A CONTRARIAN Analysis

Group DaVinci Stan Grossman Jim Epley David Miller Meredith Hollowell GGS 684 10 February 2011 Secretary Colin Powell’s speech to the UN Security Council, 05 June 2003 A CONTRARIAN Analysis

Agenda • Profile of Saddam Hussein • Team B Alternative • Devil’s Advocate Deconstruction • What If Scenario • Conclusions

Saddam Hussein – Profile • Judicious political calculator • Commitments and loyalty are matters of circumstance, and circumstances change • Nothing must be permitted to stand in “the great struggler’s” messianic path • Messianic ambition for unlimited power • dreams will be realized when the Arab nation is unified under one strong leader – Hussein • Will go to whatever lengths are necessary to achieve his goals

Saddam Hussein – Profile • Three main threats after 1996: • Increased Security Vulnerabilities • Strengthening International Support • Increased Importance of WMD Program • Defying the international community on WMD is a regular reminder to the military of his courage in defying the superior adversary Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile Jerrold M. Post, M.D.

Team B Alternative Stan Grossman

Hypothesis • Saddam required at least the appearance of weapons of mass destruction to maintain his powerful, threatening image in the region, and to maintain the loyalty of his military. • Is it possible that this was a giant bluff to maintain his image of strength?

Method of Deception • Evaluate the chain of evidence and conclude that the links are solid and conclusive, or not • It is the job of a disinfo artist to interfere with these evaluations Twenty-Five Ways To Suppress Truth: The Rules of Disinformation H. Michael Sweeney The Ladder of Inference Mind Tools Ltd.

“Evidence-1” • 26 November & 20 January tapes • Misinterpretation – dual meanings • “evacuated” – to a central location for destruction? • “destroy” message – provides implication of something to hide while performing simple housekeeping

“Evidence-2” • Hard drives at weapons facilities replaced • One scientist possessed documents at home • Misdirection – shell game • Make world believe that weapons exist • Fabricate mantle of willyness – much admired trait

“Evidence-3” • Satellite photos of weapons movement • Misdirection – shell game • Fake movement designed to infer existence • Provide known “indicators” that can be false

“Evidence-4” • Accused UN inspectors of espionage • Big lie • Bluff and delaying tactic • Put “enemy” on the defensive

“Evidence-5” • Scientists warned not to cooperate with UN inspectors • Received counter-intelligence training • False implications – appearance of guilt • Implied threat infers guilt • Appearance of hiding things

“Evidence-6” • Defector provides details and returns of Iraq to his death under suspicious circumstances • Whatever lengths - ruthless • Send false information • Then eliminate the messenger to prevent recant

“Evidence-7” • Testimony by Iraqi officers to NBC and delivery mechanisms • Misinformation – “whistleblower” vs. adminstration • Provide false statements from “knowledgeable” sources • Complaint – no proof of destruction provided; no hard proof of existence provided either

“Evidence-8” • Intercepted communications on dual use items • Play up well documented chemical warfare history • “Why should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the doubt?” • Misdirection – exactly the point

“Evidence-9” • Acquisition and construction of missile and airborne WMD delivery vehicles • Misdirection – provide what the expect to see • Easy, low-cost, anticipated props to imply capability

Devil’s Advocate Deconstruction Jim Epley

Devil’s Advocate Analysis LEGO breakdown and reassemble process: • Outline the mainline judgment and key assumptions and characterize the evidence supporting that current analytic view. • Select one or more assumptions—stated or not—that appear the most susceptible to challenge. • Review the information used to determine whether any is of questionable validity, whether deception is possibly indicated, or whether major gaps exist. • Highlight the evidence that could support an alternative hypothesis or contradicts the current thinking. • Present to the group the findings that demonstrate there are flawed assumptions, poor quality evidence, or possible deception at work. • Consider drafting a separate contrarian paper that lays out the arguments for a different analytic conclusion if the review uncovers major analytic flaws.

“Evidence-1” • 26 November & 20 January tapes • Powell • Evacuate, not destroy • Effort to hide intent • Devil’s Advocate • “evacuated” – to a central location for destruction? • Arabic-to-English Linguists are in short-supply & being human, aren’t 100% accurate . • Arabic words for : 1. Evacuate, 2. Remove, and 3. Abolish sound similar when spoken (2 of 3 begin with an “IL” sound) • SIGINT Linguist may have gisted “evacuated “ inaccurately. • “destroy” message – embarrassed to be perceived as incompetent? • Destruction of sensitive communiqués is good housekeeping. • Destruction of classified material is the primary focus of an Emergency Action Plan ( EAP) which would have been in effect at the time.

“Evidence-2” • Hard drives at weapons facilities replaced • One scientist possessed documents at home • Powell • Deceive, hide, keep from inspectors • Devil’s Advocate • Periodic replacement of hard drives at sensitive locations is standard INFOSEC and OPSEC. • Many scientists, engineers, and even students take working papers & documents to continue work at home as I’m sure many of us in this room do (to our partners’ discontent). • Not all “classified” documents are nefarious in nature – In fact most are rather mundane.

