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Field Evidence

Field Evidence. Overview. Contests Lotteries: r = 1 Experimental Investigation of Lotteries Application of Lotteries to Public Goods provision. Field Evidence. Landry, Lange, List, Price, and Rupp (QJE, 2006): ''Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity:

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Field Evidence

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  1. Field Evidence

  2. Overview • Contests • Lotteries: r = 1 • Experimental Investigation of Lotteries • Application of Lotteries to Public Goods provision

  3. Field Evidence Landry, Lange, List, Price, and Rupp (QJE, 2006): ''Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment.''

  4. Landry, Lange, List, Price, and Rupp (QJE, 2006)

  5. Experimental Evidence Lange, List, and Price (International Economic Review, 2007) “Using Lotteries to Finance Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence”

  6. Lange, List, and Price (IER, 2007)

  7. Lange, List, and Price (IER, 2007)

  8. Lange, List, and Price (IER, 2007)

  9. Application of Lotteries • Public Goods provision: Choose the appropriate PRIZE!

  10. All-pay Auctions: Complete Information • All-pay auctions: r = oo Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (AER 1993): “Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction.”

  11. Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (AER 1993) • Motivation

  12. Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (AER 1993) • Background:

  13. Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (AER 1993) • Motivation:

  14. Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (AER 1993) • The Model:

  15. Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (AER 1993) • Preliminary results: Exclusion principle

  16. The Model • n > 2 lobbyists • Politician maximizes

  17. The Model • Lobbyist i’s payoff

  18. The Lobbying Game • No pure-strategy NE

  19. The Lobbying Game • There exists a mixed-strategy NE

  20. Results

  21. Results: sketch of the proof

  22. Results: sketch of the proof

  23. Results: sketch of the proof

  24. Results

  25. Hillman and Riley (1989)

  26. Results • Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 give

  27. Selection of Finalists

  28. Selection of Finalists

  29. Selection of Finalists

  30. Selection of Finalists

  31. Selection of Finalists

  32. Selection of Finalists

  33. Selection of Finalists: Example

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