PO377 Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence

1. PO377 Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence Week 20: Managing Conflict in the Case Studies

2. Lecture outline • Introduction: “Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again” • Bosnia and Herzegovina: Problems of a complex consociation • … and Northern Ireland in comparison • Rwanda: Failures of the international community • Sri Lanka: Is the future non-violent? • Summary

3. Part I: Introduction: “Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again”

4. Long- and short-term goals of post-conflict reconstruction • Long-term goal: positive peace. • Short-term (“primary”) goals: • securing a viable and sustainable cease-fire; • creating or facilitating the conditions necessary for internal conflict resolution; • concluding the international peace presence in a country in such a way that normalisation of domestic affairs can occur [bear in mind how “normal” is conceptualised in the liberal peacebuilding paradigm] (Cousens 2002).

5. Challenges for the short-term goals of post-conflict reconstruction Inter alia: • An “unripe” moment? (Zartman 2002); • problems of international coordination (Cousens 2002); • known unknowns [spoilers] (Stedman 1997); • commitment problems of conflict parties and external actors (Walter 1997; Rothchild and Lake 1998).

6. Challenges for the long-term goal of post-conflict reconstruction • Weaknesses of the peacebuilding agenda (cp. week 19: e.g. inherent contradictions of the liberal international peacebuilding paradigm; blind spots); • to achieve positive peace, we need to address the underlying conditions that caused the outbreak of ethnic violence (Galtung 1985) – but what are these underlying conditions and can they all be resolved/altered?

7. Matching causes and solutions Primordialism: • central cause of ethnic violence: inherently conflictual nature of ethnic identities; • appropriate solution: optimistic view: keep them apart (Kaufmann 1996); pessimistic view: none (cp. Smith 1993); Instrumentalism: • central cause of ethnic violence: elite behaviour (Brass 1991); • appropriate solution: resocialising political elites; Constructivism: • central cause of ethnic violence: webs of social interactions; wider societal, political and economic circumstances (cp. Anderson 1983); • appropriate solution: reconstructing ethnic identities; Institutionalism: • central cause of ethnic violence: “unsuitable” political institutions; • appropriate solution: institutional engineering.

8. Flaws in the study of ethnic and nationalist violence • No clear definitions; • no agreed-upon set of key questions and problems; • no well-defined body of literature; • numerous methodological shortcomings. (According to Brubaker and Laitin 1998)

9. Part II: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Problems of a complex consociation

10. Cp. week 18: International intervention as “critical barrier” (Walter) for peace External actors can help bring security and stability to war-torn countries by: • making conflict either extremely difficult or unnecessary (Carment and Rowlands 2004); • bringing representatives of contending groups together for peace negotiations (Barnes 2009); • enforcing peace settlements and providing necessary security assurances (Walter 1997); • encouraging opponents to design new institutional arrangements to manage conflict (Hartzell et al. 2002; Sisk 1996).

11. Source:Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/charts/

12. Power-sharing mechanisms in Bosnia and Herzegovina • Federal distribution of territory and power; • ethnically based distribution of seats in parliament; • [ethnically] rotating presidency; • legislative conditions that require support for bills across ethnic lines; • ethnically based legislative veto over matters of vital interest; • electoral process based on proportional representation and party lists. (See O’Halloran 2005)

13. A complex consociation According to O’Leary (2001) “complex consociations” are complex, because they: • address specifically national self-determination disputes between communities; • simultaneously involve peace processes; • involve at least one additional strategy other than consociation; • are characterised by international involvement in the making, ratification and maintenance of the relevant consociational settlements.

14. Problems of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s complex consociation • Nearly 18 years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995), BiH remains a deeply divided society in which the basic functions of the political system (and possibly the maintenance of negative peace?) depend on an international presence. • Certain factors may help explain why the Dayton Peace Agreement has not led to positive peace: • an overly complex institutional arrangement; • the neglect of informal political institutions (Belloni 2001); • inherent contradictions of the liberal international peacebuilding paradigm (Cousens 2002); • the failure to reconstruct ethnic identities or to create a shared overarching national identity with an accompanying sense of a shared future [a failure of nation-building?].

