Controlled and automatic mindreading in children and adults

1. Controlled and automatic mindreading in children and adults Ian Apperly

2. What is “Theory of Mind”? • “Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition” • Essential for everyday social interaction and communication • False belief tasks as a paradigm case • (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) • These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view

3. What is “Theory of Mind”? • “Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition” • Essential for everyday social interaction and communication • False belief tasks as a paradigm case • (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) • These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view • Significant developments from infancy to early childhood • Disproportionately impaired in autism and several other genetic and psychiatric disorders

4. What is “Theory of Mind”? • “Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition” • Essential for everyday social interaction and communication • False belief tasks as a paradigm case • (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) • These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view • Significant developments from infancy to early childhood • Disproportionately impaired in autism and several other genetic and psychiatric disorders • Identifiable neural network Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view

5. What is “Theory of Mind”? • Adults? Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view

6. Overview • Part 1 • Evidence (from adults) that mindreading • Often requires cognitive control • May recruit specialised neural systems • May sometimes operate efficiently and automatically • Part 2 • How do these characteristics arise?

7. Evidence that mindreading is a flexible but demanding ability • In Adults.... • Impaired executive processes can lead to severe egocentrism • (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005) • Belief reasoning requires cognitive control • (e.g., Bull, Philips & Conway, 2007) • Belief inferences are not made automatically • (Apperly, Samson, Riggs, Simpson & Chiavarino, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010) • Belief inferences are not used automatically • (e.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Apperly et al., 2010) • Holding false beliefs briefly in mind has a measurable processing cost • (Apperly, Back et al., 2008) • Recursion (e.g., beliefs about beliefs) remains challenging • E.g., Mckinnon & Moscovitch (2007) • And this converges with evidence from children… • .

8. A deductive Belief-Desire task(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)

9. A deductive Belief-Desire task(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) • NB only Belief factor involves a perspective difference

10. A deductive Belief-Desire task(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) • B- is harder than B+ • D- is harder than D+ • (Replicates Apperly et al. 2011, Ch. Dev. Who found same pattern for adults and older children)

11. Orthogonal contrasts of varying beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) Harder conditions recruit EF, and attention/ToM areas Overlap Belief (True vs. False) TPJ, ACC, IFG Desire (Like vs. Hate) TPJ, ACC

12. Orthogonal contrasts of varying beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) Overlap Belief (True vs. False) TPJ, ACC, IFG Resisting egocentrism Desire (Like vs. Hate) TPJ, ACC

13. Orthogonal contrasts of varying beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) Overlap Belief (True vs. False) TPJ, ACC, IFG Desire (Like vs. Hate) TPJ, ACC Notably no mPFC

14. Evidence that mindreading is a flexible but demanding ability • In Adults.... • Impaired executive processes can lead to severe egocentrism • (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005) • Belief reasoning requires cognitive control • (e.g., Bull, Philips & Conway, 2007) • Belief inferences are not made automatically • (Apperly, Samson, Riggs, Simpson & Chiavarino, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010) • Belief inferences are not used automatically • (e.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Apperly et al., 2010) • Holding false beliefs briefly in mind has a measurable processing cost • (Apperly, Back et al., 2008) • Recursion (e.g., beliefs about beliefs) remains challenging • E.g., Mckinnon & Moscovitch (2007) • And this converges with evidence from children… • Mindreading seems to depend on processes for attention, working memory and executive control • Recruitment reflects functional components of mindreading • .

15. Specialised neural systems for Mindreading?(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003......) False belief (FB) sample story John told Emily that he had a Porsche. Actually, his car is a Ford. Emily doesn’t know anything about cars though, so she believed John. — When Emily sees John’s car she thinks it is a porsche ford False photograph (FP) sample story A photograph was taken of an apple hanging on a tree branch. The film took half an hour to develop. In the meantime, a strong wind blew the apple to the ground. — The developed photograph shows the apple on the ground branch

16. Specialised neural systems for Mindreading?(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003......) False belief (FB) sample story John told Emily that he had a Porsche. Actually, his car is a Ford. Emily doesn’t know anything about cars though, so she believed John. — When Emily sees John’s car she thinks it is a porsche ford False photograph (FP) sample story A photograph was taken of an apple hanging on a tree branch. The film took half an hour to develop. In the meantime, a strong wind blew the apple to the ground. — The developed photograph shows the apple on the ground branch R-TPJ shows greatest specificity for reasoning about mental states. Contrast with mPFC, which also shows activity for thinking about body states, internal sensations and personal characteristics.