“Evidence-2a” Road • “Detailed plans” for a UAV recovered from a residence* Rambler Cedar * Location: 5604 Flag Run Drive, Springfield, VA

“Evidence-3” • Satellite photos of weapons movement • Powell • Weapons exist based on “movement”, “signatures” • Devil’s Advocate • No corroborating hard evidence that anything at all was actually in the bunkers. • Decontamination vehicle is a high-pressure power washer which can be used for peaceful commercial purposes. • Even the Store-it-Yourself facility down US-29 in Fairfax has “Security”.

“Evidence-4” • Accused UN inspectors of espionage • Powell • Proof of guilt and attempt to coerce population • Devil’s Advocate • Saddam Hussein was a paranoid psychopath. • Patriotism is largely about national pride, and enforcement of inspections by foreigners questioned the legitimacy of Iraqi National Command Authority claims • Hence, cooperation with UN inspectors was unpatriotic, as they were foreign adversaries that were conducting activities that violated Iraqi sovereignty because the didn’t have the best interests of Iraq at heart (i.e., espionage).

“Evidence-5” • Scientists warned not to cooperate with UN inspectors • Received counter-intelligence training • Powell • Indicates attempt to hide truth • Devil’s Advocate • Purpose of CI is to prevent the inadvertent passing of sensitive information to foreign adversaries. • CI Awareness Training is standard OPSEC regularly practiced all over the world. • US normally provides CI Awareness Training annually. • More sensitive US positions require periodic polygraph examinations in addition to CI Awareness Training.

“Evidence-6” • Defector provides details and returns of Iraq to his death under suspicious circumstances • Powell • Details provide proof if existence • Suspicious death is validation of details • Devil’s Advocate • Defector was conducting espionage – Hence he actually was a traitor to Saddam Hussein. • May have over-inflated his importance/knowledge/ value by sensationalizing claims & over-reaching. • Traitor would have naturally wanted to tell the interrogators (what he thought ) they would want to hear to keep from being sent back to “certain death” in Iraq for espionage.

“Evidence-7” • Testimony by Iraqi officers to NBC and delivery mechanisms • Powell • Proof of existence • Devil’s Advocate • “Delivery mechanisms” can deliver anything. • Similar argument was made against US when Gary Powers was shot down in his U2 over USSR: • He stated that he was pushing a button to take pictures, • Soviets asserted that he could have been pushing a button to drop bombs, • Following that logic, Gary Powers could have released chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from a US plane over the USSR. • It is very difficult to prove a negative.

“Evidence-8” • Intercepted communications on dual use items • Powell • Need for SIGINT and HUMINT • Well documented chemical warfare history • “Why should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the doubt?” • Devil’s Advocate • Intelligence cited has not been fused and data that were presented were only separate instances of Single-Source Intelligence which hardly qualified as Multi-INT. • Incidents presented were neither thoroughly correlated nor properly substantiated – Much of it was RUMINT at best.

“Evidence-9” • Acquisition and construction of missile and airborne WMD delivery vehicles • Powell • Clear indication of intent • Devil’s Advocate • UAV/UAS platform didn’t fly beyond the stated range limitation either one-way or round-trip. • Demonstration wasn’t technically a violation. • UAV/UAS platforms are also excellent for aerial surveillance and some have no lethality whatsoever: • Global Hawk (remember earlier diagram) • Fire Scout (also made by Northrop Grumman)

Devil’s Advocate Deconstruction #2 David Miller

IRAQ’S WMD THREAT • Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction. • Secretary Powell, UN Security Council, February 5, 2003 • Iraq is not cooperating and is producing WMDs. All weapons—biological, chemical, missile, nuclear, were destroyed. General Hussein Kamal, former director of Iraq’s weapons programs, to UNSCOM in August 22, 1995, after defecting from Iraq. Killed upon returning to Iraq in 1996. • Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites. …it is seen from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation on process. R • Dr. Hans Blix, UN Chief Weapons Inspector, UN Security Council, February 14, 2003 • Iraq is cooperating and is not producing WMDs.

IRAQ’S WMD THREAT • What we see is a deliberate campaign to prevent any meaningful inspection work. • Secretary Powell, UN Security Council, February 5, 2003 • Inspections are not working. • UNMOVIC inspections are more sophisticated, and receiving more cooperation from the Iraqis, than previous UNSCOM inspections, and UNSCOM destroyed more chemical and biological weapons facilities than the Gulf war. No evidence that Colin Powell has presented today suggests we need to rush headlong into war. • Dr. Ian Davis, British American Security Information Council, February 5, 2003 • Inspections are working.

Biological & Chemical Weapons • There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. • Secretary Powell, UN Security Council, February 5, 2003 • Iraq has and is building WMDs. From 27 November 2002 to 17 March 2003, UNMOVIC conducted over 90 inspections of (biological and chemical) munitions-related facilities in Iraq. No evidence of either current or recent development or production of proscribed munitions was uncovered. UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (MOVIC), 2003 • While we were never able to provide 100 percent certainty regarding the disposition of Iraq's proscribed weaponry, we did ascertain a 90-95 percent level of verified disarmament. • Scott Ritter, UN weapons inspector from 1991-98 (UNSCOM), July 20, 2002 • There is little or no evidence of WMDs in Iraq.

