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Understanding “Enronesque” Structures What is the Risk?. Casualty Actuarial Society Toronto July 8, 2002. Elements. Removing or recasting financial statement elements to sculpt desired financial outcomes to management’s desire Typically involves complex structures
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Understanding “Enronesque” StructuresWhat is the Risk? Casualty Actuarial Society Toronto July 8, 2002
Elements • Removing or recasting financial statement elements to sculpt desired financial outcomes to management’s desire • Typically involves complex structures • Using accounting rules to define structures, not necessarily avoiding them • Not a fidelity issue - there is no element of theft in the normally accepted sense • Lack of transparency Objective - Push the stock price up by showing rapid growth and consistency in earnings
Consider • Insurance is a tool to smooth and improve financial results - does that make it bad? • Finite structures, by definition, have as their sole purpose the smoothing of financial outcomes and building off-balance sheet reserves - are they wrong? • The insurance industry provides many types of guarantees through surety and other financial guarantees - are we party to fraud? Not all complex structures and market arrangements are inherently sinful nor should we run from them due to improper uses of a few organization
Enron’s Sins • Desired to make the company asset free, resulting in huge rate of return on invested capital • Recognize future income before its earned through sale of future revenue streams - common in securitization • Many of the deals and SPVs were tied to Enron’s credit rating and in some cases, their stock price • Without the credit rating or stock price strength, all the structures implode • Enron’s business was trading, which is dependent on their financial strength • Enron’s sin was its fragile nature, based on non-transparent leverage
Example #1Selling ticket revenues not yet earned Future ticket revenues Investors Management Services Fee + Incentive Theater Chain Concessions
Example #2 - Step 1 of 5Removing Phantom Liability Corporation Booked Liability Removed from Balance Sheet $10,000,000 Premium Payment $9,500,000 Stamp Liability $20,000,000 Insurer (Offshore)
Example #2 - Step 2 Insurer (Offshore) Booked Liability Removed from Balance Sheet $XXXXX Premium Payment $9,500,000 Stamp Liability $12,000,000 Subsidiary Insurer (Offshore) Cash Balance $9,500,000
Example #2 - Step 3 Insurer (Offshore) Booked Liability Removed from Balance Sheet $XXXXX Purchase Agreement Subsidiary Insurer Promise to pay $500,000 Heirs Premium Payment $9,500,000 Stamp Liability $12,000,000 Reinsurance Agreement Subsidiary Insurer (Offshore) Cash Balance $9,500,000
Example #2 - Step 4 (five years hence) Insurer (Offshore) Booked Liability Removed from Balance Sheet $XXXXX Stock in Subsidiary Insurer payment $500,000 Heirs Cash drawdown Subsidiary Insurer (Offshore) Cash drawdown Taxable income to heirs but not Corporation Cash Balance $12,124,000 less cash drawdown
Example #2 - Step 5 (five years hence) Subsidiary Insurer (Offshore) Heirs As reserve need decreases release income for drawdown Cash drawdown Cash drawdown Taxable income to heirs but not Corporation
Example #3Make your office building disappear • Create offshore SPV • Sell building at fair market value to SPV • Insurance company guarantees floor value • SPV issues bonds on building value • SPV rents to seller with short term operating lease • SPV “owned” by Cayman orphanage
Conclusions • Complex does not equal bad • Risk transfer and asset securitization are potentially tools for good and bad • Is underlying purpose to support an inappropriate activity? • Accounting profession may be their own worst enemy • Complex may be harder to structure and sell - whether right or wrong