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TOP FIVE MOST DEADLY TACTICS TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPS) AS OF 1 APR 05

TOP FIVE MOST DEADLY TACTICS TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPS) AS OF 1 APR 05. PHOTO SOURCE: AL JAISH AL ISLAMI (ISLAMIC ARMY) IN IRAQ, http://www.globalterroralert.com. SOURCE DISCUSSION.

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TOP FIVE MOST DEADLY TACTICS TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPS) AS OF 1 APR 05

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  1. TOP FIVE MOST DEADLY TACTICS TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPS) AS OF 1 APR 05 PHOTO SOURCE: AL JAISH AL ISLAMI (ISLAMIC ARMY) IN IRAQ,http://www.globalterroralert.com

  2. SOURCE DISCUSSION THE FOLLOWING OPEN SOURCEWEBSITES WERE USED AS PRIMARY SOURCES TO OBTAIN PHOTOS, ATTACK INFORMATION (DATE, TIME, LOCATION, INSURGENT OPERATION INFORMATION), COALITION FORCES (CF) UNIT INFORMATION, AND STATISTICS (VARIOUS OTHER RESOURCES WERE RESEARCHED AS WELL, SUCH AS FOX NEWS, YAHOO NEWS, ARMY KNOWLEDGE ONLINE, AND OTHER OPEN SOURCES, INCLUDING VARIOUS RADICAL WEBSITES, ETC): MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY SMART CARDS (U) http://www.mcia.osis.gov/products/smart_card/ttp/index.htm AL QAEDA TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES (U/FOUO) http://www.osis.gov/JITF-CT/index.htm COUNTERINSURGENCY FMI 3-07-22http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-07-22.pdf FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE MANUAL, SEP 86 http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf http://www.dod.gov/releases/ http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews http://casualties.org/oif/stats.aspx http://www.globalterroralert.com http://www.defendamerica.mil/archive/2004-09/20040902pm1.html http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppt http://www.albasrah.net (Anti-US Bias) http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images(Anti-US Bias) http://www.middle-east-online.com/english(Anti-US Bias)

  3. TOP CAUSES HOSTILE - SMALL ARMS FIRE (SAF) KIA 436 HOSTILE - IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) ATTACK HOSTILE - VEHICLE BORNE IED (VBIED, NON-SUICIDE)** 85 350 HOSTILE - ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADE (RPG) ATTACK 67 HOSTILE - AMBUSH 62 HOSTILE - MORTAR ATTACK 60 HOSTILE - HELICOPTER CRASH (SAF ATTACK) 53 HOSTILE - SNIPER HOSTILE - SUICIDE IED (SUICIDE BOMBER, NON-VEHICLE) HOSTILE - VEHICLE ACCIDENT 26 25 23 TOP CAUSES OF DEATH (HOSTILE ACTS) #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 **VBIED MOVED UP FROM #6 TO #3 SINCE JAN 05; (CHART DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL HOSTILE & NON-HOSTILE DEATHS; ONLY TOP TEN HOSTILE CAUSES OF DEATH; 1710 TOTAL AS OF 1 APR 05) SOURCE:http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews & http://casualties.org/oif/stats.aspx,

  4. MONTH KIA WIA 202 MAR-03 82 APR-03 53 340 MAY-03 6 54 JUN-03 24 147 JUL-03 28 226 AUG-03 23 181 247 SEP-03 18 OCT-03 35 413 NOV-03 94 337 DEC-03 32 261 JAN-04 39 187 FEB-04 16 146 MAR-04 35 322 APR-04 131 1206 MAY-04 65 753 572 JUN-04 45 JUL-04 45 551 AUG-04 63 883 SEP-04 74 699 OCT-04 58 636 1350 NOV-04 129 DEC-04 58 131 JAN-05 107 494 FEB-05 58 407 35 166 MAR-05 KILLED & WOUNDED BY MONTH/SERVICE UP TO 1 APR 05 ARMY NAVY MARINES AIR FORCE COAST GRD TOTAL 1031 29 456 16 1 1533 (AS OF 4/1/05; INCLUDES RESERVES/GUARD/CIVS) PERIODS OF SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES APR-MAY 04 = NAJAF UPRISING AUG-OCT 04 = BUILD UP TO FALLUJAH NOV 04 = FALLUJAH OPERATION JAN 05 = ELECTIONS SOURCE:http://casualties.org/oif/stats.aspx,

