North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program

1. North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program DUK HO MOON Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1874 7 December 2011, Jeju

2. NOTE ◈The views and suggestions expressed here are the speaker’s and do not necessarily represent those of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1874. ◈ Many questions remain unanswered on North Korea’s UEP. This presentation is primarily based on open-source information including interviews with independent experts.

3. Contents 5. North Korea’s illicit procurements 6. UN Embargo against North Korea 7. Ways Forward 2. Uranium Enrichment Program Redux? 4. Why Gas Centrifuge Program? 3. Uranium Enrichment Program Revealed 1. Defining North Korea’s Nuclear Program

4. 1. Defining NK’s Nuclear Program ●The Plutonium Program - (disabled) 5MWe reactor/Reprocessing Facility/Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant - (suspended construction) 50MWe/200MWe reactors - through 4 campaigns, 30 to 50 kg of plutonium extracted ⇒ IAEA Safeguards, Geneva AF, 6 Party-Talks have mainly focused on the plutonium program in Youngbyon ● The Uranium Program - (Since April 2009) NK has stated intents on its UEP - (Nov. 2010) revealed Uranium Enrichment Workshop - undisclosed/parallel facility to produce HEU? - UF6 facility, R&D, manufacturing plant, pilot facility, auxiliary facilities? ● The Weapons Program - (Oct 2006/May 2009) 2 Nuclear Tests conducted - location of all nuclear weapons and components? - R&D, component testing, and production facilities unknown - ballistic missile deliverability of nuclear weapons?

5. ■ Denuclearization Objective ● Fundamental objective: complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of NK’s nuclear weapons and nuclear programs. ● (UN Security Council decided) NK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and exiting nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. - directed NK to act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to the parties to the NPT and the terms and conditions of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403) ● (Six-Party Talks) the goal is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner ⇒ Scope of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy?

6. 2. UEP Redux? ■ (Oct. 2002) Confrontation over HEU ● (US evidence) NK is constructing a centrifuge plant that could produce weapons-grade HEU - NK’s attempt to purchase centrifuge-related materials in large quantities (e.g. uranium feed/withdrawal system) - NK’s involvement with Khan network? ● NK’s initial admission and subsequent denials - led to collapse of the AF, expulsion of IAEA inspectors, NK’s withdrawal from the NPT, (April 2003) NK claimed it has nuclear weapons and further reprocessed the 8,000 spent fuel rods stored since 1994 ● Until 2009, doubts persisted on NK’s technical capability and the risk of assessment based solely on known procurements - (most estimate) NK has R&D facility or pilot-scale centrifuge plant, not industrial-scale plant ⇒ Underestimating/minimizing NK’s UEP capability?

7. ■ Six-Party Talks and UEP issues ● (2007) HEU trace (Russian aluminum tube/operational records of 5 MWe reactor) ● (2008) UEP was discussed during the verification protocol negotiations ■ (Apr. 2009) NK statements on its own UEP ● (29 April) “make a decision to build a light water reactor power plant and start the technological development for ensuring self- production of nuclear fuel as its first process without delay” ● (13 June) “enough success has been made in developing uranium enrichment technology to provide nuclear fuel to allow the experimental procedure” ● (4 Sep) “experimental uranium enrichment has been successfully conducted to enter into completion phase” ⇒ (12 Nov. 2010) NK revealed to Dr. Hecker a 2,000 gas centrifuge plant in Yongbyon ● (30 Nov. 2010) “the construction of LWR is brisk in NK and a modern factory for uranium enrichment equipped with thousands of centrifuge is operating to supply fuel to them”

