1 / 19

China‘s Rise as a Global Economic Superpower: Challenges for the EU

China‘s Rise as a Global Economic Superpower: Challenges for the EU. Rafael Leal-Arcas. Global economic superpower : Criteria (Bergsten). 1) must be large enough to significantly affect the world economy; 2) must be sufficiently dynamic to contribute meaningfully to global growth;

landon
Download Presentation

China‘s Rise as a Global Economic Superpower: Challenges for the EU

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. China‘s Rise as a Global Economic Superpower: Challenges for the EU Rafael Leal-Arcas

  2. Global economic superpower : Criteria (Bergsten) • 1) must be large enough to significantly affect the world economy; • 2) must be sufficiently dynamic to contribute meaningfully to global growth; • 3) must be open enough to trade and capital flows to have a major impact on other countries.

  3. China: a historically unique global economic superpower • because: • 1) it is still a poor country with a GDP/capita of around $6,000; US= $48,000; EU= $34,000 (source: CIA) • 2) not yet a democracy; • 3) not yet a market economy.

  4. historically unique global economic superpower • China’s rapidly growing economic, political, and cultural engagement and influence in today’s world is both undeniable and remarkable • but China’s rise is not yet at the level of global power of the U.S. in 20th century or UK in 19th century.

  5. Outline • I. Thesis: China’s attitude to multilateralism and responsibility in global economic governance is questionable • II. China’s preference for regionalism • III. China’s position at the WTO • IV. EC-China PCA • V. Conclusion

  6. I. Argument • attitude to multilateralism and responsibility in global ec governance is questionable or unclear • E.g.: results of July 2008 WTO Mini-ministerial conference • China seems to be more interested in regionalism

  7. Former Gral Secr CCP Deng Xiaoping on China in int’l affairs • “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” • China seeks to focus on its own internal development

  8. II. China’s questionable attitude to multilateralism • attempts to establish itself as a gravity center in Asia • Concludes many low-quality, politically motivated bilateral FTAs in the region. • strategy: creation of a powerful Asian trading bloc (EAFTA), as prima donna.

  9. East Asia

  10. Examples of China’s regionalism • China-ASEAN FTA (in effect by 2010 for 6 ASEAN MS and 2015, remaining 4) • China-Singapore FTA • China-Philippines investment agts • Various agts with Mekong Delta countries • China: serious about multilateralism?

  11. Regionalism in Finance • IMF-like East Asian reserve fund • China: bossing its trade partners to use renminbi instead of $ • makes use of its strategic location to extend influence in eco development for market access in SE Asia • Reactions to China’s success: • -Jp’s econ partnership with ASEAN • -India: FTAs with various ASEAN countries

  12. ASEAN

  13. III. China at WTO: Backseat • insists on keeping the status of a developing country despite its size both economically (3rd) and demographically (1st). • But, is not just any developing country; China is not Guatemala • Yet, to justify its passive role at WTO, “recently acceded members“ category

  14. Backseat at WTO • Compared to Brazil and India (NLPs), China plays timid role both in the Doha round and in the WTO’s DSS. • E.g.: only brought 4 cases before the WTO as complainant, compared to > 15 cases by India and > 20 by Brazil.

  15. Reasons for China’s passivity at WTO • a rather young WTO member • needs to improve skills and competences on WTO matters • Culturally, tends to avoid disputes (influence from Confucius) • rather inefficient bureaucracy • Wants all benefits but no obligations?

  16. IV. EC-China PCA • EC= China’s largest trading partner • Trade and econ coop agt since 1985 • Negotiations for a PCA started Jan 07 • But, FTA not on the horizon • Would ostracize other EC trade partners

  17. Difficulties in EC-China trade • Protection of IPRs • Counterfeiting and product piracy • Product safety concerns • Ballooning bilat trade deficit • China’s undervalued currency • China’s delay in enforcing WTO rules • Unfair subsidies to favored national industr

  18. Ways to improve EC-China trade relations • Dialogues: • -1st High Level eco and trade dialogue (2008): investmt, market access, IPR protection • 2nd HED (May 09): improve product safety • Cooperation (for future): • -launch of coop program on IPR protection • -creation of IPR helpdesk for EU businesses in China

  19. Conclusion • attitude of China to multilateralism and responsibility in global ec governance is unclear • appears to lack an internationalist view to world trade affairs; more focused on regionalism • should assume more responsibility multilaterally. Why? B/c with greater power and a greater voice comes greater responsibility.

More Related