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Secure Key Agreement for Group Communication A Team

Secure Key Agreement for Group Communication A Team. Eric Olson Will Asche Dan Kaplan Anthony Spring Girish Sarma. Outline. Current Framework Key agreement protocol Goals accomplished Goals not accomplished Assumptions Limitations Problems What we learned Future works Conclusion.

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Secure Key Agreement for Group Communication A Team

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  1. Secure Key Agreement for Group CommunicationA Team Eric Olson Will Asche Dan Kaplan Anthony Spring Girish Sarma

  2. Outline • Current Framework • Key agreement protocol • Goals accomplished • Goals not accomplished • Assumptions • Limitations • Problems • What we learned • Future works • Conclusion

  3. Current Framework Application KAP PROXY M2MI M2MP

  4. Secure Key Agreement Protocol • Communication among group members privately and securely, since all the messages reach every one present in the network • Each device contribute to the generation of a common group key for communication

  5. Goals accomplished • Secure communication • Dynamic join & leave of devices • Join multiple groups simultaneously • An attacker cannot gain any information from the underlying broadcast network • Working example applications • Simple command line chat interface • An IRC like application

  6. Goals not accomplished • Devices disappearing without notice* • Authenticate nodes and IC • Make the implementation more scalable • Reliable communication • JRMS, TCP/IP

  7. Trusted members Trusted third party, Information Center (IC) All devices can see every one present in the current network The new member has extra computational burden when joining Assumptions

  8. Limitations • Scalability limitations • Cannot send large objects • Propagation delays

  9. Problems • Slow start up of IC when using large prime numbers. • Inability to add Java crypto library’s implementation of asymmetric key encryption • Dependency on the implementation layer to discover other devices in the network

  10. Analysis • lg n messages for every member join/leave • n + lg n memory consumption • Use of stream cipher requires less computational power, but less secure than block ciphers

  11. \/\/|_|7 vv3 13@4l\l3|)? • M2MI – M2MP • The protocol • Basics of cryptography

  12. If we had 10 more weeks… • Handle devices disappearing • Error checking & handling • Reliable multicast • More applications • More optimizations

  13. Conclusions • M2MP & M2MI were sufficient for obtaining the minimal requirements specified by the protocol • This protocol is not practical for ad-hoc networks • Authentication is dependent upon unique ids, such as MAC / IP addresses • Remote event synchronization is dependent on reliable multicast

  14. Conclusions • E-moo • tabs are evil • GROUPED == GROUPSTARTUP !!! • if( left ) return left else return left • System.err.println (“what the F***2 ?!?!!!!!”); • Don’t double lock files

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