15. Part III: … and Northern Ireland in comparison

16. Dayton and Good Friday • Taking apparent differences between Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand, and Northern Ireland on the other into account (such as the degree of ethnic diversity, level of economic development, democratic traditions etc.), two similarities in their peace processes stand out: • Both the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement have established “complex consociations” in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland respectively (O’Leary 2001); • in both cases, international intervention played – in different forms – a pivotal role in reaching the peace agreement (Wolff 2006).

17. Power-sharing mechanisms in Northern Ireland • Cross-community executive power-sharing; • proportionality rules throughout the governmental and public sectors; • autonomy/community self-government; • veto rights for minorities.

18. Evaluating the 1998 Agreement • The 1998 Agreement is the most successful conflict settlement in Northern Ireland to date. Thanks to a less complex institutional framework, greater concern for public approval and the existence of democratic traditions, it avoided several of the pitfalls of the Dayton Peace Agreement. • However, like the Dayton Peace Agreement, it does not solve the actual conflict issue, and cannot really address issues of on-the-ground identities and relationships between communities, so that it is questionable how far the 1998 Agreement can help achieve positive peace.

19. Evaluating the 1998 Agreement (2) • In this context, the various suspensions of the devolved government in Northern Ireland have put the future of the Agreement repeatedly in doubt (O’Leary 2001; Wolff 2005). • Lack of trust among political elites; external interference (particularly from the British government – both an external and an internal actor); and the linking of weapons decommissioning to the functioning and survival of the political institutions established under the 1998 Agreement have exacerbated the structural shortcomings of the complex consociation (ibid.)

20. Part IV: Rwanda: Failures of the international community

21. Arusha Accords • In response to the civil war launched in 1990 by exiled Tutsi (RPF) against the Rwandan government, talks are held in 1992 in Arusha, Tanzania, largely in response to pressure from the USA, Belgium, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Delegations from African states; observers/monitors from France, Belgium, Germany, US, Britain, Canada, Netherlands, EU. • US State Department: continued aid to Rwanda was dependent upon progress towards a multi-party coalition government. • The negotiations led to August 1993 Arusha Accords:

22. Arusha Accords (2) • Democratic power-sharing governance; • RPF and Rwandan armed forces to integrate; • International peacekeeping force (UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda – UNAMIR) to be deployed and French soldiers to withdraw. • Refugees to be allowed home. • Hutu regime not genuinely committed to cease-fire or Accords; periodic massacres; Accords never instituted; civilian militias armed and trained by the MRND and CDR. • Many thought the Accords were the best settlement that could be achieved; the problem was Habyarimana’s regime was not committed. Others say the Accords backed hardliners into a corner and created an extremist reaction (Khadiagala 2002).

23. Genocide • ‘[B]oth the mediators and the parties to the Arusha Agreement staked its implementation almost exclusively on international actors who were unwilling and unprepared to expend the resources required to meet its provisions’ (Khadiagala 2002: 463). • Implementation of Arusha Accords delayed; genocide of Tutsis began April 1994. UNAMIR peacekeepers withdrew. • Genocide ended July 1994 through RPF military victory. RPF governing in coalition with 4 other political parties provided for in the Arusha Accords (exception of MRND). New President, PM and many cabinet members were Hutu but the current government is much more Tutsi-dominated (incl. Pres. Kagame who was military leader of the RPF).

24. Post-Genocide • When RPF took power up to 2,000,000 Hutu fled to refugee camps in neighbouring states, mainly Zaire. From camps Hutu exiles launched attacks on Rwanda; Rwandan govt invaded Zaire (now DR Congo) to clear out Hutu refugee camps. Various types of Rwandan military involvement in DRC since then. • Today Rwanda is fairly stable but more like tenuous stalemate than genuine peace. Weakly democratic and pretty authoritarian. Politicians accused of corruption etc. • Govt has arguably failed to move towards genuine national reconciliation. Approach seems largely to be to try and erase the notion of ethnic difference.

