Assessment-relativism and judgments of taste

1. Assessment-relativism and judgments of taste November 14th, 2008

2. Something “subjective” about judgments of taste: Objective judgments: • “Andy Kaufman was born on January 17th, 1949.” • “Ryan had lunch today at the business school.” Subjective judgments: • “Andy Kaufman was hilarious.” • “The food at the business school cafeteria is delicious.”

3. Something “subjective” about judgments of taste (cont’d): Why think that judgments of taste are subjective? • Widespread, seemingly intractable disagreement • Objectivism would commit us to implausible attributions of sensory-failure (e.g. humor-blindness) • Lack of deference • Willingness to judge things according to our own standards, despite the fact that, when pressed, we can give no argument as to why our standards are the “correct” ones

4. Something “subjective” about judgments of taste (cont’d): If we want to construe taste judgments as “subjective,” then we are left with two viable options: • Contextualism • Relativism Relativist’s argument against contextualism: Relativism, unlike contextualism, can make sense of disagreement about matters of taste

5. Contextualism: Contextualism: subjectivity as part of the content of taste judgments “Andy Kaufman was hilarious” Andy Kaufman was hilarious according to my/our sense of humor. “The food at the business school cafeteria is delicious.” The food at the business school cafeteria is delicious according to my/our gustatory sensibilities.

6. Contextualism (cont’d): Problem: contextualism fails to make sense of disagreements about matters of taste Bob: “Andy Kaufman was hilarious.” Andy Kaufman was hilarious according to Bob’s sense of humor. It is not true that Andy Kaufman was hilarious according to Bob’s sense of humor. Andy Kaufman wasn’t funny at all according to David’s sense of humor. David: “That’s not true. Andy Kaufman wasn’t funny at all.”

7. Contextualism (cont’d): Response: the standards that we relativize to are shared standards Bob: “Andy Kaufman was hilarious.” Andy Kaufman was hilarious according our shared sense of humor. It is not true that Andy Kaufman was hilarious according to our shared sense of humor. Andy Kaufman wasn’t funny at all according to our shared sense of humor. David: “That’s not true. Andy Kaufman wasn’t funny at all.”

8. Contextualism (cont’d): Worry: disagreements persist even when it becomes apparent that there are no shared standards Response: in such cases, our assertions aim at “accommodation”

9. Contextualism (cont’d): Further worry: disagreement only seems possible within the bounds of a single conversation • Bob overhears David saying, “Andy Kaufman wasn’t funny at all.” • Ryan overhears Selim saying, “The food at the business school • cafeteria isn’t all that tasty.” Response: disagreement is secured so long as we presuppose commonality of standards Further worry: predicts that perception of disagreement should disappear in cases where it becomes apparent that standards are not shared Yet another worry: predicts a more cautious epistemology than one might expect

10. Contextualism (cont’d): Possible response: contextualism as a revelatory thesis (e.g. Harman) • Stipulating semantic-blindness comes at a theoretical cost • Can the relativist can avoid making the same stipulation?

11. Relativism: “One might now despair of ever getting subjectivity and disagreement into the same picture. Perhaps we just have to choose. This is where the relativist comes in with her seductive song. “You can have it both ways,” she says, “if you just accept that propositions about the funny [and] the delicious… have truth values only relative to a person or perspective. When I say that apples are delicious and you deny this, you are denying the very same proposition that I am asserting. We genuinely disagree. Yet this proposition may be true for you but false for me.” - MacFarlane, “Relativism and Disagreement” pp. 7-8.

12. Relativism (cont’d): Relativism: content of claims expressed by taste judgments have no built-in subjectivity; rather, the subjectivity is built-in to the way that we assess these judgments “Andy Kaufman was hilarious.” Andy Kaufman was hilarious. Whether T/F for a given assessor depends on whether Andy Kaufman was hilarious according to the sense of humor of that assessor “The food at the business school cafeteria is delicious.” The food at the business school cafeteria is delicious. Whether T/F for a given assessor depending on whether the food at the business school is delicious according to the gustatory sensibilities of that assessor

13. Relativism (cont’d): Bob: “Andy Kaufman was hilarious.” Andy Kaufman was hilarious. David: “That’s not true. Andy Kaufman wasn’t funny at all.” It is not true that Andy Kaufman was hilarious. Andy Kaufman wasn’t funny at all. Bob as assessor: Bob has spoken truly, and David has spoken falsely David as assessor: Bob has spoken falsely, and David has spoken truly

14. Relativism (cont’d): Analogy with possible-worlds semantics: • Taken as orthodoxy that propositional truth is relative to possible-worlds • Barack Obama was elected as the 44th president of the United States • True in the actual world • False in worlds where McCain won the election; where the American revolution was a failure, etc. • So, why not relativize propositional truth to other parameters (e.g. time, sense of humor, etc.)?

15. Relativism (cont’d): Disanalogy with possible-worlds semantics: • Relativism introduced as a way of providing for the possibility disagreement about matters of taste where standards are not shared • But, possible-worlds semantics does not provide for the possibility of disagreement where worlds are not shared

16. Relativism (cont’d): Suppose I were to say, here and now, “Barack Obama was elected as the 44th president of the United States”: • The proposition that I express (that Barack Obama…) is true in the actual world, and false in worlds where McCain won the election • At the same time, it would be a mistake for someone in a McCain world to judge that I have spoken falsely • This is because my utterance concerns the actual world, and not the McCain worlds; as such, it would be a mistake to evaluate the truth of my utterance by appeal to any world other than the actual world • So, for the possible-worlds semanticist, while propositional truth might be relative, utterance truth is absolute • What the relativist wants us to embrace is relativism about utterance truth

17. Worries about relativism: Does our ordinary conception of (utterance) truth admit of relativity? A: “There are three chairs in the living room.” B: ##“Well, perhaps there are three chairs in the living room for you, but there are only two for me.” Banal cases of “for you/for me”: A: “This sweater is too tight.” B: “Well, perhaps it is too tight for you, but it’s not too tight for me.” Observation: In ordinary conversation when I claim, “p,” and you respond, “Maybe p for you, but ~p for me,” my immediate reaction is to search out a relevant relativistic feature of the content of my original claim. Absent such an apparent feature (e.g. in the “Well, perhaps there are three chairs in the living room for you...” case), I am left baffled. Or at least so it seems.

18. Worries about relativism (cont’d): Why would we engage in this sort of linguistic practice? • As MacFarlane points out, engaging in an assessment-relative discourse facilitates disagreement within a domain where there are no “objective” facts of the matter • Why not just stick with talk of what we (dis)like? • Why not adopt a contextualist discourse? Response: disagreement provides us impetus to “coordinate”

19. Worries about relativism (cont’d): But how? • At least in cases where our disagreement is owed just to differences in taste, there is nothing one person can say to another to (rationally) bring her to “coordinate”; relative to her context of assessment, she is in the right • With respect to persuasion/coordination via rational argument, contextualism and relativism are on equal footing Pragmatic motivation? • Insofar as I have motivation to get along with you, make collective plans, etc., the fact that we disagree about matters of taste might provide me with pragmatic reasons to alter those tastes • But these motivations are present even if we restrict ourselves to talk of (dis)likes • In this respect as well, then, relativism and contextualism are on equal footing

20. Worries about relativism (cont’d): Brute disposition to resolve (logical) disagreement? • At least in cases where our dispute is owed just to differences in taste, we can have neither epistemic nor pragmatic reason to “coordinate” • So, any tendency to “coordinate” would have to be entirely non-rational • Seems a little spooky/arbitrary

21. fin