Why Don’t People Always Help Others in Need?

1. Why Don’t People Always Help Others in Need? • Diffusion of responsibility • presence of others leads to decreased help response • we all think someone else will help, so we don’t

2. Why Don’t People Always Help Others in Need? • Latane studies • several scenarios designed to measure the help response • found that if you think you’re the only one that can hear or help, you are more likely to do so • if there are others around, you will diffuse the responsibility to others • Kitty Genovese incident

3. Before group discussion Group 1 Group 2 For Against Strength of opinion (a) After group discussion Group 1 Group 2 For Against Strength of opinion (b) Social Pressure in Group Decisions • Group polarization • majority position stronger after a group discussion in which a minority is arguing against the majority point of view • Why does this occur? • informational and normative influences

4. Social Pressure in Group Decisions • Groupthink • group members try to maintain harmony and unanimity in group • can lead to some better decisions and some worse decisions than individuals

5. Influence of Others’ Requests - Compliance • Sales techniques and cognitive dissonance • four-walls technique • question customer in such a way that gets answers consistent with the idea that they need to own object • feeling of cognitive dissonance results if person chooses not to buy this thing that they “need”

6. Sales Techniques and Cognitive Dissonance • Foot-in-the-door technique • ask for something small at first, then hit customer with larger request later • small request has paved the way to compliance with the larger request • cognitive dissonance results if person has already granted a request for one thing, then refuses to give the larger item

7. The Reciprocity Norm and Compliance • We feel obliged to return favors, even those we did not want in the first place • opposite of foot-in-the-door • salesperson gives something to customer with idea that they will feel compelled to give something back (buying the product) • even if person did not wish for favor in the first place

8. Percentage donating Neither Pregiving Both Foot-in- the-door Type of solicitation Combining Sales Techniques • What happens if you combine reciprocity norm with foot-in-the-door? • Hypothesis - the 2 techniques will cancel each other out • Bell, et. al. (1994) study • Evidence supports hypothesis

9. Preventing Reactance Against Pressure • Psychological reactance • if pressure is too blatant, has opposite of intended effect • leads to salespeople using softer techniques so that person feels they have a choice • often phrase pressure into questions • “would you please put your books and notes away for the quiz?”

10. Obedience • Obedience • compliance of person is due to perceived authority of asker • request is perceived as a command • Milgram interested in unquestioning obedience to orders

11. Stanley Milgram’s Studies • Basic study procedure • teacher and learner (learner always confederate) • watch learner being strapped into chair -- learner expresses concern over his “heart condition”

12. Stanley Milgram’s Studies • Teacher to another room with experimenter • Shock generator panel – 15 to 450 volts, labels “slight shock” to “XXX” • Asked to give higher shocks for every mistake learner makes

13. Shock Level Switch Labels and Voltage Levels Switch Labels and Voltage Levels Shock Level “Slight Shock” 15 30 45 60 “Moderate Shock” 75 90 105 120 “Strong Shock” 135 150 165 180 “Very Strong Shock” 195 210 225 240 “Intense Shock” 255 270 285 300 “Extreme Intensity Shock” 315 330 345 360 “Danger: Severe Shock” 375 390 405 420 “XXX” 435 450 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Stanley Milgram’s Studies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

14. 120 150 300 330 “Ugh! Hey this really hurts.” “Ugh! Experimenter! That’s all. get me out of here. I told you I had heart trouble. My heart’s starting to bother me now.” (agonized scream) “I absolutely refuse to answer any more. get me out of here You can’t hold me here. Get me out.” “(intense & prolonged agonized scream) “Let me out of here. Let me out of here. My heart’s bothering me. Let me out, I tell you…” Stanley Milgram’s Studies • Learner protests more and more as shock increases • Experimenter continues to request obedience even if teacher balks

15. Obedience • How many people would go to the highest shock level? • 65% of the subjects went to the end, even those that protested

16. Percentage of subjects who obeyed experimenter Slight (15-60) Moderate (75-120) Strong (135-180) Intense (255-300) Very strong (195-240) Extreme intensity (315-360) Danger: severe (375-420) XXX (435-450) Shock levels in works Obedience

17. Explanations for Milgram’s Results • Abnormal group of subjects? • numerous replications with variety of groups shows no support • People in general are sadistic? • videotapes of Milgram’s subjects show extreme distress

18. Explanations for Milgram’s Results • Authority of Yale and value of science • Experimenter self-assurance and acceptance of responsibility • Proximity of learner and experimenter • New situation and no model of how to behave

19. Percentage of subjects administering the maximum shock (450 volts) Follow-Up Studies to Milgram • Original study • Different building • Teacher with learner • Put hand on shock • Orders by phone • Ordinary man orders • 2 teachers rebel • Teacher chooses shock level

20. Critiques of Milgram • Although 84% later said they were glad to have participated and fewer than 2% said they were sorry, there are still ethical issues • Do these experiments really help us understand real-world atrocities?

21. Cooperation and Social Dilemmas • Social dilemma • action/inaction will benefit individual, but harm others in the group, and cause more harm than good to everyone if everyone takes that course • Use of games to study social dilemmas • one-shot prisoner’s dilemma • iterative prisoner’s dilemma • effect of adding players

22. One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Game • 2 prisoners must decide between silence and confession • Both silent = both get relatively short prison sentences • Both confess = both get moderate prison sentences • One confesses = confessor gets no sentence, partner gets very long sentence • No communication between players until both have chosen

23. Player 2 Cooperates Defects $3 $0 $3 $5 Cooperates Player 1 $5 $1 $0 $1 Defects One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Game • Game in lab setting • choice to cooperate or defect • consequence is monetary • highest vs. lowest individual payoff • highest vs. lowest total payoff

24. Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma Game • 2 players play same game repeatedly • Iterative nature changes logic for players • Rapoport’s Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy • first time you meet new partner, cooperate • for all other trials, do to partner what they did to you on previous trial • can’t “win” with TFT • this strategy gets others to cooperate

25. Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma Game • Why is TFT effective in gaining cooperation? • it’s nice - cooperates from the start, encouraging cooperation • it’s not exploitable - discourages defection by reciprocating each defection • it’s forgiving - as soon as partner begins cooperating, TFT reciprocates • it’s transparent - partner quickly learns that best strategy is to cooperate

26. Player 2 Cooperates Defects Gratitude Anger Gratitude Guilt Cooperates Player 1 Guilt Disaffection Anger Disaffection Defects Emotions and Cooperation • Cooperation + cooperation • Failure to cooperate + failure to cooperate • Cooperation + failure to cooperate • Failure to cooperate + cooperation

27. Social Identity and Cooperation • Social identity theory • states that when you’re assigned to a group, you automatically think of that group as an in-group for you • Sherif’s camp study • 11-12 year old boys at camp • boys were divided into 2 groups and kept separate from one another • each group took on characteristics of distinct social group, with leaders, rules, norms of behavior, and names

28. Sherif’s Camp Study • Leaders proposed series of competitive interactions • Led to 3 changes between groups and within groups • within-group solidarity • negative stereotyping of other group • hostile between-group interactions

29. Sherif’s Camp Study • Overcoming the strong we/they effect • establishment of superordinate goals • e.g., breakdown in camp water supply • overcoming intergroup strife - research • stereotypes are diluted when people share individuating information

30. Summary • When we help others, when we don’t • presence of others • diffusion of responsibility • Group decision making • group polarization • groupthink

31. Summary • Compliance • sales techniques • Obedience • Milgram’s studies • Cooperation • Sherif’s camp study