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Chapter 7: The Operational Dimension. Contents of Chapter 7:. (Introduction of Military Interventions) Preventive Operations Planning for Military Intervention Carrying Out Military Intervention Following Up Military Intervention A Doctrine for Human Protection Operations. Introduction.
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Contents of Chapter 7: • (Introduction of Military Interventions) • Preventive Operations • Planning for Military Intervention • Carrying Out Military Intervention • Following Up Military Intervention • A Doctrine for Human Protection Operations
Introduction • 7.1: Military Intervention is different from: • Warfighting • Traditional Peacekeeping Operations • 7.2: Requires more ‘robust’ action than the Traditional Peacekeeping • 7.3: Military Intervention = the Last Resort
Preventive Operations • 7.4: Two Categories of Preventive Military Operations • First is: ‘’Preventive Deployment’’ • (7.5): Example of ‘’Preventive Deployment’’ = UNPREDEP in Macedonia (1992-1999) • (7.6):Second is: Deployed resources without actual intervention on the territory • 7.7: IF both 1 and 2 fail then they may be turned into an Intervention Tool to begin Military Interventions
Planning for Military Intervention • 7.8: Careful advance planning is required: • Military preventative actions • Post-conflict operations Coalition Building: • 7.9: Multinational Coalitions have disadvantages and must be prepared for them • 7.10: UNITAF, UNOSOM I, NATO, UNFROFOR, etc. • 7.11: Common political resolve and common political military approach • 7.12: Greatly important to stress BOTH
Contintued...Planning for Military Intervention Objectives: • 7.13: ‘’coalition partners may well have different ideas about the objectives through intervention action.’’ • 7.14: ‘’Differences in objectives often emerge in discussion over the ‘exit strategy’.’’
Contintued...Planning for Military Intervention Mandate: • 7.15: Clear and unambiguous mandate = Most important requirement • 7.16: Objective of Mandate = military commanders understanding their mission • 7.17: Mandates will inevitably need to be adjusted to meet new demands during intervention
Contintued...Planning for Military Intervention Resources and Commitment: • 7.18: Careful preparation of required resources • 7.19: Level of Resources, Broad international support
Carrying Out Military Intervention Command Structure: • 7.20: Unity of command is essential for the successful conduct of operations • 7.21: Tight Political Control with Clear Objectives
Continued…Carrying Out Military Intervention Civil-Military Relations: • 7.22: Tensions usually arise between collaboration of Military Forces, Civilian Authorities, and Humanitarian Agencies • 7.23: Dedicated humanitarian organizations • 7.24: Required military force may sometimes make it impossible for humanitarian workers to help • 7.25: Attempts of Coordination, can also create additional turmoil
Continued…Carrying Out Military Intervention Applying Force: • 7.30: The strategy of Surprise; not always possible • 7.31: Amount of military power, ‘’The operation is not war but an operation to protect populations’’ • 7.32: Compensation for disadvantages must be focused on during the beginning planning stages
Continued…Carrying Out Military Intervention Casualties: • 7.33: Casualities caused by lost purpose of Responsibility to Protect Humanitarian Interests • 7.34: Defense from intervening force is Important, but Should Not Be the Principle Objective
Continued…Carrying Out Military Intervention Media Relations: • 7. 35: Media will expose and give worldwide criticism to anyone that attempts to excessively use overwhelming military power • 7.36: Media has an impact on enforcement and public support therefore, deadly force must be used at a tolerated level • 7.37: Planning for Operation to Protect should include detailed sub-concept for public information
Following Up Military Intervention Transfer of Authority • 7.38: Main Mission = to provide the safe environment necessary for the restoration of good governance and law • 7.39: Transition of Responsibility from Military Authorities to the Civilian Authorities as soon as possible
Continued… Following Up Military Intervention Peacekeeping and Peace Building • 7.40: Post-intervention requirement to remain engaged to sustain the peace and stability • 7.41: Internal security challenge remaining = ‘’old’’ habits will return + immediate aftermaths spawn: • Organized crime • Revenge attacks • Arms proliferation • Looting and theft
Continued… Following Up Military Intervention Five Protection Tasks • 7.42: Five Protection Tasks that emerge from post-enforcement experiences; 1) Protection of Minorities • 7.43: 2) Security Sector Reform: build up local authorities in the society and transfer knowledge and insights • 7.44: Civilian Police = high priority for a society’s growth of stability
Continued… Following Up Military Intervention Five Protection Tasks continued… • 7.45: 3) Disarmament, Demobilization, and reintegration • 7.46: Consent/Voluntary Disarmament = challenged by issues • 7.47: No doctrinal political and military descretion to pursue a coercive strategy for purpose of Disarmament and etc. • 7.48: 4) Mine Action: • United Nations Mine Action Service • Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining • additional Mine Action Centres
Continued… Following Up Military Intervention Five Protection Tasks continued… • 7.49: 5) The Pursuit of War Criminals; possible demand of military forces during/following these enforcement actions due to possible hostility
A Doctrine for Human Protection Operations 7.50: Summary • Responsibility to Protect = Different from: • Traditional War-fighting • and UN Peacekeeping Operations • Close reference Chapter 4, ‘’Doctrine for Human Protection Operations’’ • Request for solution of the open ended: Coercive Intervention in Article 7.47
Continued… A Doctrine for Human Protection Operations 7.51: What the requested Doctrine of Coercive Intervention Should Include: • Clearly defined political objective with matching resources and rules of engagement (see Articles 7.13 – 7.14) • Politically controlled intervention with a specified military commander with a single military chain that follows with unity of purpose (see Article 7.20) • Aim to enforce compliance, NOT for the purpose of defeat of the state; must have objective to protect and maintain the peace
Continued… A Doctrine for Human Protection Operations 7.51: What the requested Doctrine of Coercive Intervention Should Include: • Guarantee maximum protection of the civilian population • Adherence to International Humanitarian Law • Defense of the intervening force should never take priority over resolve to accomplish the mission (see Article 7.34) • Maximum coordination between Military Authorities, Civilian Authorities, and Humanitarian Organizations (see Article 7.22)