Military Theory and Strategy

1. Military Theory and Strategy Lsn 2

2. ID & SIG: • Clausewitz, Corbett, Douhet, forms of maneuver, Jomini, Mahan, Mitchell, principles of war, Sun Tzu

3. Key Theorists Sun Tzu Jomini Clausewitz Mahan Corbett Douhet Mitchell Principles of War Objective Offensive Mass Economy of force Maneuver Unity of command Security Surprise Simplicity Agenda

4. Key Theorists • Sun Tzu • Jomini • Clausewitz • Mahan • Corbett • Douhet • Mitchell

5. Sun Tzu • Chinese military theorist circa 453-221 B.C. who wrote The Art of War. • Significantly influenced Mao Zedong and subsequent writers on revolutionary warfare • Stressed the unpredictability of battle, the importance of deception and surprise, the close relationship between politics and military policy, and the high costs of war

6. Sun Tzu • Emphasized the role of situational awareness • “So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.” • Championed the bloodless victory • “One hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skillful. Seizing the enemy without fighting is the most skillful.”

7. Antoine-Henri de Jomini • Jomini (1779-1869) was a Swiss military theorist who sought to interpret Napoleon • Published the Summary of the Art of War in 1838 • Became the premier military-educational text of the mid-nineteenth century and greatly influenced Civil War generals • “Many a Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War in the other” (General J. D. Hittle)

8. Antoine-Henri de Jomini • As a product of the Enlightenment, Jomini sought natural laws to govern the conduct of war • Developed a very geometrical and scientific approach to war • Stressed the principle of concentration, the strategic value of interior lines, and the close relationship between logistics and combat • Interior lines are “those adopted by one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose them a greater force.”

9. Interior Lines Exterior Lines Interior Lines • The benefits of interior lines could be gained either by central position or superior lateral communications

10. Carl von Clausewitz • Prussian officer born in 1780 • Resigned his commission in 1812 and joined the Russian Army to fight Napoleon • Ideas on war were heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolutionary period and Napoleon’s Prussian adversary Gerhard von Scharnhorst • Died in 1831 and his wife published his On War in 1832

11. Carl von Clausewitz • War is neither an art nor a science • It is a continuation of “policy” (or “politics”) by other means. • A form of social intercourse • War is like a wrestling match • It is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” • But it is not unilateral. It is a contest between two independent wills.

12. Carl von Clausewitz • Used a trinitarian analysis consisting of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war’s element of subordination to rational policy • Often loosely expressed as “the people, the military, and the government”

13. Carl von Clausewitz • Analyzed “absolute war” or “war in theory,” but then noted that factors such as poor intelligence, chance, friction, etc make war in practice different than war in the abstract (the “fog of war”) • Argued one should focus his military efforts against the enemy’s “center of gravity” (“Schwerpunkt”) • Very important concept in modern American military doctrine

14. Albert Thayer Mahan • US naval officer who lived from 1840 to 1914 • Wrote The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812 • Considered “sea power” to include the overlapping concepts of command of the sea through naval superiority and that combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produces national “wealth and greatness”

15. Albert Thayer Mahan • Advocated • “that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive” • “(1) Production; (2) Shipping: (3) Colonies and Markets– in a word, sea power” • Thought the Navy should be used offensively and that its principle object should be destruction of the enemy’s fleet • Destroying the enemy’s battle fleet would in turn cause his merchant fleet to find the sea untenable • To be effective, the fleet should not be divided and should be autonomous

16. Albert Thayer Mahan • Saw the Navy’s economic strangulation of France by blockade as the key to Britain’s defeat of Napoleon • “It was not by attempting great military operations on land, but by controlling the sea, and through the sea the world outside Europe,” that the British “ensured the triumph of their country.” • Critics argue that Mahan confused a necessary or important cause with the sufficient cause • The British Navy was important, but the Army and diplomacy also played key roles

17. Albert Thayer Mahan • Considered the navy to be a better instrument of national policy than the army • This was especially true for the United States which had “neither the tradition nor the design to act aggressively beyond the seas,” but at the same time had “very important transmarine interests which need protection” • Increasingly became an imperialist in order to gain control of the resources the US needed to best use its naval power

18. Julian Corbett • Mahan’s British contemporary and chief competitor as a naval theorist • Corbett stressed the limitations as well as the importance of naval power • He emphasized coordination between land and naval strategy rather than independent naval action • He rejected the invariable dominance of the offensive and focused on the dynamic relationship between the offensive and the defensive at sea

19. Julian Corbett • Although originally much less well-known than Mahan, Corbett gained increased prominence in post-Cold War American naval thought • Ideas became more relevant in an era in which the US Navy has no peer competitor and conducts more littoral operations than blue-water fleet-to-fleet actions

20. Giulio Douhet • Italian air power theorist who lived from 1869 to 1930 • Saw air power as a way for Italy to overcome its inherent weaknesses in manpower and natural resources • But to become the dominant weapon it could be, aircraft had to be freed from the control of ground commanders who did not understand the new capability • Advocated the creation of a separate air arm to be commanded by airmen

21. Giulio Douhet • Wrote “Rules for the Use of Airplanes in War” in 1912 but met resistance from his superiors who forced him to change references to the airplane as a “weapon” and instead consider it only a “device” to support the ground forces • Advocated the production of bombers • Soon became known as a radical and his methods for advancing the cause of airpower often worked at cross-purposes with his goals • His criticism of Italy’s conduct in World War I got him arrested and court martialed • In 1920 the verdict was overturned and Douhet was promoted to general, but instead of returning to active duty he focused on writing