  5. HIGHEST THREAT AREAS 1 APR 05 AL ANBAR PROVINCE IS STILL THE MOST DANGEROUS AREA AFTER ADDING AL ANBAR (VIC), RAMADI AND FALLUJAH’S KIA FIGURES TO TOTAL 394 KIA; INCLUDES ONLY 15 TOP HIGH THREAT AREAS. SOURCE:http://casualties.org/oif/stats.aspx,

  6. ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) ATTACK TRENDS MARCH DATA NOT AVAILABLE SOURCE:http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf

  7. ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) ATTACK TRENDS IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED BY ACTS OF WAR WHILE IT APPEARS BY OPEN SOURCE REPORTING THAT AIF OPERATIONS HAVE SLOWED, ACTUALLY AIF HAVE SHIFTED TARGETING FROM CF TO IZ TARGETS. AIF ARE NOW KILLING IZ CIVILIANS AND ISF AT ONE THE HIGHEST RATES EVER, ACCORDING TO THE AVAILABLE OPEN SOURCE DATA. SOURCE:http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf

  8. #1: SAF ATTACKS • SAF DURING CLOSE COMBAT - DIRECT ACTION • LIMITED SAF FIRES (TO HARASS) ON • PATROLS • CONVOYS • DRIVE-BY ON CHECKPOINTS PHOTO SOURCE:http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/pages/1092130982_2802_jpg.htm

  9. SAF DURING CLOSE COMBAT - DIRECT ACTION -PLANNED TARGETS & TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY -MASSED/UNMASSED FIRES -TARGET EXPOSED CF/INA/ING PERSONNEL THAT ARE MOUNTED OR DISMOUNTED -FIRES ORIGINATE FROM AIF IN -BUILDINGS -HOMES -AROUND STREET CORNERS -VEHICLES -DEFENSIVE POSITION(PREPARED/HASTY) -TUNNELS -SAF THREAT COMES FROM ALL AGES AND SEXES PHOTO SOURCE: CHILD SOLDIERS http://www.albasrah.net/images/moqawama/pages/moqawama_55_jpg.htm; WOMEN PROTESTINGhttp://www.albasrah.net/images/moqawama/pages/015_gif.htm

  10. SAF HARASSMENT ON PATROLS/CONVOYS -UNPLANNED/TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY -NON-MASSED FIRES -PERFORMED BY 1-2 AIF WITH RIFLES OR PISTOLS -TARGET EXPOSED CF PERSONNEL ON VEHICLES -EXPOSED TRACK COMMANDER -EXPOSED GUNNER -SAF MAY ORIGINATE FROM AIF IN: -TOP OF BUILDINGS OR HOMES -WINDOWS OF BUILDINGS OR HOMES -AROUND STREET CORNERS -VEHICLES/MOTORCYCLES -MIXED IN WITH PEDESTRIANS -AIF WILL IMMEDIATELY BREAK CONTACT PHOTO SOURCE:http://www.albasrah.net/images/iraqi-resist/pages/r2863957857_jpg.htm

  11. SAF DRIVE-BY -PLANNED -REQUIRES 1-2 AIF WITH AK-47S -MOST OFTEN AGAINST CHECKPOINTS -CAR DRIVE-BY (MOST COMMON METHOD) -MOTORCYCLE DRIVE-BY -TARGET EXPOSED PERSONNEL SUCH AS: -CF -IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD (ING) -IRAQI NATIONAL ARMY (INA) -IRAQI POLICE SERVICE (IPS) -AIF WILL IMMEDIATELY BREAK CONTACT -PRE-PLANNED EXFIL ROUTES SOURCE: TCP VIC FALLUJAH, IZ,http://www.albasrah.net/media/sound/falluja.htm

  12. #2: AIF IED ATTACKS • IED ON LINEAR ROUTE: • AIF ARE EMPLACING FEWER IEDS • YET, AIF ARE EMPLACING MORE POWERFUL IEDS (REQUIRES MORE AIF PERSONNEL & TIME TO PREPARE, EMPLACE, DETONATE) • DETONATED BY MANUAL OR REMOTE DETONATION • PLANNED, RECONNOITERED, PHOTOGRAPHED/VIDEOTAPED • IEDS CAN BE EMPLACED IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS: • ON ROADS (IN HOLES, DEAD ANIMAL CARCASSES, CONCRETE, ASPHALT, OR UNDER DEBRIS) • ALONG ROADS (MEDIAN, SHOULDER) • THROWN FROM BRIDGES • CREEK BEDS

