Influencing Minds: Evolution of Psychological Operations in American Warfare

1. Oh My!

2. “Planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.” “Planned use of propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.” Defining PSYOP – Now and Then

3. Core element of U.S. Information Operations (IO) Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, Military Deception, Operations Security In concert with Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs “The Whole Process of Wartime Communications” – Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) Director Barry Zorthian In Context – Now and Then

4. “Distinctive American Way of War evolved from the Indian Wars through the Civil War and reached its zenith during the Second World War. The United States mobilized its considerable material and human resources to annihilate the armies of its enemies, to destroy the moral and economic capacities of their opponents to make war, and to secure unconditional surrender.” – Russell F. Weigley

5. No Respect

7. Propaganda Section D • US Army Captain Heber Blankenhorn • Sold “the psychologic factor over the counter like so much meat” • Leaflets as “Military Weapons”

8. A perfect compliment • “Always attack, never defend.” • “Arrow of initial penetration in conditioning and preparing the people and the territory in which invasion is contemplated.” • “Must heavily involve those entrusted with the prosecution of subsequent forms of warfare.”

9. “Soldierly Distrust” • “Experience…never developed by any U.S. agency” – Donovan • “Right to a place of dignity in our military arsenal” – Eisenhower • Operation Fantasia

10. “Unmasking Communism” • Ike’s PSYOP advisors included former PWD, SHAEF deputy chief C.D. Jackson and OSS veteran Abbott Washburn • USIA offensive

11. “Quiet American”

13. The “Treatment”

18. “6 months ago this man would have killed you.” • “Today he is fighting with the GVN and her Allies. He was convinced to rally to the GVN by Psychological Operations leaflets and loudspeaker missions. Thanks to PSYOPs, you have one less enemy and one more ally. PSYOPs can be effective if used properly.  Think PSYOPs. It's worth it. Your life and the lives of your men are worth it.”

19. “Chieu” and “Hoi” • Rationale offered by pilots who resisted PSYOP drops: “That is mixing politics with war.” – Taro Katagiri, 4th PSYOP commander, 1968-1970

20. Ruffled Feathers?

21. “Bypassing over Hearts and Minds”

22. Sub-surface frictions

23. “Low level of Effectiveness” • PSYOP/INTELL Study – 7th PSYOP Group, 11 November 1967 • Dependent on “Fallout” and “personal relationships” “…a difficult way to operate.” • Limited access, limited capabilities • 25 PSYOP Intelligence personnel, suggested 400 needed • “From crisis to crisis, like firemen putting out fires.” • JUSPAO processed 5% of 1,500 pages daily

24. A misnomer? • Final Technical Report PSYOP Studies – Vietnam (1971) • From “individual action” to “the highest level of policy formulation” there is “little or no input of competent professional knowledge of dynamic applied psychology to most aspects of PSYOP.” • Label of Psychological Operations – “misleading even if applied loosely.”

25. Top Heavy

26. Survey Says: • 1967 Nationwide Hamlet Survey – • 18% saw RVN opposition as “enemies of the people, traitors to the nation” • 30% “merely say VC are Vietnamese” • 40% “disapproved of U.S. intervention” • 122 hamlets in 15 provinces • 1,313 respondents in “reasonably secure and accessible” areas

27. “Dear Black GIs”

28. Old habits

29. Toward a new Psychology of American PSYOP