Today’s Lecture

1. Today’s Lecture • Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • J.L Mackie

2. Preliminary comments: A problem with evil • The Problem of Evil traditionally understood must presume some or all of the following: • (1) There is a universal conception of evil shared among all rational moral agents (i.e. valuers). • (2) Is it not the case that our conception(s) of evil are (partially or wholly) socially constructed. • (3) If there is no universal conception of evil, there must be significant overlaps in our (broadly construed) various conceptions.

3. Preliminary comments: A problem with evil • Each of these ‘framework’ assumptions is designed to minimize or eliminate a pluralist interpretation of our moral practices. • Otherwise (i.e. if we have various, non-overlapping, conceptions of evil), we run into the problem of specifying which interpretation will, or ought to, serve to highlight that which must be explained by the theist.

4. Preliminary comments: A problem with evil • There is at least one strong reason for thinking that the theist must bear a significant burden in this area of discussion. • The hypothesis that there is a God or Goddess that is perfect (i.e. lacking in nothing), so that S/He is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, omnibenevolent, and maximally free, leads one to expect certain things to be true of the world S/He creates and oversees. One of these things is the general absence of unnecessary evil. • So, if this working theistic hypothesis is true, there should be a general absence of unnecessary evil in the universe (since the universe was created, and is being maintained, by the Deity in question).

5. Preliminary comments: A problem with evil • Though the previous slide points out where the substantial ‘burden of proof’ lies, what the theist must accomplish in their defense of theism is by no means clear. • Take any prima facie example of evil. Must the theist be able to explain her theism in lieu of it? • Take various paradigmatic examples of evil. Must the theist be able to explain her theism in lieu of them all? • What if the various paradigmatic examples yield (or reflect) inconsistent conceptions of evil?

6. Preliminary comments: A problem with evil • How much evil makes it improbable that God exists? Is it 10 turps, 20 turps, 300 turps (‘turp’ is the term Alvin Plantinga proposed to denote a ‘unit of evil’ [he isn’t serious, by the way])? • How much gratuitous, or unnecessary, evil makes it improbable that God exists? Is one incident enough, or perhaps two, or three?

7. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • Logical Problem of Evil: • (1) The propositions ‘God exists’ and ‘evil exists’ are inconsistent (that is, they cannot both be true in the same possible world). • (2) ‘Evil exists’ is true. • (3) So, ‘God exists’ must be false. • (4) It is irrational to believe that a proposition is true, if it must be false. • (5) Consequently, it is irrational to believe that ‘God exists’ is true. • (6) Consequently, it is irrational to believe that God exists. • Note that (3) concerns metaphysics, while (5) and (6) concern epistemology.

8. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • Evidential Problem of Evil: • (1) The truth of the proposition ‘evil exists’ will make it highly improbable that ‘God exists’ is true. • (2) ‘Evil exists’ is true. • (3) So, it is highly improbable that ‘God exists’ is true. • (4) It is irrational to believe that a proposition is true, if it’s truth is highly improbable. • (5) Consequently, it is irrational for anyone to believe that ‘God exists’ is true. • (6) Consequently, it is irrational for anyone to believe that God exists. • Note, once again, that (3) concerns metaphysics, while (5) and (6) concern epistemology.

9. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • Alternate understanding of the Evidential Problem of Evil: • (1) The truth of the proposition ‘evil exists’ will make it highly probable that ‘God does not exist’ is true. • (2) ‘Evil exists’ is true. • (3) So, it is highly probable that ‘God does not exist’ is true. • (4) It is the paradigm of rationality to believe that a proposition is true when it’s truth is highly probable. • (5) Consequently, it is rational for everyone to believe that ‘God does not exist’ is true. • (6) Consequently, it is rational for everyone to believe that God does not exist. • Note that (3) concerns metaphysics, while (5) and (6) concern epistemology.

10. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • Existential Problem of Evil: • The Existential Problem of Evil is analogous to the Evidential Problem of Evil, except that the evil which is taken to undermine the truth of the claim ‘God exists’ is the evil we experience in our day to day affairs, and which our existence in itself does not mitigate. • The existent evil to which the atheologian refers in either the Logical or Evidential Problem of Evil does not need to be experienced by humans, nor be related to the perceived worth of our own existence.

11. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • When talking of evil philosophers often distinguish between natural and moral evil on the one hand, and necessary and gratuitous evil on the other. • Natural evil: evil which is not the result, or product, of free activity (i.e. the actions of free agents). • Moral evil: evil which is the result, or product, of free activity (i.e. the actions of free agents). • Necessary evil: an evil that is a necessary condition for a greater good, or an evil that exists in such a way that there is more good than would be the case if the evil did not exist. • Gratuitous evil: an evil that is not necessary.

12. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • Defense: S adequately defends her belief that God exists exactly when she offers adequate responses to those criticisms that, if true, undermine the truth, or probable truth, of her belief that God exists. An adequate response undermines the truth, or probable truth, of the relevant criticisms. • Theodicy: S offers a theodicy exactly when she provides an answer to the question - Why does God permit evil? (The term comes form the Greek words theos (or ‘God’) and dike (or ‘justice’).)

13. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • Restricted Theism: Consists of the beliefs that God exists, and that God is omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omnipresent. • Expanded Theism: Consists of Restricted Theism and a soteriology (an account of salvation or deliverance - i.e. a doctrine of sin and atonement), an account of immortality, an eschatology (an account of the last times), et cetera. • A discussion of the Problem of Evil will go differently depending on whether one is addressing restricted or expanded theism.

14. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • What is it for God to be omnibenevolent (or All-good)? God’s goodness can be understood in at least one of three ways: • God is “ontologically complete” (Morris, T.V. 1991. Our Idea of God. Intervarsity Press, p. 50). That is, God is maximally great and is the source of all other being and goodness. • God always acts in perfect accord with our moral principles. • Not only does God always act in perfect accord with our moral principles, but he also engages in superogatory acts (or acts beyond the call of moral duty).

15. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • What is it for God to be omnipotent (or All-powerful)? God’s power can be understood in at least one of three ways: • God can do everything/anything. • God can do anything which it is logically possible for Her/Him to do. • God can do anything which it is logically possible for a maximally great being to do.

16. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • What is it for God to be omniscient (or All-knowing)? God’s knowledge can be understood to contain the following: necessary truths, contingent truths, and ‘middle truths’. • Necessary truths are those propositions which are true in all possible worlds (including the actual world). • Contingent truths are those propositions which are true in the actual world but false in at least one possible world. • Middle truths are those propositions which are counterfactually true of substantially free beings.

17. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • Compatibilism: (1) For every event, there is a cause or set of causes which determines it. (2) Sometimes humans act freely. This position is often referred to as Soft Determinism. • Incompatibilism: Either (1) but not (2), or (2) but not (1). The former is referred to as Hard Determinism, the latter is referred to as Libertarianism (not to be confused with the political ideology).

18. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil • ‘First order evil’ often refers to a certain quality or quantity of pain or unhappiness. • ‘First order good’ often refers to a certain quality or quantity of pleasure or happiness. • Second order goods arise from minimizing first order evils, or maximizing first order goods. • Second order evils arise from maximizing first order evils, or minimizing first order goods. • Third order goods (if there are any) arise from minimizing second order evils, or maximizing second order goods - and so on (it is sometimes thought) into infinity.

19. J.L. Mackie • John Mackie, an Australian philosopher, was born in 1917 and died in 1981. • He worked in ethics, history of philosophy, philosophy of religion and metaphysics. • He was well known for his moral anti-realism and atheism. (Moral anti-realism basically involves denying the existence of moral truths or facts.) • He is also a Compatibilist, or Soft Determinist.

20. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Intro • The following propositions cannot all be true (at least in the same possible world): • (1) God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent. • (2) “Good is opposed to evil” (FP, p.107) (or “a good thing always eliminates an evil as far as it can” [FP, p.107]). • (3) “[T]here are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do” (FP, p.107). • (4) Evil exists (FP, p.107). • The problem is that the theist is committed to all of them (FP, p.107). • Note that this is a Logical Problem of Evil (FP, p.106).

21. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Adequate solutions • (1) Deny God’s omnipotence. • (2) Severely restrict what omnipotence means. • (3) Deny God’s omnibenevolence. • (4) Deny that good is opposed to evil. • (3) Deny that evil exists or is real. • The world and evil are illusory. • Evil is a privation of good. • Partial evil or disorder is universal good or harmony, respectively (FP, p.107).

22. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Adequate solutions • (1) Denying God’s omnipotence disqualifies God as a Perfect Being. • (2) Omnipotence can die a death of thousand qualifications. • (3) To reinterpret evil denies the significance of suffering, pain and misery. • (4) Those who adopt any of the solutions from the previous slide often trap themselves in inconsistency (they sneak in the Divine attributes they deny in other areas of their theology) (FP, pp.107-08).

23. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • Fallacious solution: • Evil is a necessary counterpart to good. You cannot have good without evil (FP, p.108). • Problems: • (1) Qualifies what we mean by omnipotence, or outright denies that God is omnipotent (FP, p.108). • Mackie concedes that qualifying omnipotence, so that God cannot do what is logically impossible, is a legitimate move. It will fail, however, if God is the originator of the logical rules or principles that dictate what is possible and what is not (FP, pp.108-09).

24. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • (2) On this account, good is not opposed to evil. That is, good can only exist if evil also exists (FP, p.109). • (2a) If, in saying an event is good, we are assigning a comparative property to that event, that is, we are saying that the event is better than such and such, it will be in the long run self-defeating. After all, to promote ‘being better than’, you simultaneously promote ‘being less worse than’. If by ‘being less worse than’ we mean ‘being less evil’, then as we promote good we are simultaneously promoting (a lesser degree of) evil. It makes no sense in such a context to talk of promoting good to the exclusion of evil (FP, p.109).

25. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • (2b) If, in saying that an event is good, we are assigning a property with absolute magnitude, then there will be a certain quantity or quality which that event can possess and which makes it good. So understood, we can make sense of talking about promoting good to the exclusion of evil, but good and evil will not, then, be counterparts. An event could be good, even if there were no evil (FP, p.109).

26. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • Fallacious addendum: • Can we save this solution by arguing that good and evil are logical opposites (i.e. good and non-good, OR evil and non-evil), and so we cannot have good without evil? (FP, p.109) • Problems: • (1) It is not clear that good and evil are logical opposites. That is to say, it is not clear that by ‘evil’ we mean non-good (FP, p.109).

27. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • (2) Even if good and evil were logical opposites, it would not be clear that to have good we must have evil. Such a claim is ambiguous between a metaphysical and epistemological claim. The metaphysical claim seems false, even if the epistemological claim is true (FP, p.109). • (3) Even if the metaphysical claim were true, we would not require the amount of evil we have in order to have good (FP, pp.109-10).

28. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • Fallacious solution: • “Evil is necessary as a means to good” (FP, p.110). • Problems: • Again this seems to severely restrict the meaning of omnipotence. If the necessity in this solution refers to causal necessity, it presupposes the existence of laws to which God Her/Himself is responsible. It also presupposes, contra common thought on the matter, that God is not the creator of causal laws (FP, p.110).

29. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • Fallacious solutions: • The universe is (aesthetically or morally) better with some evil in it than it would be if there were no evil at all. • Aesthetic understanding: Evil provides a contrast to good, heightening the beauty of good. • Moral understanding: A universe which is progressive, where good triumphs over evil or good overcomes evil, is better than a universe which is static or unchanging - even if, in that universe, good has “unchallenged supremacy” (FP, p.110).

30. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • Implications: • (1) Certain kinds of evil are logically necessary for certain kinds of good (FP, p.110). • (2) Second order goods are more significant, are more valuable, than first order goods. Also first order evils do not take away from the significance of second order goods (FP, p.110). • (3) Good, on this account, does not tend to eliminate evil. Rather, second order goods either maximize first order goods, or minimize first order evils (FP, p.111). (God’s goodness on this account is an example of third order goodness [FP, p.111].)

31. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • Problems: • (1) The so-called second order goods are aiming at maximizing first order goods. That is to say, second order goods are a means, even if ultimately, to first order goods. Given the (ultimate) primacy of first order goods, why have a universe with second order goods or evils? (Mackie is not going to press this objection [FP, p.111].) • (2) God is not so much minimizing first order evils, than He is maximizing second order goods (FP, p.111).

32. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • (3) There will be, in a universe of second order goods, the possibility of second order evils. Indeed, in this universe there are second order evils. As God seeks to maximize second order goods, He ought to minimize these second order evils. But there appears to be a great deal of second order evil. Thus the problem of evil reemerges, only at a higher level (FP, p.111). • Note that one can solve this problem by appealing to an even higher good. But this merely pushes the problem of evil to an even higher level. For with third order goods comes the possibility of third order evils. Either at some point the proposed solution under discussion fails, or we generate an infinite regress of ever higher goods and evils (FP, p111).

33. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • Fallacious solutions: • Evil arises as a result of free and causally efficacious human choices (FP, p.111). • This solution can be used to avoid Mackie’s third criticism in the previous slide. Second order evil, rather than being justified by appealing to third order goods, can be explained as a by product of the choices of free moral beings. The good of free will is regarded as higher than any second order good. Thus, benevolent actions done freely are greater, or more significant, than those same actions done by automata. The possibility that with this freedom we may also get second order evils is seen as a necessary, and acceptable, risk, given the greater good of free will (FP, pp.111-12).

34. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • Problems: • (1) It is surely possible that every free moral being always freely chooses the good. Why did God not create a universe containing those free moral beings, instead of this universe with free moral beings who only sometimes choose what is good? The dilemma offered in the solution is a false one. That is, the choice for God was not between creating either free moral beings or automata (FP, p.112).

35. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • It may be objected that this response is logically incoherent. But for this objection to be successful, the objector must mean by ‘free act’ something akin to random, or undetermined, action. For if the moral agent acts from, or in conformity to, their character, then God can create free moral beings with the requisite (morally infallible) character. But if the moral agent acts randomly, wherein lies the moral significance of their actions (FP, p.112)? • Besides, think of Heaven (as construed in those theistic traditions that make much of this place in the after-life). In Heaven humans will never choose evil, as there will be no more evil according to these traditions (that’s what makes Heaven heaven). But if God can so create humans in the after-life, why didn’t He do it here in the first place?

36. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • Problems (continued): • (2) If humans are substantially free, are their wills outside of God’s control? Here again we face the possibility that God is not omnipotent. If He can control their wills, but elects not to, on what grounds can such an omission be justified? To say that such evil, perpetrated by free moral beings, is (morally) better than evil perpetrated by automata, runs counter to theistic condemnations of sin (FP, p.112).

37. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • (3) We are now circumambulating the Paradox of Omnipotence. Can God create things He cannot control? Can God institute laws that subsequently restrict His actions or choices? Affirmations or denials of either possibility seems to commit us to denying that God is omnipotent (FP, pp.112-13).

38. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • We can make a distinction between first and second order omnipotence. First order omnipotence refers to God’s unlimited power. Second order omnipotence refers to God’s ability to remove or eliminate his first order omnipotence. If we take this route to explain how moral beings are (now) substantially free, we cannot talk (now) of an unqualified omnipotent God (FP, p.114).

39. “Evil and Omnipotence”: Fallacious solutions • We could, alternatively, deny that God is in time. That is to say, no times can be assigned to God’s actions. By choosing this route, however, we cut ourselves off from any meaningful talk of God’s power, whether it be limited or unlimited. After all, if we can talk of God actualizing a certain state of affairs, we can say (albeit at a later date) that God actualized a certain state of affairs. But this is just to assign a time to God’s actions, which is absurd. So, we cannot talk of God exercising His power (FP, p.114).