  13. #2: AIF IED ATTACKS • MULTIPLE ROADSIDE IEDS OR DECOY, MANUAL/REMOTE DETONATION • IED THREAT TO DISMOUNTS • SUICIDE IED MANUAL DETONATION -AIF ARE DEPLOYING MORE IEDS (AVERAGE 30 PER DAY FEB 05, VERSES 25 PER DAY APR 04); NOW THEY ARE FOCUSING ON ISF, NOT CF. -HOWEVER, US CASUALTIES STILL REMAIN AT AN ALL TIME HIGH FOR THE FIRST QUARTER 2005. SOURCE: BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, IRAQI INDEX 11 MAR 05

  14. DECOY IED ATTACKS SOURCE: MCIA IED SMART CARD; PHOTO SOURCE: http://www.strategypage.com/gallery/articles/military_photos_200412100.asp

  15. SUICIDE IED ATTACKS • TARGETS ARE PLANNED AND RECONNOITERED PHOTOGRAPHED/VIDEOTAPED • OFTEN INSIDE JOBS • REQUIRES 4-8 AIF • WALK UP METHOD OF ATTACK • TARGETS ARE PEOPLE: • CF, IPS, ING, OR INA BASES OR POSTS • KEY IRAQIS IN THEIR OFFICES • KEY IRAQIS IN THEIR RESIDENCES • KEY IRAQIS IN THEIR CARS • IEDS CARRIED BY • SUITCASE • BAG • BACKPACK • VEST

  16. #3 VBIED ATTACKS • STATIONARY, NON-SUICIDE VBIED: • -PARKED VBIED • -DROP-OFF VBIED • -VBIED DIVERSIONS • -UNWITTING VICTIM-DRIVER IN VBIED • -VBIED DECOYS

  17. VBIED ATTACKS (NON-SUICIDE) • PARKED VBIEDS: • -REMOTE CONTROL OR COMMAND DETONATED VBIED: • VBIED IS STATIONARY/UNMANNED: FROM AN OVERWATCH POSITION, AIF MAY USE A HARD WIRE OR A REMOTE CONTROL DEVICE (CELL PHONE, GARAGE DOOR OPENER, ETC.) TO DETONATE AS TARGET PASSES. • MAY BE A STRIPPED VEHICLE (STRIPPED OF SEATS/TIRES, BODY DAMAGE). • MAY BE A JUNK YARD VEHICLE THAT AIF SIMPLY PUT TIRES ON AND PLACED NEXT TO ROAD AS A VBIED. MAY EVEN HAVE BEEN HASTILY REPAINTED. • MAY APPEAR TO BE A FUNCTIONAL VEHICLE, BUT PARKED WITH HOOD UP. MAY HAVE FUEL CANS STACKED NEARBY OR IN BACK SEAT. • -COMPLEX AMBUSH: AIF OFTEN INITIATE A COMPLEX ATTACK WITH A STATIONARY • VBIED (SINGLE OR MULTIPLE) THAT IS DETONATED ON A CONVOY OR CF BASE; AIF CONTINUE THE ATTACK WITH RPGS, MORTARS AND SMALL ARMS FIRE (SAF). NOTE: AIF CLAIMED TO HAVE USED SEVEN VBIEDS DURING ABU GHRYAB PRISON ATTACK 3 APR 05.

  18. VBIED ATTACKS • DROP OFF VBIED: A VBIED IS DRIVEN AND PARKED NEXT TO TARGET (FOR EXAMPLE: ING FORMATION); DRIVER WALKS AWAY FROM VEHICLE AND DETONATES. • DIVERSIONS: A VBIED EXPLODES IN ANOTHER PART OF THE TOWN, AT THE SAME TIME AIFS ATTACK AN IRAQI POLICE STATION. • UNWITTING VICTIM-DRIVER: AIF PLANTS AN IED ON A VEHICLE OF AN UNWITTING EMPLOYEE, POLICEMAN OR GOVERNMENT WORKER, THEN DETONATES THE VBIED AS THE VICTIM DRIVES THEIR VEHICLE VICINITY OF THE TARGET (OFTEN A GOVERNMENT BUILDING, ETC).