25. Again: International intervention as “critical barrier” for peace External actors can help bring security and stability to war-torn countries by: • making conflict either extremely difficult or unnecessary (Carment and Rowlands 2004); • bringing representatives of contending groups together for peace negotiations (Barnes 2009); • enforcing peace settlements and providing necessary security assurances (Walter 1997); • encouraging opponents to design new institutional arrangements to manage conflict (Hartzell et al. 2002; Sisk 1996). ￫ What did they do in Rwanda?

26. The “internationalised” Arusha Peace Process • “It has commonly been asserted that the international community has been negligent in seeking to resolve conflicts in ‘unimportant’ parts of the world such as Africa, by contrast for example with the resources lavished on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. This claim can scarcely be made in the case of the Rwandan conflict, where the international community, led by regional states and the Organisation of African Unity, took an active role in attempting to negotiate a solution from a very early stage” (Clapham 1998: 200). ￫ Note that this quote refers to the Arusha Peace Process pre-1993, not the international community’s reaction to the 1994 genocide.

27. Failures of the international community during the genocide • Weak mandate and minimal capacity of peacekeeping mission to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords; • information failures; • supply of weapons from France; • inadvertent encouragement of Hutu extremists by first threatening to withdraw and then actively withdrawing troops, embassy staff, aid workers etc.; • lack of political will among UN Member States to act… (Carlsson 2005; Melvern 2005).

28. Failures of the international community after the genocide • Coordination and prioritisation problems in the post-conflict reconstruction agenda; • ambiguous position towards the political liberalisation of Rwanda; • neglect of crimes and human rights violations after the genocide; • failure to prosecute officials of the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front [RPF] (Reydams 2005; Uvin 2001).

29. Part V: Sri Lanka: Is the future non-violent?

30. Peace Attempts • 1985 and 1986: failed attempts at conflict resolution tried, brokered by India. • 1987: Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, enforced by Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). IPKF involved in killings, torture, disappearances and rape; fought by LTTE and forced to leave in 1990. • 1990: short-lived ceasefire and talks; renewed war and massive displacement. • 1995: failed attempt at ceasefire and talks; army re-took Jaffna city from LTTE.

31. Peace Attempts • Feb 2002: indefinite ceasefire signed. Norwegian-brokered talks soon stalled; LTTE withdrew from talks Apr 2003 and again after Feb 2006. • Increasing violence from Nov 2005 elections and esp. mid-2006 army ground offensive in east and clashes in north. Sept 2006 LTTE insisted all EU members of SLMM leave (Norway and Iceland remained; Sweden, Denmark and Finland left). • 2007 war against LTTE in east scaled up. Particularly brutal since start of 2009 and in May 2009 the state military won a decisive victory over the LTTE, surrounded by allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

32. Is the future non-violent? Two ways to answer this question: • with regards to the prospects of sustainable peace [difficult to assess]; • with regards to non-violent strategies for change as alternative route to pursue minority interests.

33. Cp. week 13: Why civil resistance works Commitment to non-violent methods... • enhances domestic legitimacy; • encourages more broad-based participation in resistance; • enhances international legitimacy. • Regime violence against non-violent movements is likely to backfire (cp. Sharp’s definition of “political jiu-jitsu”). (See Stephan and Chenoweth 2008)

34. Are non-violent strategies the next step? Pro: • Long traditions of active civil society (Orjuela 2003); • ongoing international support for non-violent movements in Sri Lanka (ibid.); Contra: • Deeply divided civil society (ibid.); • passivity of grass-roots people (ibid.); • militarisation of Sri Lankan society (abundance of weapons and trained combatants) (ICG 2006; Chris Smith 2003 & 2007).

35. Part VI: Summary

36. Summary • Needless to say, neither negative nor positive peace are easily obtainable goals after the outbreak of large-scale ethnic violence. • Achieving positive peace is a particularly demanding [elusive?] goal, as it requires the elimination of those conditions that led to the outbreak of ethnic violence in the first place. • There is not and cannot be a blueprint of managing [or, if at all possible, resolving] violent ethnic conflict. • Today’s lecture presented some factors influencing the question of “what next after ethnic violence” [institutional design in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland, international intervention in Rwanda and civil society in Sri Lanka], but it is down to you – and your own critical assessment – to identify what you consider to be the most relevant conditions affecting the prospects of negative and positive peace in our case studies.