240 likes | 258 Views
Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions. Lei Wang Georgia Institute of Technology Joint work with Gagan Goel Chinmay Karande Google Georgia Tech.
E N D
Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions Lei Wang Georgia Institute of Technology Joint work with Gagan Goel Chinmay Karande Google Georgia Tech
Overview of Combinatorial Auction • Setting • Mechanism • Allocation: • Payment: • Truthfulness • Social welfare
Our Model and motivation • Motivation
Our Model • Public function • Private value: • Valuations
Myerson’s Characterization of truthful mechanism • Monotone allocation: • Payment is determined • Example: VCG mechanism • Approximation algorithm might not be monotone
Our conversion • Plan: • Choose a range R • Run MIR • Show:
Conclusion • Conversion
Future direction • Randomized mechanism • Randomized maximum in range • Randomized rounding
Truthfulness v.s. Approximability • Huge clash in non-Bayesian setting • On the hardness of being truthful C.Papadimitriou and Y.Singer FOCS’08 • No clash in Bayesian setting • Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design J.Hartline and B.Lucier STOC’10 • Towards Optimal Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design X.Bei and Z. Huang SODA’11 • Is there any clash for single-parameter?
Thank you! 谢谢