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BIOSECURITY & BIOSAFETY: A NON-PROLIFERATION INSTRUMENT

BIOSECURITY & BIOSAFETY: A NON-PROLIFERATION INSTRUMENT. Marc Finaud, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Moscow, 9 September, 2005. DEFINITIONS.

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BIOSECURITY & BIOSAFETY: A NON-PROLIFERATION INSTRUMENT

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  1. BIOSECURITY & BIOSAFETY: A NON-PROLIFERATION INSTRUMENT Marc Finaud, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Moscow, 9 September, 2005

  2. DEFINITIONS • BIOSAFETY: Set of standards and procedures defining all aspects of protection of workers and the environment against accidental dissemination of biological agents, including technology to ensure confinement of pathogens (filters, sealed equipment, etc.). • BIOSECURITY: Procedures aimed at avoiding deliberate dissemination of pathogens (by theft, diversion or other hostile acts).

  3. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS • A biological weapon (BW) is a system capable of disseminating pathogens (biological or toxic agents), natural, or genetically modified to enhance their characteristics. • Developments in biotechnology could be used for the production or the improvement of BW and provide access to new biological agents better suited to military uses, making vaccines and treatments more complex.

  4. INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS • 1925 Geneva Protocol: bans the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. Not prohibited : use in internal conflicts, threat of use, production, R&D… 133 ratifications with many reservations (retaliation). • 1972 Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention: No verification. 152 ratifications. Expert Group negotiating Confidence & Transparency Measures, incl. a Code of Conduct for Scientists. • Australia Group: control of dissemination and transfer of equipment, items and technology in both biological and chemical fields of interest for proliferating countries or terrorist organisations (Lists covering main dual-use areas with a “catch-all” clause to control exports of unlisted items).

  5. NATIONAL PREVENTION MEASURES UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (28/04/04): “all States (…) shall adopt and enforce : • (…) effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery (…); • (…) measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials (…) • (a) (…) measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport; • (b) (…) physical protection measures; • (c) (…) border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat (…) the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items (…); • (d) (…) national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including (…) criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations.

  6. THE TERRORIST RISK So far, terrorist attempts to acquire biological agents have fallen short of successful weaponization. Only 2 significant biological attacks: • Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo failed to weaponize botulinum toxin and anthrax, and used chemical agent sarin for attacks in a Tokyo subway in 1994 and 1995. • In 1984 in Dalles, Oregon, a religious cult, Rajneesh, disseminated salmonella bacteria in 10 restaurants, infecting 750 people, but with no fatalities. • In October 2001, letters containing anthrax sent to members of US Congress and the media, killed 5 and infected 18 others. Mass disruption and billions of dollars in decontamination and prevention expenses.

  7. THE TERRORIST RISK Required quantities for lethal effect WeaponGrams • Aerial explosives 320 million • Fragmentation cluster bombs 32 million • Hydrocyanic acid 32 million • Mustard gas 3.2 million • Sarin nerve gas 800,000 • Radiological weapon 5,000 • Type A botulinal toxin 80 • Anthrax spores 8 Attack on a water supply • Potassium cyanide 18,000 • Nerve agent VX 100 • Typhoid culture 1

  8. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) • G8 Global Partnership: 2002=>2012 $20bn to help Russia & FSU to destroy or secure WMD & WMD-related materials. Priority to Nuclear & Chemical Weapons/Materials. International Science & Technology Center (ISTC). • US Bilateral CTR Programs

  9. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) THE EU & THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP 2003-2006 (in €M)

  10. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) Russian BW Complex: • early 1990s: 65,000 personnel; 50 facilities, huge quantities of agents; • 2000: 15,000 personnel; 50% labs insecure (2002 GAO Report).

  11. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) International Cooperation Programs USA (FY2005): • Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (DoD): $55M • Improved safety/security of dangerous pathogen collections (2004: $11.2M; 2005: $24.6M).

  12. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) France: €5M (2003-2004): Biosecurity Program to develop new prophylactic and therapeutic means for fighting bioterrorism: 1. Securing pathogens by applying international norms to labs; 2. Training Russian scientists on international norms in the framework of scientific collaboration; 3. Joint research in New Generation Therapies in conformity with pharmaceutical norms. Framework: ISTC

  13. SCIENTIST REDIRECTION PROGRAMS Moscow ISTC: • 1994-2004: $600M; 60,000 scientists employed. • 2004: $56M for 193 projects, grants to 27,104 scientists = 9,012 full-time/yr • Biotechnology: 31.6% of new projects; 38.7% of funding.

  14. . Source: ISTC Annual Report 2004

  15. IDENTIFIED AREAS OF COOPERATION • Consolidating & eliminating dangerous pathogens collections; • Upgrading biosafety & biosecurity of microbial collections and research facilities; • Strengthening epidemiological surveillance; • Integrating & coordinating disease surveillance systems, incl. Anti-Plague Institutes; • Computerizing paper archives on past disease outbreaks; • Training of scientists on proliferation risks; • Improving access to facilities; • Establishing single point of contact of government.

  16. SOURCES • John Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002 • Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control, A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2001 • http://http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwissuebrief.asp • http://www.bioterrorism.slu.edu/bt/products/ahec_chem/ppt/17 • http://www.defense.gouv.fr/portal_repository/159120745__0001/fichier/getData?_&ispopup=1 • http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00138.pdf • http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm#56 • http://www.ransac.org/Issues/U.S.-Russian%20Nonproliferation%20Programs/Chemical%20and%20Biological%20Weapons/Biological%20Weapons/624200331413PM.html • http://cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/funding.htm • http://www.istc.ru/ISTC/sc.nsf/html/annual-report.htm • http://cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/pottertalk.htm

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