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Handshake Protocols

Handshake Protocols. COEN 150. Threat Model. Passive Sniffing Malicious Mallory can read messages between Alice and Bob. Spoofing Malicious Mallory can create messages that seem to come from either Alice or Bob. Standard Attack Modes: Breaking Cryptography Man-in-the-Middle

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Handshake Protocols

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  1. Handshake Protocols COEN 150

  2. Threat Model • Passive Sniffing • Malicious Mallory can read messages between Alice and Bob. • Spoofing • Malicious Mallory can create messages that seem to come from either Alice or Bob. • Standard Attack Modes: • Breaking Cryptography • Man-in-the-Middle • Replay Attacks • Reflection Attack (Open several connections)

  3. Simple Password Protocol Alice: Hi, I am Alice. My password is “fiddlesticks”. Bob: Welcome, Alice. Vulnerable to sniffing and replay attack: Mallory sniffs the exchange. Mallory: Hi, I am Alice. My password is “fiddlesticks”. Bob: Welcome, Alice.

  4. Shared Secret Alice and Bob share a secret key K. Alice: I am Alice. Bob: Encrypt random number R. Alice: EK(R) Bob (calculates EK(R) as well.): Welcome Alice.

  5. Shared Secret Vulnerable to DOS attack. while(1) { Mallory: I am Alice. Bob: Encrypt R. Mallory: X. Bob (EK(R) != X): Access denied. }

  6. Shared Secret Vulnerable to sniffing and replay attack if R is not random or if R is repeated.

  7. Shared Secret Use of Clock: Alice: I am Alice, EK(clock). Bob calculates clock, compares with his value: Welcome Alice. Problems with clock accuracy: Demand tight accuracy: drifting clocks can be bad. Otherwise: replay attack.

  8. Shared secret, use of clock Sniffing + replay attack: Mallory to Bob: KILL, KILL, KILL, KILL. (Bob cannot receive messages because his message buffer is filled up.) Alice: Hi, I’m Alice. EK(clock). Mallory to Alice: KILL, KILL, KILL, KILL. (Alice cannot receive messages because her message buffer is filled up.) Mallory to Bob: Hi, I’m Alice. EK(clock). Bob: Hi, Alice.

  9. Shared secret, use of clock Mallory KILL KILL Hi, I’m Alice, EK(clock) Hi, I’m Alice, EK(clock) Bob Alice

  10. Public Key Alice: “I’m Alice.” Bob: “R”. Alice: “EAlice(R)”. Bob calculates “DAliceEAlice(R) == R”: Hi Alice.

  11. Public Key Alice: “I’m Alice.” Bob creates random challenge R: “EAlice(R)”. Alice: “R”. Bob checks “R == R”: Hi Alice.

  12. Public Key: DOS attack Trudy: “I’m Alice.” Bob: “R”. Trudy: “X” Bob calculates “DAliceEAlice(X) != R: Access Denied. Bob spends much more time computing than Trudy!

  13. Mutual Authentication: Shared Secret Alice: “I am Alice” Bob: “RB” Alice: EK(RB). RA. Bob calculates EK(RB) himself: EK(RA). Hi Alice. Alice calculates EK(RA) herself: Hi Bob.

  14. Mutual Authentication with less messages? Alice: I am Alice. RA Bob: RB. EK(RA). Alice: Hi Bob. EK(RB). Bob: Hi Alice.

  15. Mutual Authentication with less steps is vulnerable to the reflection attack Session 1 Trudy: I am Alice. RA. Session 1 Bob: RB. EK(RA). Session 2 Trudy: I am Alice. RB. Session 2 Bob: RB’. EK(RB). Session 1 Trudy: Hi Bob. EK(RB). Session 1 Bob: Hi Alice.

  16. Warning Signals • Requestor should authenticate herself first. • Don’t have requestor and requestee do exactly the same thing. (E.g. use different key pairs.) • If you provide encryption service, you set yourself up for a key guessing attack.

  17. Public Key: Simple Mutual Authentication Alice: “I am Alice. RA” Bob: “EBob(RA). RB” Alice DBobEBob (RA)=RA: Hello Bob. EAlice(RB). Bob: DAliceEAlice(RB) = RB: Hello Alice.

  18. Key Distribution Centers • Maintains a shared secret for each registered user. • To set-up a connection requires the KDC to set up a session key.

  19. Key Distribution CenterOriginal Algorithm • Alice to KDC: Alice wants Bob. • KDC to Alice: Here is your session key. • KDC to Bob: Here is your session key. This needs to be modified.

  20. Key Distribution Center:Needham Schroeder Protocol Alice to KDC: N1, Alice wants Bob. KDC to Alice: KA(N1,KS,Bob,Ticket), where Ticket=KB(KS,Alice). Alice to Bob: Ticket, KS(N2). Bob to Alice: KS(N2-1,N3). Alice to Bob: K(N3-1). N1, N2, N3 are nonces to prevent replay attacks.

  21. Key Distribution Center:Needham Schroeder Protocol Variant Alice to KDC: N1, Alice wants Bob. KDC to Alice: KA(N1,KS,Bob,Ticket), where Ticket=KB(KS,Alice). Alice to Bob: Ticket, KS(N2). Bob to Alice: KS(N2-1),KS(N3). Alice to Bob: K(N3-1). N1, N2, N3 are nonces to prevent replay attacks.

  22. Replay attack on modified NS Alice to KDC: N1, Alice wants Bob. KDC to Alice: KA(N1,KS,Bob,Ticket), where Ticket=KB(KS,Alice). Alice to Bob: Ticket, KS(N2). Bob to Alice: KS(N2-1),KS(N3). Alice to Bob: KS(N3-1). Trudy as Alice to Bob: Ticket, KS(N2) Bob to Alice, but intercepted by Trudy: KS(N2-1), KS(N4) Trudy as Alice to Bob: Ticket, KS(N4). Bob to Alice, but intercepted by Trudy. KS(N4-1), KS(N5). Trudy as Alice to Bob: KS(N4-1).

  23. Key Distribution Center • Assume that Alice’s key has become compromised. • Trudy can now present herself as Alice to Bob with an old ticket. • Tickets need to have an expiration date!!!!!!!!!!!

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