17. Evidence that mindreading is a flexible but demanding ability • In Adults.... • Impaired executive processes can lead to severe egocentrism • (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005) • Belief reasoning requires cognitive control • (e.g., Bull, Philips & Conway, 2007) • Belief inferences are not made automatically • (Apperly, Samson, Riggs, Simpson & Chiavarino, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010) • Belief inferences are not used automatically • (e.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Apperly et al., 2010) • Holding false beliefs briefly in mind has a measurable processing cost • (Apperly, Back et al., 2008) • Recursion (e.g., beliefs about beliefs) remains challenging • E.g., Mckinnon & Moscovitch (2007) • And this converges with evidence from children… • Mindreading seems to depend on processes for attention, working memory and executive control • Recruitment reflects functional components of mindreading • Quite strong evidence for some neural specialisation • .

18. Evidence that mindreading is an efficient but inflexible processes? • Can all mindreading really be so demanding? • Two systems for mindreading? (e.g., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009, Psych. Rev.)

19. Evidence that mindreading is an efficient but inflexible processes? • Can all mindreading really be so demanding? • Two systems for mindreading? (e.g., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009, Psych. Rev.) • Evidence of involuntary inference of: • Simple visual perspective (Samson et al., 2010) • Agent’s spatial frame of reference (Zwickell, 2011) • Agent’s “false belief” (Kovacs et al., 2010) • Sometimes without explicit awareness • Schneider et al. (2011) • Without need for “executive control” • Qureshi et al. (2010) • This pattern converges with evidence of mindreading in infants….

20. Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP) Only ever judge “self” – how many dots you can see

21. Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP) * ns Only ever judge “self” – how many dots you can see

22. Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP) * ns Only ever judge “self” – how many dots you can see Such effects are exaggerated under cognitive load (Qureshi et al., 2010)

23. Overview • Part 1 • Evidence that mindreading • Often requires cognitive control • May sometimes operate efficiently and automatically • May recruit specialised neural systems • Part 2 • How do these characteristics arise? • We must look at developmental change

24. Effortful & Flexible Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC Efficient & limited TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view

25. ? Effortful & Flexible Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC Efficient & limited TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view

26. How do we end up with automatic processes? (+ Language, Executive function, Knowledge) Infant system grows up a. Effortful & Flexible Automatisation Efficient & limited

27. How do we end up with automatic processes? (+ Language, Executive function, Knowledge) Infant system grows up a. Effortful & Flexible Automatisation Efficient & limited b. Infant system remains intact Efficient & limited (+ Language, Executive function, Knowledge) Effortful & Flexible

28. How do we end up with automatic processes? (+ Language, Executive function, Knowledge) Infant system grows up a. Effortful & Flexible Automatisation Efficient & limited b. Infant system remains intact Efficient & limited (+ Language, Executive function, Knowledge) Effortful & Flexible Both exist in development

29. What is the origin of automatic perspective-taking? Altercentric interference = indication of automatic perspective calculation RT (ms) Main effect of consistency Significant interaction

30. Evidence for automatisation?Surtees & Apperly (2012) Child Development 120 children aged 6-10 and adults Automatisation: Predict younger children to suffer less interference for self judgements. Original automaticity: Predict equivalent interference at all ages. “You see 2” Or “He sees 2”

31. Evidence for automatisation? Surtees & Apperly (2012) Child Development 120 children aged 6-10 and adults “You see 2” Or “He sees 2”

32. Automatic perspective-taking? • In adults, Level-1 visual perspectives may be calculated even when unnecessary and unhelpful • Automatic? • What is the developmental origin of automaticity? • Original automaticity? • Automatisation? No evidence of automatization

33. Neural specialisation through development • E.g., Reading development • correlation with children’s reading skill • Yellow = +ve • Blue = -ve • Neural specialisation emerges • Unlikely to be determined by an evolved programme Turkeltaub et al. 2003

34. Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.) • 5-11Y children, and adults • 3 story conditions in fMRI • Physical • Social • Mental (+Social) • Battery of mindreading tasks outside of scanner

35. Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.)

36. Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.)

37. Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.) Differentiation of social and mental in rTPJ was correlated with mindreading success outside of the scanner

38. Summary • Part 1 • Evidence that mindreading • Often requires cognitive control • May sometimes operate efficiently and automatically • May recruit specialised neural systems • Part 2 • Development must be explained • Development constrains theories of the mature system Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view

41. Social abduction(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, in prep)

42. Social abduction(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, subm.) TB vs. FB Green = D? vs. D-&D+ Green = D? vs. D-&D+&FB&TB Selective for D?