8. 3. UEP Revealed ■ (Nov. 2010) Hecker report on a small industrial-scale gas centrifuge facility ● 2,000 centrifuges in six cascades (100-meter hall) ● Centrifuges: 6 feet (1.82 m) high, 8 inches (20 cm) in diameter - claimed to have steel rotors, likely maraging steel, hence P2 type - rotors with single bellows, casings made from an aluminum alloy - with three small stainless tubes emanating from the top to the central plumbing ● Through-put claimed at 8,000kg SWU/year - average enrichment level of 3.5 per cent (tails 0.27 %) - could produce 2 tonnes of LEU per year (adequate for small LWR) - up to 22-33kg of HEU per year, sufficient for one to two weapons ● claimed to be operating, producing LEU now - Hecker could not confirm, but not inconsistent with what he saw ● claimed to have manufactured all components domestically, but modeled after the centrifuge at Almelo (URENCO) and Rokhasho-mura (Japan) ● claimed the capability to produce UF4 and UF6. (bet. 2003 and 2007) A new anhydrous line was built to produce UF4, which is in turn fluorinated to make UF6 ⇒ NK’s pursuit of UEP for an extended period of time : a new security threat (vertical/horizontal proliferation risk) posed

9. ■ (Sep. 2011) IAEA Director General report * As the Agency has no design information and no access, the configuration and operational status of the facility cannot be confirmed ● the layout of the centrifuge cascade and the size of the centrifuge casings were broadly consistent with a design disseminated through a clandestine supply network to other countries. ● Some of the technology and information required for a centrifuge uranium enrichment program was acquired through the same clandestine supply network ● NK has attempted to procure from a wide range of suppliers materials and equipment suitable for use within an enrichment program, such as vacuum components, electronic equipment, dual- use, computer numerically controlled machine tools ● (Libya’s import of 3 cylinders containing UF6) All three cylinders were present in NK prior to their transfer Libya (2000/2001). It is “very likely” the natural UF6 in the larger cylinder originated in NK. NK had undeclared conversion capabilities prior to 2001  (22 Sep. 2011) IAEA General Conference Resolution on NK’s non-compliance (GC(55)RES/33)

10. 4. Why Gas Centrifuge Program? ■ Uranium Enrichment Development ● (1940s-1950s) various methods of Uranium Enrichment for military purposes ● (1960s-1980s) Gas Centrifuge emerged for fuel for LWRs in developed countries - Zippe (USSR)-> Zippe (Univ. of Virginia)–> URENCO–> Pakistan (Khan)–>Libya/Iran/NK ■ Proliferators “choice of today” ● clandestine operation and rapid breakout possible ● no significant signatures, small and stable power supply needed - compact size of centrifuges: 1 to 3 m/0.5 diameter (hidden in underground facility) ● (since 1980s) Khan Network provision of turn-key package to countries of concern - nuclear Wal-Mart, multinational black market emerged ⇒ NSG control on Trigger List/Dual-use items, Additional Protocol, UNSCRs embargo (NK/Iran) - but, proliferators use a variety of techniques to evade and use items with lower parameters

11. ■ Generic drawing of an early URENCO-type centrifuge

12. ■ Basic Theory/Improvement in Technology ● gaseous UF6 is fed into a cylindrical rotor that spins at high speeds about its axis ● centrifugal forces cause the heavier 238 UF6 molecules to move closer to the wall than the lighter 235 UF6 molecules ● relatively lighter enriched gas at the top of the centrifuge and heavier depleted gas at the bottom ● this flow can be driven mechanically by scoops and baffles of thermally by heating the bottom end up ● Flexible joints, called bellows, are built into the rotor, so it could bend freely with the dynamic force and adopt new shapes as it accelerated through each critical speed ● Modern computer numerically controlled machine tools in specially constructed “clean room” are used ● The bottom bearing : adequate lubrication system to prevent wear and ensure smooth operation (top bearings : ring magnets are used)

13. ■ Examples of Gas Centrifuge Cascades (Source : J. Michael Whitaker, Safeguarding Uranium Enrichment, June 20, 2011)

14. ■ Typical Operations at a UF6-based Enrichment Plant (Source : J. Michael Whitaker, Safeguarding Uranium Enrichment )

