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IPSRA GET CERT. Dec 12, 2000 Robert Moskowitz rgm@icsa.net Steve Bellovin smb@research.att.com. IPSRA Goals. to define a standard mechanism to accomplish human user authentication to an IPSec device running IKE, using legacy authentication mechanisms
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IPSRA GET CERT Dec 12, 2000 Robert Moskowitz rgm@icsa.net Steve Bellovin smb@research.att.com
IPSRA Goals • to define a standard mechanism to accomplish human user authentication to an IPSec device running IKE, using legacy authentication mechanisms • “The WG strongly prefers mechanisms that require no changes to AH, ESP or IKE protocols.” • --The IPSRA Charter
GETCERT Goals • To accomplish our objectives without touching or using IKE. • To build on existing tools and protocols. • Almost identical to part of a full-scale certificate-issuing service, so we decided to steal one. • Client-side key pair generation. • To produce a standards-track RFC. • Previous Internet-Draft introduce concept.
APPROACH • Use SSL/TLS • Use existing HTTP and HTML authentication syntax. • AUTHORIZATION LINE • Legacy back-end authorization servers • RADIUS • SCEP certificate request syntax • PKCS 10 (with PKCS 9.14) and PKCS 7 • Thus could be done with • A web browser with plugin or java applet • APACHE server with CGI program
PROCESS FLOW • The client establishes a TLS secured HTTP connection to the CA service. • The client authenticates the server certificate. The subject is the desired server. • The client provides its authentication over this connection. • The client requests via SCEP the CA root certificate. • Note: The server certificate might be a commercial SSL certificate. This way the client might be expected to have that certificate's signing certificate for validation.
PROCESS FLOW Cont. • The client requests a certificate via SCEP. • The server sends the certificate via SCEP after validating the request against the RADIUS database information. • The client uses the issued certificate in its IKE negotiation with a gateway.
ISSUES • SCEP is not Standards track in PKIX • Full copy of appropriate SCEP syntax • GETCERT ver 2 can use CMP ir or corresponding CMC transaction • SCEP has serious limitations • Do not apply in the limited GETCERT framework • No need for revocation or rekeying • TLS pathway provides implicit trust of root cert • Lots of round trips • TLS, AUTHORIZATION, CA and CERT REQUEST • Web users barely notice this sort of overhead in typical surfing
Why SCEP and not CMP or CMC • CMP and CMC standards track in PKIX • CMP interoperability established (use IR) • CMC code to emerge shortly (use pKIRequest) • But SCEP deployed • Reference code? • Simple PKCS 10 and 7 in client • Open SSL and Cryptlib can provide CGI code • SCEP well bounded with GETCERT • Certs short-lived • Typically no CRLs