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HOW WILL AMI & DYNAMIC PRICING AFFECT LOW INCOME USERS?. Ahmad Faruqui, Ph. D. Principal National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners New York, New York July 18, 2007. Reasons why it might hurt them . They can’t shift much load since they don’t have much load to begin with
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HOW WILL AMI & DYNAMIC PRICING AFFECT LOW INCOME USERS? Ahmad Faruqui, Ph. D. Principal National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners New York, New York July 18, 2007
Reasons why it might hurt them • They can’t shift much load since they don’t have much load to begin with • Most don’t have central or room air conditioning equipment • They have don’t the money to invest in enabling technologies that facilitate peak clipping and load shifting • They don’t have the money to pay an additional metering charge • AMI will be used to remotely disconnect them when they fall behind in their payments • Ergo, they will be made worse off and should be excluded from AMI and dynamic pricing
Reasons why it will help them • Many low-income customers will benefit from dynamic pricing since they have flatter-than-average load profiles • Others will benefit because they have a strong motivation to save money by curtailing peak load • California’s pricing experiment (SPP) provides supporting evidence • In Track B, which focused on low income consumers in San Francisco, consumers reduced peak load by 2.6 percent • In Track A, on a statewide basis, customers with incomes below $40,000 curtailed peak load by 10.9 percent and those on the CARE rate by 2.9 percent • The average customer in California curtailed peak load by 13 percent, the average customer in the temperate climate zone by 7.6 percent • All together, 77 percent of all customers saved money • Low-income users have also responded to RTP rates in Chicago
How can we protect low-income users? • Waive the AMI metering fee for all low-income users • Make the AMI metering fee volumetric, which would favor low users, many of whom would be low-income users • Raise the low-income discount on the monthly bill (in California, this is already 20 percent) • Credit them (and all other users) with a credit for the hedging premium when they shift to dynamic pricing • Monte Carlo simulations show that more than 95 percent of users would benefit if given a 3 percent hedging premium
With demand response, AMI and dynamic pricing become attractive to over 95% of customers
Should we protect low income users? • This is a major policy issue that should be debated in every state • What is not a good idea is the notion of excluding low-income users from AMI and dynamic pricing • This “Swiss cheese” deployment will prevent the full operational benefits of AMI being achieved • It will raise “The Gap” that has to be covered by demand response and prevent its deployment • All other customers will be deprived of demand response benefits that nationally speaking, could be in the $35 billion range
Additional reading • Brattle Group, The. “The power of five percent.” Discussion paper. May 2007. • Brattle Group, The. “Quantifying the benefit of demand response for PJM,” prepared for PJM Interconnection LLC. and MADRI, January 2007 • Faruqui, Ahmad. “Breaking out of the bubble: how dynamic pricing can mitigate rate shock,” Public Utilities Fortnightly, March 2007. • Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), The US. Demand Response and Advanced Metering, Staff Report, August 2006 • North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). “2006 Long-Term Reliability Assessment,” October 16, 2006. • Plexus Research, Inc., Deciding on Smart Meters, Edison Electric Institute, September 2006.
Contact information • Ahmad Faruqui, Ph. D.Principal • The Brattle Group353 Sacramento Street, Suite 1140San Francisco, CA 94111Voice: 415.217.1026Fax: 415.217.1099Cell: 925.408.0149 • Email: Ahmad.Faruqui@Brattle.Com