Chemical Weapons • In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity in this picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons activity. • Secretary Powell, UN Security Council, February 5, 2003 • Proves weapons activity • The "decontamination vehicles" U.N. teams were led to by U.S. information invariably turned out to be simple water or fire trucks. • Inspector Jorn Siljeholm, MOVIC, March 19, 2003 • Does not prove weapons activity

Nuclear Weapons • We have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons. • Secretary Powell, UN Security Council, February 5, 2003 • Iraq has an active nuclear weapons program. • The Intelligence Bureau and the State Department at this time we were preparing Secretary Powell (for the UN speech) dissented on one key issue. And they essentially said there was no active nuclear program in Iraq. • Laurence Wilkerson, Chief of Staff, U.S. Department of State, statement on preparing Secretary Powell for UN speech • Iraq does not have an active nuclear weapons program.

Nuclear Weapons We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program. Secretary Powell, UN Security Council, February 5, 2003 • Iraq is still pursuing nuclear weapons. • First, we have inspected all of those buildings and facilities that were identified, through satellite imagery, as having been modified or constructed over the past four years. No prohibited nuclear activities have been identified during these inspections. • Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General IAEA, UN Security Council, January 27, 2003 • No evidence that Iraq is pursuing nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapons Sites  Bombed by Israelis, 1981     Bombed by coalition, 1990-93           Monitored by IAEA     • Nuclear sites were either destroyed or are being monitored.

Ballistic Missiles • What I want you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that can fly over 1,000 kilometers. • Secretary Powell, UN Security Council, February 5, 2003 • Iraq has an active ballistic missile program. • Iraq doesn’t have the capability to do long-range ballistic missiles. There is a lot of testing that has to take place, and this testing is all carried out outdoors. They can’t avoid detection. • Scott Ritter, UN weapons inspector from 1991-98 (UNSCOM), 2002 • Iraq does not have a ballistic missile capability.

What If Scenario Meredith Hollowell

“What If?” Analysis A Trail of Causation • Assumes an event has occurred with potential (negative or positive) impact and explains how it might come about. Focuses on the causes of an event vs. its consequences (HI/LP). • Useful for challenging a strong mindset that a confidently made forecast might not be entirely justified. • Use of this technique is important when examining a decision based on questionable or limited information, providing policymakers with a cautionary counterpoint to the conventional wisdom. • Steps to take: Think backwards and develop a plausible pathway through which this hypothetical event occurs. • Present to the group the findings that enable decision-makers to ‘hedge their bets’ even if the conventional analytic line is accepted. • Continue to monitor any indicators as the situation develops.

Conventional Analytic Line • According to Powell’s UN Security Council Brief and the “evidence” compiled: • Saddam Hussein has WMDs • Saddam Hussein has shown megalomaniacal tendencies • Conclusion: To protect the free world we must preempt any attack

“What If?” Scenario • The possibility of a total economic collapse is remote, but what if, as a result of acting on the conventional analysis the US finds itself in a protracted two theater war, causing a catastrophic economic collapse and therefore weakened ability to deal with potential security threats?

Thinking Backwards • Steps leading up to a total economic collapse • Act on hearsay and circumstantial findings that Iraq has WMDs • Military Action – invade Iraq as a coalition force with the intent to force Saddam’s hand • Due to overwhelming fire power and Saddam’s reduced capability fighting attrition-style warfare from the first Gulf War, coalition forces easily topple Saddam’s regime and kill Saddam Hussein • Prior to being ousted Saddam makes one last bid at vengeance • Destroys profit-making infrastructure to prevent coalition use of it.

Thinking Backwards (cont) • Fear on the part of the US to leave a political and security vacuum (similar to Afghanistan in the ’90’s) necessitates an increased presence on the ground in Iraq • Now fighting two full-time wars • Increased military spending • Iran, seeing a vulnerable US, floods the world market with cheap oil • Causes OPEC nations to slow their purchase of US national debt • China, seizing the opportunity to increase their sphere of influence, also stops buying US national debt • Causes a catastrophic meltdown of the US economy

Historical Perspective • Nation building, governance overhauls and examples of their failures • Vietnam (’65-’75) • Haiti (1994) • Bosnia (’95-’04)

Parting Remarks • Some Implications • In the ensuing chaos of the toppled regime in Iraq some of the WMDs, prior to confiscation, go missing • In the weakened state caused by a second Great Depression these missing WMDs can more easily be used against us, to more devastating effect • Caveats • Difficult to construct a “What If?” storyline, looking in hindsight • Natural tendency to mimic the path history took • Prevents a more thorough analysis

Conclusions

Conclusions • Based on: • Saddam Hussein’s profile and known disinformation techniques • Evidence with multiple possible presentations • Contradictory evidence • And previously unconsidered impacts • There is a low probability that Iraq is in possession of or is pursuing the stockpiling of WMD • And that this could be a case of posturing in an attempt to appear strong and still viable as a national, regional, and global leader

A CONTRARIAN Analysis