  19. VBIED ATTACKS • DECOYS: • -STATIONARY VBIED SIGHTED BY CF CONVOY; CONVOY STOPS AT A SAFE DISTANCE; SECOND DEVICE SUCH AS BURIED IED IS DETONATED ON STOPPED CONVOY. • -CFS FIND AND BEGIN TO CLEAR A VBIED (DECOY) OR A SIMPLE IED, WHEN A SECOND VBIED NEARBY DETONATES ON THE CF EOD TEAM. • -‘PUSH AWAY VBIED’-- CF IDENTIFY A ‘BROKEN DOWN, ABANDONED’ VEHICLE BLOCKING AN MSR; CF HMMWV BEGINS TO PUSH THE VEHICLE OFF THE ROAD; AIF IN OVERWATCH REMOTELY DETONATE THE ‘BROKE’ VEHICLE JUST AS THE HMMWV BEGINS TO PUSH IT. PHOTO SOURCE: CNN

  20. #4: RPG ATTACKS • SINGLE RPG FIRED AT A CF, INA, OR ING TARGET TO HARASS • BUILDING • BASE • PATROL • CONVOY • CHECKPOINTS • RPG FIRED DURING CLOSE COMBAT – DIRECT ACTION PHOTO SOURCE: FIGHTING IN IRAQ http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/index.htm

  21. RPG ATTACKS ON CONVOYS/PATROLS -LIMITED PLANNING -TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY -UNMASSED FIRES -PREFER TO FIRE AT VEHICLES RATHER THAN BUILDINGS -TARGET CF, ING, INA, OR IPS -AIF WILL QUICKLY BREAK CONTACT PHOTO SOURCE: FIGHTING IN IRAQ, http://iraq4ever.blogspot.com/ ; MAHDI MILITIA,http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/pages/r977494193_jpg.htm

  22. RPG FIRED IN CLOSE COMBAT -HASTILY PLANNED -UNMASSED FIRES -MAY BE COMBINED WITH SAF -TARGET PERSONNEL, A BUILDING, VEHICLE -TARGET CF, ING, INA, OR IPS -OCCUR DAY OR NIGHT -AIF MAY BREAK CONTACT WHEN: -FACING SUPERIOR FIREPOWER -AIR/GROUND QRF ARRIVE PHOTO SOURCE: MAHDI MILITIA,http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/pages/r3220281186_jpg.htm

  23. #5: AIF AMBUSHES • HARASSMENT AMBUSHES ON PATROLS/CONVOYS • INTENT IS TO ATTACK AND THEN IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW • MAY USE ONLY AK-47S+RPGS • DAY OR NIGHT • COMBAT AMBUSHES ON PATROLS/CONVOYS • INTENT IS TO ATTACK AND DESTROY TARGET IN KILL ZONE • MAY OFTEN BE COMPLEX AMBUSHES (IED+AK-47S+RPGS+LIGHT MACHINE GUNS+MORTARS) • DAY OR NIGHT SOURCE: FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE MANUAL, SEP 86

  24. AIF HARASSMENT AMBUSH -TARGETS COMBAT PATROLS OR CONVOYS -INTENT IS TO HARASS -PROBABLY LESS HEAVILY ARMED -LAY IN WAIT, ATTACK AND WITHDRAW -PREPLANNED, RECONNOITERED -PHOTOGRAPHED OR VIDEOTAPED -AMBUSH ELEMENT CAN BE STATIONARY OR IN VEHICLES -POSSIBLE STATIONARY AMBUSH ELEMENTS: -MAIN FIRING LINE (AMBUSH LEADER IS INCLUDED IN THIS GROUP) -SECURITY ELEMENT. SOURCE: FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE MANUAL, SEP 86 PHOTO SOURCE:http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/pages/mahdi-resistance6_jpg.htm.

  25. AIF COMBAT AMBUSH -TARGETS COMBAT PATROLS OR CONVOYS -INTENT IS TO CAUSE MAXIMUM DESTRUCTION OF CF (OR ING/INA/IPS) VEHICLES/EQUIPMENT AND MAXIMUM CASUALTIES -PROBABLY A COMPLEX AMBUSH; MAY HAVE MINED ROADSIDE -LAY IN WAIT, ATTACK, DESTROY EQUIPMENT + VEHICLES, KILL CF PERSONNEL IN KILL ZONE, AND WITHDRAW -PREPLANNED, RECONNOITERED -PHOTOGRAPHED OR VIDEOTAPED -AMBUSH ELEMENT CAN BE STATIONARY OR IN VEHICLES -POSSIBLE STATIONARY AMBUSH ELEMENTS: -MAIN FIRING LINE (AMBUSH LEADER IS INCLUDED IN THIS GROUP) -SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT GROUP (DEMO TEAM TO DESTROY VEHICLES & EQUIPMENTS IN KILL ZONE AFTER ATTACK) -SECURITY ELEMENT. SOURCE: FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE MANUAL, SEP 86 PHOTO SOURCE: FIGHTING IN KARBALA http://www.albasrah.net/images/iraqi-resist/pages/r3290927916_jpg.htm; FIGHTING IN RAMADI http://www.alchahed.net/ramadi_101004.htm

