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Economic Development of Japan

Economic Development of Japan. No.4 Meiji 2&3. Meiji Mura. P.56. Japan’s economic growth was driven mainly by private dynamism while policy was also helpful . Cumulative history, Edo achievements, national unity and nationalism. Private-sector dynamism and entrepreneurship

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Economic Development of Japan

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  1. Economic Development of Japan No.4 Meiji 2&3 Meiji Mura

  2. P.56 Japan’s economic growth was driven mainly by private dynamism while policy was also helpful Cumulative history, Edo achievements, national unity and nationalism Private-sector dynamism and entrepreneurship (primary force) Rapid industrialization esp. Meiji and post WW2 period Policy was generally successful despite criticisms:--Power monopoly by former Satsuma & Choshu politicians--Privatization scandal, 1881--Excessively pro-West--Unfair by today’s standard Policy support (supplementary)

  3. PP.57-58 Chronology of Meiji Industrialization 1870s - Monetary confusion and inflation US banking system adopted with little success Printing money to suppress Saigo’s Rebellion (1877) Early 1880s - Matsukata Deflation Stopping inflation, creating central bank (Bank of Japan) Landless peasants & urban poor (“proletariat”) emerge Late 1880s - First company boom Osaka Spinning Company and its followers Series of company booms(late 1890s, late 1900s, WW1) Postwar management (after J-China War & J-Russia War) Fiscal spending continued even after war  BoP crisis Active infrastructure building (local gov’ts) & military buildup Masayoshi Matsukata(Councilor of Finance)

  4. Inflation in Meiji Period P.230 Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Historical Statistics of Japan, Vol.4, 1988.

  5. Money and Inflation in Early Meiji

  6. First Company Boom Number of companies Legal capital (million yen) Yoshio Ando ed, Databook on Modern Japanese Economic History, 2rd ed, Tokyo Univ. Press, 1979.

  7. PP.62-65 Technology Transfer 1. Foreign advisors (public and private sector) 2. Engineering education (studying abroad, Institute of Technology; technical high schools) 3. Copy production, reverse engineering, technical cooperation agreements (esp. automobiles, electrical machinery); sogo shosha (trading companies) often intermediated such cooperation Private-sector experts, 1910Mining 513 (18.0%) Textile 300 (10.6%) Shipbuilding 250 (8.8%) Power & gas 231 (8.1%)Trading 186 (6.5%) Railroad 149 (5.2%) Food 149 (5.2%)TOTAL 2,843 (100%)

  8. P.64 Studying Abroad (Early Engineers) • First students: bakufu sent 7 students to Netherlands in 1862 (naval training) • By 1880s, 80 Japanese studied engineering abroad (shipbuilding, mechanics, civil engineering, mining & metallurgy, military, chemistry) • Destination: UK (28), US (20), France (14), Germany (9), Netherlands (8) • They received top-class education and could easily replace foreigners after coming back • They mostly worked in government (no modern private industries existed at first)—Ministry of Interior, MoF, Army, Navy, Ministry of Industry

  9. P.64 Kobu Daigakko工部大学校(Institute of Technology) • 1871 Koburyo of Ministry of Industry; 1877 renamed to Kobu Daigakko; 1886 merged with Tokyo Imperial University (under Ministry of Education) • First President: Henry Dyer (British engineer) with philosophy “judicious combination of theory and practice” • Preparatory course (2 years), specialized studies (2 years), internship (2 years) + government-funded overseas study for top students • 8 courses: civil engineering, mechanical engineering, shipbuilding, telecommunication, chemistry, architecture, metallurgy, mining (classes in English) • Producing top-class engineers (import substitution)—Tanabe Sakuro (designer of Biwako-Kyoto irrigation canal & power generation); Tatsuno Kingo (builder of Tokyo Station, BOJ, Nara Hotel, etc.)

  10. Parallel development or “hybrid technology” PP.65-67

  11. PP.79-80 Neoclassical Labor Market Japanese workers: --Too much job hopping, do not stay with one company --Lack of discipline, low saving --Barrier to industrialization Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Survey of Industrial Workers, 1901. Female domestic workers: --Urban industrialization and rural poverty and labor surplus female migration from villages to cities --End of Meiji to early Showa were the peak period of jochu (housemaid) --17.5% of non-farm female workforce, second largest after textile workers (1930) --5.7% of households hired jochu (1930) --There were both young and old jochu, some living-in and others commuting --International comparison (female non-farm employment share): UK 1851 (11.4%), US 1910 (11.8%), Thailand 1960 (10.6%), Philippines 1975 (34.3%) Source: Konosuke Odaka, “Dual Structure,” 1989.

  12. Wage: Gender Gap Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, "Table of Wages." Note: 1 yen = 100 sen.

  13. Konosuke Odaka: World of Craftsmen, World of Factories(NTT Publishing, 2000) • In Japan’s early factories, traditional shokunin (craftsmen) and modern shokko (workers) coexisted. • Craftsmen were proud, experienced and independent. They were the main force in initial technology absorption. • Workers received scientific education and functioned within an organization. Their skills and knowledge were open, global and expandable. • Over time, craftsmen were replaced by workers. Experience was not enough to deepen industrialization. Prof. Odaka proves these points by examining the history of concrete firms in metallurgy, machinery and shipbuilding.

  14. Prof. Odaka’s Working Hypotheses • In the early years of factories, Japan’s traditional craftsmen in mechanics and metal working played key roles in absorbing new technology. Farmers and merchants were not suitable for factory operation. • However, trained engineers, not craftsmen, created a modern production system suitable for Japan. • Adaptation of imported system to Japanese context • Production management system, including hired labor • Skill formation system based on formal education and OJT • The gap between craftsmen’s skill and modern technology had to be bridged. Hired foreigners, then Japanese engineers, provided this bridge up to WW2.

  15. PP.65, 179-181 Monozukuri (Manufacturing) Spirit • Mono means “thing” and zukuri (tsukuri) means “making” in indigenous Japanese language. • It describes sincere attitude toward production with pride, skill and dedication. It is a way of pursuing innovation and perfection, often disregarding profit or balance sheet. • Many of Japan’s excellent manufacturing firms were founded by engineers full of monozukuri spirit. Akio Morita (Sony’s co-founder)1921-1999 Sakichi Toyota1867-1930 Konosuke Matsushita1894-1989 Soichiro Honda1906-1991

  16. Toyota Techno Museum in Nagoyadisplays textile machines in actual operation, including Sakichi Toyota’s 1924 invention. It also explains Toyota’s car history.www.tcmit.org/english/index.html Meiji Mura (Meiji Village) is an open-air museum of Meiji architecture and culture, Inuyama City, Aichi Prefecture www.meijimura.com/english/index.html

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