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Radius Vulnerabilities in Wireless Overview

Radius Vulnerabilities in Wireless Overview . Randy Chou - rchou@arubanetworks.com Merv Andrade - merv@arubanetworks.com Joshua Wright - jwright@sans.org. Background & Vulnerability. AP (Authenticator). Client (Supplicant). Radius Auth Server. Associate + EAP. Key Exchange w/ Server Cert.

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Radius Vulnerabilities in Wireless Overview

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  1. Radius Vulnerabilities in Wireless Overview Randy Chou - rchou@arubanetworks.com Merv Andrade - merv@arubanetworks.com Joshua Wright - jwright@sans.org

  2. Background & Vulnerability AP (Authenticator) Client (Supplicant) Radius Auth Server Associate + EAP Key Exchange w/ Server Cert User Auth inside TLS Send MPPE Key Send encryption Keys • Sniff packets. Wired risky, wireless undetectable. • VLAN separation does not mitigate sniffing. • Radius key known or attacked offline, see draft. • Wireless data decryption, can be offline.

  3. Attack Methodology • Adversary captures request and response authenticators • Mounts brute-force/dictionary attack against secret • Adversary uses secret to: • Forge Access-Accept frames • Decrypt MPPE for EAP keys Response Auth = MD5(code + id + len + request auth + attributes + secret)

  4. The Problem • Several references disclose vulnerabilities but are largely ignored • Some popular clients don’t implement IPSEC per RFC3579 • Impact of compromised secret is serious • Compromised authentication, decryption of link-layer encryption mechanisms • Loss of keys == Loss of certificates

  5. Goals • Update RFC3579 to MUST for IPsec support • Analyze seriousness of vulnerabilities in existing implementations • Provide best practice recommendations • Certification process for RADIUS devices • Not just interoperability, conformance tests

  6. Questions? • Please direct comments to the authors or RADEXT reflector Randy Chou - rchou@arubanetworks.com Merv Andrade - merv@arubanetworks.com Joshua Wright - jwright@sans.org http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/RADEXT/radius_vuln_00.txt

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