15. 5. North Korea’s illicit Procurements ■ Pakistan and A. Q. Khan Network ● (1993) Benazir Bhuto visit to North Korea (Nodong for centrifuge) - carried CD on gas centrifuge program ● (late 1990s) Khan’s package provision of a Starter-kit with drawings - two dozen P1/P2 centrifuges - a flow meter - some special oils for centrifuges - on-grounds training at 2 workshops (KRL) - a shopping list with names of suppliers - blueprints for centrifuges and other related process equipment - possibly blueprint for making HEU bomb (Khan denied it) ● Assistance to produce pure UF6, asking provision of UF6 to Libya ■ Nuclear Procurement in Europe ● NK used IAEA as a vehicle for its open-source intelligence (OSINT) ● (1980s/1990s, Vienna) Yun Ho Jin bought a range of items : vacuum pumps, dial gauges, generators, steel rotors and plates, and compressors - organized NK delegation’s visit to Europe - mobilized Optronic (Germany)/Kohas (Swiss) ● (since late 1990s) reportedly in China, Yun directs NCG’s illicit procurements - (in 2002) Yun gave order to Optronic to ship 200 tonnes of high-strength aluminum pipe listing Shenyang Aircraft as end-user (initial shipment was intercepted in April 2003 at Alexandria)

16. ■ Mobilizing Korean Networks in Japan ● Chosen Soren (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) - (in 1965/1969) affiliated companies sold NK various industrial machines, including radio activity measuring instruments essential for uranium enrichment - (in 1959) Chosen Soren created Korean Association of Science and Technology (KAST, Kakyo) ● Kakyo’s extensive activities - based in Tokyo with 12 local branches (1,200 members), 300 members are very active - (from 1980 to 1995) sent to NK 300,000 volumes on science/technology. Also sent 100,000 items, samples and materials including nuclear engineering and reprocessing - organized science/technology exhibitions in NK - invited NK scientists/engineers to Japan - suspected of having contributed to NK missile/nuclear weapons program - Lee Zi Ku (first chairman of Kakyo) was a scientist who studied under Professor Kouji Fushimi of Kyoto Univ., famous for his research on uranium enrichment ● (Oct.2005/Nov.2006) Tokyo Metropolitan Police Agency’s investigation - Kakyo is under the control of External Relations Division of Korea Workers’ Party - Kim Man Yu Foundation/Nishiarai Hospital funded Kakyo - several members were investigated on their role in NK’s rerpocessing/missile programs ● NK’s procurement of Japanese dual-use materials, equipment and machines - (until early 1980s) : direct import from Japan - (in the 1980s) : legally from Japan via third countries, such as Singapore and China - (in the 1990s) : used Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries as additional transit points - (recently) : using Myanmar as an additional channel of procurement. [Source :Katsuhisa Furokawa, The Nexus between illicit networks and WMD proliferation: The case study of North Korea]

17. ■ NK’s Known illicit procurements in 2000s * Aluminum tubes, ring magnets for use in a centrifuge upper bearing, epoxy resins used in assembling centrifuge parts, and a range of equipment important to operating centrifuges individually or in cascades, such as vacuum pumps, valves, specialized UF6 resistant oils. * Flow-forming machine usable to make centrifuge rotors and an electron beam welder for centrifuge assembly. State-of-the-art computer numerically controlled (CNC) (machines for making centrifuge parts * Spare parts for centrifuge-related equipment * Computerized control equipment used to run a plant composed of centrifuge cascades. * Pressure transducers, which are used to measure the vacuum pressure in individual centrifuges and cascades. (Source : David Albrights’s presentation to the POE on 3 October 2011) ■ Selected Companies/Individuals Involved: reported, not confirmed ● Russia - NK attempted to procure a range of nuclear items since the collapse of Soviet Union. (1997) NK attempted to purchase maraging steel from Russia - (2003) NK obtained 150 tonnes of aluminum tubing through a unknown agent, possible NCG or a company affiliated Khan network from a Russian company (sufficient for 2,700 centrifuges)