  26. SAF/RPG ROLLING AMBUSH(5 JUN 04, BLACKWATER AMBUSH) ? ? ? ? BIAP • FRIENDLY CONVOY (VICINITY BAGHDAD AIRPORT • -TWO VEHICLE (SUBURBANS) CONVOY TO BIAP • -SOFT BODY LEADS; ARMORED TRAILS • -LEAD VEHICLE-4 PERSONS; TRAIL VEHICLE-3 PERSONS • EQUIPPED: M4’S BODY ARMOR, RADIOS, AK-47S, HGS • -LEAD TOOK RPG HIT; TRAIL PULLED ALONG SIDE • -DEFENDED AS LONG AS POSSIBLE; 4 KIA, 2 WIA • -WITHDREW UNDER FIRE; • -COMMANDEERED VEHICLE IN ON-COMING LANE TO ESCAPE • AIFS • -VEHICLES ATTACKED, PASSED & RETURNED • -TWO VEHICLES STOPPED IN FRONT • -PKM (ARMOR PIERCING TRACER?), SAF, RPG • -FIRED/MANEUVERED ON TARGET • POSSIBLE FLANK UNIT • -POSSIBLY MORE THAN ONE AIF VEHICLE IN REAR • -COLLECTED CASUALTIES BEFORE DEPARTING • -DISCIPLINED DIAGRAM SOURCE:http://www.blackwaterusa.com

  27. COMPLEX AMBUSH ON PATROL/CONVOY 1. IED INITIATES AMBUSH HALTING CONVOY. 3. REAR OF CONVOY ATTACKED BY RPG, FROM OPPOSITE SIDE OF ROAD. T T 2. GUN TEAM ENGAGE CONVOY, DRAWING ATTENTION TO ‘THEIR’ SIDE OF THE ROAD. DIAGRAM SOURCE:http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppt

  28. MORTARS-WITH AMBUSHES -PLANNED FIRES AGAINST CF, INA, ING OR IPS PATROLS/CONVOYS -MASSED FIRES WITH SAF, MACHINE GUN, RPG, IED, AND/OR VBIED -EXPLOIT MAXIMUM RANGE OF MORTAR SYSTEM -IMMEDIATE DISPLACEMENT AFTER FIRING -SYSTEM TRANSPORTED BY: -VEHICLE -CART -MOTORCYCLE -HAND CARRIED BY CREW -DAY OR NIGHT FIRES -EXPLOIT RESTRICTED FIRE ZONES (HOUSES, APARTMENTS, OR BUILDINGS) SOURCE: FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE MANUAL, SEP 86;

  29. ANALYST COMMENTS • AIF FIRING SMALL ARMS IN CLOSE COMBAT REMAINS THE #1 CASUALTY PRODUCING TACTIC • THE IED REMAINS #2 CASUALTY PRODUCING TACTIC • AIF ARE ACTUALLY DEPLOYING MORE IEDS THAN BEFORE • HOWEVER, ARE TARGETING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES MORE THAN THE COALITION • VBIED ATTACKS MOVED UP FROM #6 TO #3 SINCE JAN 05 • AIF HAVE REALIZED THAT THE VBIED IS THE NEXT MOST DANGEROUS THREAT TO MOUNTED CF BESIDES THE SUICIDE VBIED • VEHICLE IS EASY TO OVERLOOK ON SIDE OF ROAD • CAN HOLD A MUCH LARGER EXPLOSIVE THAN AN IED • DOES NOT REQUIRE CONCEALING/BURYING (BURIED IED)

  30. ANALYST COMMENTS • AIF HAVE CHANGED THEIR TARGETING FOCUS TO INA, ING, AND IPS TARGETS • AIF MAY BEGIN TARGETING PRIME MINISTER, PRESIDENTS/VICE PRESIDENTS, AND ASSEMBLY MEMBERS, AS THE IRAQI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ASSUMES POWER APRIL 2005 (DATA MAY NOT BE ALL INCLUSIVE; GREAT CARE WAS GIVEN TO ACCURACY, BASED ON AVAILABLE OPEN SOURCES) POCs:vincent.mclean@leavenworth.army.mil, penny.mellies@leavenworth.army.mil, ADCSINT, TRADOC, FORT LEAVENWORTH, 913-684-7920

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