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Security in Application & SDLC. Barkan Asaf Nov, 2006. Security Perimeter. Application. Load Balancer. App Server. Application Client. Application Layer. Databases. Web Server. Proxy. Hardened OS. Network Layer. Firewall. Firewall. Firewall. External Network. DMZ.
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Security in Application& SDLC Barkan Asaf Nov, 2006
Security Perimeter Application Load Balancer App Server Application Client Application Layer Databases Web Server Proxy Hardened OS Network Layer Firewall Firewall Firewall ExternalNetwork DMZ Internal Segment Internal Segment
Security Regulations& Standards "70% of today's successful hacks involve Web Application attacks " SPI Dynamics
Vulnerability Stack & Security scanners Web Application Security scanner Network level Security scanner
Technical vs. LogicalVulnerabilities • Logical Flaws • Security vulnerabilities that arise with somecontextual logic in application. • Example: • Multi step procedure that can be bypassed with direct invocation • Technical Vulnerability • Security vulnerabilities that can be discovered without anycontextual logic • Examples: • HTML Injection • SQL Injection • Web Application scanners limitations/challenges • Session state management - • Script parsing • Logical flows • Custom URLs • Privilege escalation • False negative/positive Technical vs. Logical Vulnerabilities at WhiteHat
Release Cycle Security Tollgates inSoftware Development Life Cycle (SDLC) Product Requirements Functional Design Technical Design Implementation Testing Beta Security Tollgates Architectural Risk Analysis Security Requirements Document Secure Coding Security Testing
Unvalidated Input (A1) Description HTTP inputs into the application are not validated. Include URL, Headers, query strings, cookies, form fields, hidden fields. Leads to almost all web application vulnerabilities. Threats Client-side Attacks (3), Command Execution (4), Denial of Service (6.2) Demonstration Validation layers • Counter measures • Use Application level validation that includes: • Strong data type • Length • Logical Boundaries • Legal characters • Correct Syntax
Broken Access Control (A2) Description Authorization boundaries in code are broken or not properly enforced. Threats Credential/Session prediction (2.1), Insufficient Authorization (2.3) Insufficient process validation (6.4) • Counter measures • Robust authorization management • Do not trust client side tokens for authorization • Authorize all requests except anonymous objects • Block resource enumeration and Forced Browsing in application
Broken Authentication & Session Management (A3) Description A weak implementation of Authentication framework or unsecure Session management. Threats Brute Force (1.1), Insufficient Authentication (1.2), Insufficient session expiration (2.3), Session fixation session (2.4), Session prediction (2.1) Demonstration • Counter measures • Use Random GUID as session indication • Assign session id only after authentication • Assign new session id when change from HTTP<->HTTPS • Correlate session indication with valid session object in application • Use standard and robust Password policy enforcement • Use standard and robust Lockout policy enforcement • Do not trust client to send session state (session GUID only)
Cross Site Scripting (A4) Description Attacker is using a vulnerable web application into sending unintentionally a user (Victim) a malicious active script that will be executed on its browser and breach his security framework. Threats Client-side attacks (3) Demonstration Demonstration XSS Demo • Counter measures • Use Application level validation that will either negatively or positively validate all • inputs coming from untrusted clients. • Use HTML encoding centrally in presentation layer
Buffer Overflows (A5) • Description • The attacker sends data to a program, which it stores in an undersized stack buffer. • The result is that a either corrupted or malicious code is executed. • Buffer overflow vulnerabilities typically occur in code that: • Relies on external data to control its behavior • Depends upon external properties of the data • Is so complex that a programmer cannot accurately predict its behavior Threats Buffer overflow (4.1) Code Example char buf[BUFSIZE]; gets(buf); • Counter measures • Use interpreted languages as Java/Python • Validate your input boundaries and size before processing
Injection Flaws (A6) Description Attacker is using Injection flaws to relay malicious code through a web application to another System. The code is executed on behalf of the web application. Threats Command execution (4), Denial of Service (6.2) Example SQL Injection - Code example • Counter measures • Use Application level validation that will either negatively or positively validate all • inputs coming from untrusted clients. • Use prepared statements and set each parameter before use in query
Improper Error Handling (A7) Description Improper handling of errors in application can result with the application sending the attacker Error messages that reveal implementation/architecture/components information he should not know. Threats Information leakage (5.2) • Example • throw SQL exceptions back to client • throw stack trace on Web service exceptions • throw Application server stack trace back to client • Counter measures • Catch all exceptions in server side – never throw exception to client • Handle all errors in back end • Do not send the user excessive information that is not required as Platform architecture • ports in use , components in use and more.