18. ● Germany - (1987) Leybold sold a small annealing furnace, which can be used to treat maraging steel rotors - (April 2003) NK shipment of 22 tonnes of aluminum tubes through Optronic was intercepted (planned volume was 200 tonnes, sufficient for 4,000 centrifuges. Hans Werner Trupper (Optronic) led the aborted shipment According to a URENCO expert, the tubes appeared as if they would be finished into an outer casing of a P2 centrifuge * NK acquired UF6 storage equipment from Swiss at the end of 1990s ● Japan - Toko Boeki (Li Gyeong Ho) sold Myanmar cylindrical grinders and LCR meters/cutomized grinders (Japanese police found these shipments to NK) - (July 2003) Tokyo Vacuum exported vacuum pumps and components via Nakano to the Transmerits (Taiwanese trading Company) : (July 2007) IAEA inspectors discovered in Yongbyon Tokyo vacuum’s items : oil-diffusion pump, oil-rotary pump, and relevant component - (2004/2006) Horkos exported more than 200 machine centers to a number of countries including North Korea - Meishin attempted to export frequency converters to NK through Thailand (Loxley pacific) ● China - Taiwan: (2006/2007) Royal Team Corporation conducted 14 transactions of precision machinery workstation computers for NK, Yicheng Co. exported high-precision equipment capable of producing weapons-related material to NK, (2010) NK imported 2 computer- controlled machine tools - Mainland: (2007/2009) NK reportedly purchased CNC centers, via China

20. 6. UN embargo against North Korea ※ (UNSCRS 1718/1874) All Arms embargo including related financial transactions, technical training or services - except export of small arms/light weapons to NK - a ban on the export of luxury goods to NK - Member States inspection obligations ■ a nuclear, bio/chemical and ballistic missiles programs-related embargo ● (Nuclear) NSG Trigger List/Dual-use Items ● (Bio/Chemical) AG List ● (Ballistic Missiles) MTCR List ● A Gas Centrifuge-related designation (prohibition/embargo) - NSG Trigger List: Rotating/Static components, Auxiliary Systems - Dual-use Items: Industrial Equipment/Materials - Yun Ho Jin/Namchongang Trading Corporation (NCG) * Until now, 8 entities and 5 individuals were designated by the UNSC

21. ■ Urgency to update designation of goods ● NSG Trigger List and Dual-Use Items are old and ambiguous. To block NK’s UEP advancement, Watch list/Choke point items should be identified and controlled more vigorously. A new additional designation is needed ● The following is a tentative list, not exhaustive. Some are only partially controlled on NSG lists or fall below thresholds for controlled items, but can be used directly or modified for use in centrifuge program. • Vacuum roots pumps • Vacuum measuring equipment (pressure transducers and piranni gauges) • Maraging steel • Flow-forming machines: *controlled by the NSG • High-strength aluminum alloy • Converters/inverters • Bellows-sealed valves • Fibrous or filamentary materials, and prepregs • Filament winding machines • Perfluorinated lubricants: *not controlled • Ring magnets: *not controlled • Semi-hard magnetic alloys in thin strip form: *not controlled (Source : Consultations with independent experts)

22. 7. Ways Forward ■ Six-Party Talks ● shutdown of the UEP under international monitoring ● “complete and correct” declaration on the UEP  dismantlement ■ Implementation of UNSCRs 1718/1874 ● (Member countries) blocking the illicit flow of proscribed items to and from NK. Especially export and customs controls on dual-use items with lower parameters. “Catch-all” control should be applied. Industry’s early cooperation with law enforcement is important. Cut-off assistance of technology and know-how including intangible technology through exchange of engineers and scientists ● (Neighbouring countries) stringent prohibition and export control. extra-vigilance should be applied to transit/trans-shipment point - China’s role is indispensable - regional cooperation among law enforcement authorities (ROK, Japan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Myanmar) ● (Nuclear Non-proliferation/Export Control) Mandates should be reviewed/enlarged - IAEA/NSG cooperation needed The End