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DNS Measurement at a Root Server. Nevil Brownlee, kc Claffy and Evi Nemeth Presented by Zhengxiang Pan Mar. 27 th , 2003. Introduction. DNS: Domain Name System BIND: Berkeley Internet Name Domain System. Local Name Server. UDP. client. Local Name Server. Root Server. Local Name Server.
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DNS Measurement at a Root Server Nevil Brownlee, kc Claffy and Evi Nemeth Presented by Zhengxiang Pan Mar. 27th, 2003
Introduction • DNS: Domain Name System • BIND: Berkeley Internet Name Domain System Local Name Server UDP client Local Name Server Root Server Local Name Server
Methodology Passive capture DNS packets at F.root-server.net Use Tcpdump & Error logs
Results • A. query rate • Responds 93% of the input packets.
Error taxonomy • B1. Repeated queries • Maybe the results of a broken nameserver or a broken client. • B2. Private Address Space • About 7% of the queries are asking for hostname associated with an RFC 1918 address. • 2% - 3% of the queries have the source IP address in RFC 1918 space.
Error taxonomy • B3. Top Level Domains • In 1 hour trace of Jan. 7, 2001: • 16.5% of the servers asked only INVALID TLD • 37.1% of the servers asked at least one INVALID TLD
Error taxonomy • B4. Bogus A Queries • A query: hostname IP address • 12-18% A queries target IP address • B5. Source Port Zero • Port 0 is reserved and not valid in UDP / TCP. • Root servers never answer queries from port 0
Error Taxonomy • B6. Dynamic Updates • DHCP can dynamic update local nameserver, should not try to update root servers.
Results • Attacks • Spoofing source IP, using root server as reflector, flooding the attack target with answers it did not ask. • Scanning IP space. • Microsoft’s DNS woes • Jan. 24, 2001 Microsoft nameserves down, query load for Microsoft names go to over 25% of the total query load.
Summary • Percentages of servers have bad behaviors: • 13% bogus A query • 35% invalid TLD • 35% leaking internal information • Strategy • Diagnose and repair bugs in implementation • Deploy negative answers