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A Security Enhancement and Proof for AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement). Vladimir Kolesnikov Bell Labs SCN 2010. Program. AKA background AKA Single-UIM property Our extension to “regular” KE. The AKA Setting. HE (Home Environment). AV. ?. SN (Serving Network). MS
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A Security Enhancement and Prooffor AKA(Authentication and Key Agreement) Vladimir Kolesnikov Bell Labs SCN 2010
Program • AKA background • AKA Single-UIM property • Our extension to “regular” KE
The AKA Setting HE (Home Environment) AV ? SN (Serving Network) MS (Mobile Set)
AKA Message Flow Credential: Shared key K One-time Auth vector AV RAND, SQN AUTN = SQN, FK(0,SQN,RAND) XRES = FK(1,RAND) SK = FK(2,RAND) Obvious problem: MS does not contribute randomness AKA Resolution: K stored on single UIM UIM keeps state (SQN) sk sk
“Crypto-traditional” Multi-UIM secuirity Users have several devices UIMs keyed with the same key improves AV management Simplified state management (SQN) More robust (simplified credential management, UIM cloning) Strict AKA deployment requirements Flow is preserved. No extra messages No extra overhead
Our Multi-UIM-secure AKA Idea: do not use AKA-derived SK directly. use SK’ = FSK (RANDC)
Multi-AKA RANDC Fsk(RANDC) Fsk(RANDC) sk sk
Security Give the usual game-style KE security definition Theorem: Essential message exchange of the above Multi-AKA protocol is a secure KE protocol.