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Norbord’s Combustible Dust Experience March 29, 2011

Norbord’s Combustible Dust Experience March 29, 2011. Peter Quosai General Manager, EH&S Toronto, Canada 416-777-4440 peter.quosai@norbord.com. Justin Smyth Project Engineer Norbord South Molton, England justin.smyth@norbord.net. Jason Homme Process Tech Norbord Minnesota - Bemidji

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Norbord’s Combustible Dust Experience March 29, 2011

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  1. Norbord’s Combustible Dust ExperienceMarch 29, 2011 Peter Quosai General Manager, EH&S Toronto, Canada 416-777-4440 peter.quosai@norbord.com Justin Smyth Project Engineer Norbord South Molton, England justin.smyth@norbord.net Jason Homme Process Tech Norbord Minnesota - Bemidji jason.homme@minnesota.norbord.com

  2. Norbord • Approximately 2,000 employees • Based in Toronto, Canada • North America • 9 OSB mills (7 US, 2 Quebec) • Europe/United Kingdom • 2 OSB mills • 3 PB/MDF lines • 1 added value plant – lamination and RTA furniture

  3. Agenda • Norbord’s dust explosion experience – South Molton, England • Our overall approach to reducing combustible dust risks • Examples of quick wins in a Minnesota OSB plant • Experience with vacuum systems in European panel mills

  4. The South Molton PB explosionA wake-up call PB line explosion - 2004

  5. The South Molton PB explosionHow did it happen? Material infeed Keller wind sifter Grit removal Dry material discharge Material transport fan

  6. The South Molton PB explosionWhat was the consequence? Risk to employees Prohibition notice from the UK Health and Safety Executive Extended downtime – business continuity risk Cost - £1.4M to bring the plant back on line Immediate ban on the use of compressed air for cleaning and dry brushing Prohibition extended to other Norbord UK facilities

  7. The South Molton PB explosionWhat contributed to the explosion? Wood dust has the ability to be explosive Contamination in the material Maintenance was poor Philosophy to keep running at all costs Housekeeping standards were poor No protection systems fitted to the plant to safely vent pressure Process interlocking poor

  8. The South Molton PB explosionWhat did we do about it? Plant blow downs replaced with wash downs or vacuum systems Dust leak management program put in place Explosion protection systems installed Process interlocks improved Employee awareness training rolled out Similar action plans also implemented in Norbord’s other EU mills

  9. Norbord’s general approach…So far • Treat all dust as potentially explosive • Increase awareness and training – assign champions • Keep as much wood in the systems as possible • Eliminate historic accumulations • Understand where dust is coming from • Systematically identify sources • Reduce or eliminate use of compressed air for cleaning • Set guidelines for use • Explore and encourage vacuum alternatives • Developed clear and documented program expectations

  10. Addressing the source of dustQuick wins in Minnesota OSB • First we developed a Dust Recognition Form • Trained employees what to look for and to use the form • Then we identified the areas that were the largest dust contributors that could be a “Quick Win” • We created a list of projects that would produce the best results for containment or capturing fugitive dust • With the help of contractors we are maximizing the use of our air systems • Within a year we have been able to complete about 20 of our heavy hitters!

  11. Belt cleaner on the outfeed conveyor for the dryer, this cleaner has reduced the amount of dust by 75% going to the take up pulley which normally would end up falling on the floor • Below the take up pulley, the amount of dust here has been reduced from one and a half bobcat buckets to a shovel full in 8 hours

  12. Outfeed end of the flatline dryer, we installed the hood from “K” air system to collect the dust from the outfeed end of the dryer • Blower for the outfeed end of the dryer, this is used for separating the dust from the wafers so the hood in the previous slide can collect the dust

  13. Rotary dryer outfeed conveyor take up pulley has been fully enclosed. Clean up now is done from the bottom door, it’s just shoveled into a wheel barrow. This keeps a lot of dust from being blown around when doors are open on the building • Woodroom tail ends of the wet wafer conveyors, they have been fully enclosed to keep the dust contained inside

  14. Mat conveyor return pan, this has been closed up and the dust is directed to the bin below. Prevents the dust from being blown around

  15. Vacuum Systems • Inverness OSB • Gotland BagVac • Portable • 12”HG, 1200m3/hr • 4” (100mm) flex hose connection • Dedicated area specific 4” collection network • Direct dump to hopper or bag

  16. Vacuuming has its advantages • Does not compromise existing extraction systems or reduce negative pressure from bunkers/conveyors • Reduces risk of contaminants from floor making it into floor pick-ups etc. • Reduces ignition sources in extraction equipment • Handles materials only once BeforeVacuuming AfterVacuuming

  17. … there is much more to do. • Reinforce housekeeping and leak detection routines • Continue training and communication • Develop habit to identify and fix leaks • Establish “acceptable” housekeeping expectations • Quantify residual risk • Characterize/test remaining dust • Classify areas • Plan investments for improvement (dust extraction etc.) • Review suitability of fire protection and control • Review engineering for explosion venting, etc. • Limit propagation - explosion detection, inerting systems, etc.

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