22. Giulio Douhet • Douhet’s argument was that airpower added a third dimension that revolutionized warfare by granting new flexibility and initiative • The speed of aircraft and the vastness of the sky equaled offensive power • Considered airpower to be supreme • Without control of the air, all operations– land, sea, even air– were doomed • The appropriate target was not the enemy’s planes in the air but their airfields and air industry on the ground

23. Giulio Douhet • Saw airpower as being able to crush the enemy’s will to fight by destroying or neutralizing a country’s “vital centers”– those elements of society, government, and industry essential to the functioning of the state • It could do so without the need for the bloody commitment of ground forces that had made World War I so costly

24. Giulio Douhet • Douhet recognized the importance of targeting • Aircraft could strike virtually anything but in order to be most forceful they should not attempt to strike everything • Instead, focus on the five basic target systems that Douhet considered the vital centers of a modern country • Industry, transportation, infrastructure, communication nodes, and the will of the people • The will of the people was the most important target • Douhet did not advocate aircraft attacking or supporting ground forces; airpower was to be used strategically, not tactically

25. Billy Mitchell • Building on his World War I experience and relationships with British air marshall Sir Hugh Trenchard and, to a lesser extent, Douhet, Mitchell (1879-1936) led the American charge for air force autonomy • Viewed “independent” air operations, such as strategic bombing, as more lucrative than simply supporting land or sea forces

26. Billy Mitchell • Argued that bombers could win wars by destroying an enemy’s war-making capability and will to fight, and that in so doing could yield a victory that was quicker and cheaper than one obtained by surface forces • The key to obtaining victory through airpower lay in establishing an autonomous air force, free of control by surface commanders and led by airmen possessing special expertise • Began calling for a separate air force in 1919

27. Billy Mitchell • Believed airpower could wreck an enemy’s will to fight by destroying his capability to resist and that capability was not the army or the navy but the nation’s industrial and agricultural base • Eliminating industrial production “would deprive armies, air forces and navies… of their means of maintenance.” • Did not necessarily want to attack civilians directly but to sever the population from the sources of production • Considered civilian will to be very fragile

28. Billy Mitchell • Mitchell’s personality did not help him • Boundless ego, extremely driven, short of temper • “Mitchell tried to convert his opponents by killing them first.” (Hugh Trenchard) • Mitchell took his case to the American people with many of his writings appearing in popular magazines rather than military professional journals • Did not favor aircraft carriers, because, among other things, they represented naval air self-sufficiency which threatened his vision for a separate air force

29. Billy Mitchell • Mitchell’s vehemence toward the military bureaucracy reached a peak on Sept 5, 1925 when he blamed the crash of the Navy dirigible Shenandoah on the “in competency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable administration of the National Defense by the Navy and War Departments” • Two weeks later President Coolidge himself proffered court martial charges against Mitchell • He was found guilty on Dec 17 and retired from the service Feb 1, 1926 • Mitchell’s message was carried on by more diplomatic advocates such as Hap Arnold and the Air Force became a separate branch of the US military in 1947

30. Principles of War

31. Principles of War • British military officer J. F. C. Fuller developed a list of principles based on the works of Clausewitz and Jomini for use by the British Army in World War I • The US Army modified them and published its first list in 1921 • Objective • Offensive • Mass • Economy of force • Maneuver • Unity of command • Security • Surprise • Simplicity

32. Objective • When undertaking any mission, commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact. Commanders need to appreciate political ends and understand how the military conditions they achieve contribute to them. • Ensure that all actions contribute to the goals of the higher headquarters. • Example: Ho Chi Minh’s objective in the Vietnam War was the unification of North and South Vietnam under communist rule.

33. Offensive • Offensive operations are essential to maintain the freedom of action necessary for success, exploit vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments. • Offensive actions are those taken to dictate the nature, scope, and tempo of an operation. • Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results; it is the essence of successful operations. • Example: Rather than continue to defend at Pusan, MacArthur went on the offensive with Operation Chromite (the Inchon landing) in Korea.

34. Mass • Commanders mass the effects of combat power in time and space to overwhelm enemies or gain control of the situation. • Time: applies the elements of combat power against multiple targets simultaneously • Space : concentrates the effects of different elements of combat power against a single target • Example: Schwarzkopf’s decision to increase the Operation Desert Storm force from one to two corps reflected his concern for mass.

35. Economy of Force • Commanders never leave any element without a purpose. When the time comes to execute, all elements should have tasks to perform. • Economy of force requires accepting prudent risk in selected areas to achieve superiority in the decisive operation. • Economy of force involves the discriminating employment and distribution of forces. • Example: In World War I, the Schlieffen Plan depended on an economy of force effort in the east in order to gain mass in the west.

36. Maneuver • As both an element of combat power and a principle of war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage. It includes the dynamic, flexible application of leadership, firepower, information, and protection as well. • Achieves results that would otherwise be more costly • Keeps enemies off balance by making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can deal with them. • Example: In the Mexican War, Winfield Scott fought a war of maneuver based on the turning movement.

37. Unity of Command • Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. • Develops the full combat power of a force • Usually requires giving a single commander authority • Example: Eisenhower did an excellent job of maintaining unity of effort among coalition forces in World War II.

38. Security • Calculated risk is inherent in conflict. Security protects and preserves combat power. • Does not involve excessive caution • Measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and threat • Example: The French did not have adequate security in the Ardennes Forest when the Germans attacked in World War II.

39. Surprise • Surprise results from taking actions for which an enemy or adversary is unprepared. • It is only necessary that the enemy become aware too late to react effectively. • Contributions to surprise include speed, information superiority, and asymmetry. • Example: The terrorist attack on September 11 depended on surprise.

40. Simplicity • Plans and orders should be simple and direct. Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans executed late. • Clear and concise plans cut down on misunderstandings • Example: Grant’s orders to Sherman in the Atlanta Campaign are classic in their simplicity and clarity.

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