Insecure Storage (A8) Description Improper usage/implementation of cryptographic in code application. Examples Saving private key of SSL server on File system as clear text Saving DB connection object as clear text on file system Failure to encrypt critical data Poor sources of randomness Poor choice of algorithm Attempting to invent a new encryption algorithm Failure to include support for encryption key changes Threats Information leakage (5.2), Insufficient Authentication (1.2) • Counter measures • Use well known and proven cryptographic • Choose a suited algorithm according to security/performance trade-off • Make secrets in memory not serialized • Make keys replaceable and configurable by size if possible • Encrypt all private/confidential credentials
Denial Of Service (A9) Description All actions or procedures in application that will make it unusable. Network level attacks are not Included in here. Threats Denial of Service (6.2) • Example • Resource starvation when all concurrent users are used by zombies • HTML persistence injection causes DoS to the application main page • Counter measures • Use well known and proven cryptographic • Choose a suited algorithm according to security/performance trade-off • Make secrets in memory not serialized • Make keys replaceable and configurable by size if possible • Encrypt all private/confidential credentials
Insecure Configuration Management (A10) Description Insecure usage of servers/components configuration. Mostly out of the box settings are not secure. • Examples • Unpatched security flaws in the server software • Web server Misconfigurations (directory listing/traversal enabled) • Unnecessary default, backup, or sample files • Improper file and directory permissions • Unnecessary services enabled • Default accounts with their default passwords • Administrative or debugging functions that are enabled or accessible • Overly informative error messages (more details in the error handling section) • Unsecre usage of certificates Threats Insufficient Authentication (1.2), Insufficient authorization (2.2), SSI Injection (4.6), Directory indexing (5.1), Information leakage (5.2), Path traversal (5.3), Predictable Recourse Location (5.4), Abuse of Functionality (6.1) • Counter measures • make hardening procedure to infrastructure before shipping
Summary • Loose the naïve approach regard client’s behavior * • Validate all inputs from untrusted clients * • No Such thing as Security in client side • Use standard security solutions/configuration • Make sure the client gets only the responses he needs * • Remove legacy/unnecessary resources from production app
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) The script, sent by the attacked client to the server was then received again by the client, now with the proper security context, and was able to send the cookie to the attacker A4
SQL Injection – Code example By passing Login logic using SQL Injection flaw SQLQuery = "SELECT Username FROM Users WHERE Username = ‘" & strUsername & "‘ AND Password = ‘" & strPassword & "‘" strAuthCheck = GetQueryResult(SQLQuery) If strAuthCheck = "" boolAuthenticated = False Else boolAuthenticated = True End If Explanation: If Username=‘ or 1=1 this will be evaluated to true always and the SQLQuery will be resolved to true Returning the first record in Users table and bypassing the login logic Using UNION to concatenate data to flawed query SELECT FirstName, LastName, Title FROM Employees WHERE City = ‘‘ UNION ALL SELECT OtherField FROM OtherTable WHERE ‘‘=‘‘ Explanation: City = ‘’ will return null from DB and the only record sets returned From DB will be from the new query A6
Validation layers (Secure in depth) Web related issues Logic boundries Persistence breaches A1