRs devolution (Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002) • Many governments are operating on much tighter fiscal policies (Henderson et al., 1998) • A new regime that merges academic and commercial reward systems (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001).

7. S&T Policy Reforms In Taiwan • Science and Technology Basic Law (1999) • Subsidy Principle of Management and Promotion of Academia R&D Results (2002) • Assist research institutes to establish technology transfer or liaison offices; • to subsidize academic patent application and maintenance fees

8. Items for Institutional Legitimacy

9. Hypothesis 1: The greater the institutional legitimacy that academic patent inventors perceive, the better their entrepreneurial performance is

10. Resource-based view A broad definition of resources (Wernefelt, 1984; 1995) • Organizational resources • University’s IPR incentive program • Networking resources • Researcher’s relationships with other researchers, industrial partners, manufacturers, and venture capitalists • Personal resources • Researcher’s training, experience, intelligence, and insights of the researcher

11. Items for Organizational Resources (1/2)

12. Items for Organizational Resources (2/2)

13. Hypothesis 2: The greater the organizational resources that academic patent inventors could receive, the better their performance is

14. Items for NetworkingResources

15. Hypothesis 3: The greater networking resources that the academic patent inventors possess, the better their performance is

16. Items for Personal Resources

17. Hypothesis 4: The greater the personal resources that academic patent inventors possess, the better their performance is (e.g., 4a: patenting: 4b: licensing and 4c:spin-offs).

18. Conceptual framework License Agreement Patent Grant Spin-off Equity Participation

19. recursive regression models • Number of patent grants = α +β1 IPR office subsidy +β2 Patenting incentive +β3 Patent subsidy +β4 IPR evaluation expert +β5 IPR agent+β6 Academic research links +β7 IPR training & education + μ…………(Equation 1) • Number of licenses = α+β1 ΛPatent grant +β2 Royalty distribution+ β3 U-I cooperative project subsidy + β4 Licensing incentive + β5 Industrial collaborative research +β6 Industrial contract research+ β7 Technology transfer experience + η……….. (Equation 2) • where ΛPatent grant is the predicted number of patent grants (from Equation 1) • Number of spin-off equities = α+β1 ΛPatent grant +β2 ΛLicense + β3 Industrial temporary transfer + β4 Campus entrepreneurial fund + β5 Incubator facility + β6 Manufacturer links+ β7 Venture capitalist links +β8 Pro-activeness +β9 Risk-taking+ β10 Work satisfactory + β11 Time availability +ξ ……(Equation 3) where ΛPatent grant is the predicted number of patent grants (Equation 2) and ΛLicense is the predicted number of licenses (Equation 3). The above recursive models assume that the error terms μ, η andξare all independent.

20. Research Method • in-depth interview • Un-structured interview with 8 faculty members • survey • 474 academic researchers with patent grants are surveyed. • Nominal and self-reported scale are measured for the investigating variables • 229 valid questionnaires through a three-wave postal survey (response rate is 48%)

21. Dependent Variables • Number of patent grants • the first step of academia-based research commercialization (Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002) • Number of licenses • the most common approach to exploiting academic research result (Powers and McDougall, 2005) • Equity participation of spin-off • The patent inventors retain their academic positions and share equity ownership with industrial partners

22. Independent Variables • Institutional legitimacy: IPR office subsidy, licensing income distribution, U-I cooperative project subsidy, and industrial temporary transfer • Organizational resources: patenting incentive, patenting subsidy, IPR evaluation committee, IPR agent, licensing incentive, entrepreneurial fund, and incubator facility • Networking resources: academic research links, industrial research links, manufacturer links, and venture capitalist links • Personal resources: IPR training & education, technology transfer experience, entrepreneurial attributes, work satisfaction, and time availability

23. Reliabilities for Variables

24. Nature of respondents

25. Findings

29. Take-away points for patenting • IPR infrastructure • Most inventors tend to rely on the assistance of the IPR offices to file patent application. • Org’al resources: • The organizational incentive programs might not be necessary foster performance of academic patenting. • Network resource: • Strong research lab teamwork in terms of information collecting and brainstorming substantially enlarges the robustness of the research discoveries (Timmons, 1999). • Prior experiences: • IPR training and education reflects the willingness and capability of a researcher to realize their research potentials.

30. Take-away points for licensing • Institutional factors: • The higher share (e.g., 80%) of licensing income distributed to the academic inventors and U-I cooperative project subsidy fosters academic licensing performance • Network resources: • Industry-academia research links lead academic research results to be closer to industrial needs (Jensen et al., 2003; Zucker et al., 1998). • Personal resources: • The transfer experience decreases transaction costs and makes exchange mechanisms to transfer university knowledge possible.

31. Take-away points for spin-offs • Institutional factors • Entrepreneurial fund and incubator facility were suggested as the important impetus in fostering equity participation of academic spin-off (Di Gregorio & Shane, 2003). • Personal resources • pro-activeness and risk-taking were significant in fostering equity participation of academic spin-off (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) • Time availability for academic researchers was suggested as one of the determinants

32. Thank you for your attention! Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang Email: yucchang@mx.nthu.edu.tw