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Northumbria Uni. Ethical Hacking 2014-01-16. $ whoami. Andrew Waite andrew.waite@onyx.net / @ infosanity Ex-System/Network admin for Newcastle DataCentre Degree placement from Northumbria Security Consultant – Day Job (not just a suit) Security Researcher – Spare time MASSIVE geek.
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Northumbria Uni Ethical Hacking 2014-01-16
$whoami • Andrew Waite • andrew.waite@onyx.net/ @infosanity • Ex-System/Network admin for Newcastle DataCentre • Degree placement from Northumbria • Security Consultant – Day Job • (not just a suit) • Security Researcher – Spare time • MASSIVE geek
Agenda – Defence (sorry) • Real World incidents & Issues • DDoS • Crypto-Locker • Organic growth • Foundations – Network Design • Uncommon (and cheap & easy) ways of detecting attack. • Or how to screw with the bad guys™ • Demo/Lab( $deity willing….)
DDoS • Co-Location environment – What we do. • Case Studies (four) • First signs of trouble • Investigation • Solution Alternatives?
Ransomeware • Typical (corporate) response to an infection? • Scenario 1 – Police Warning • Scenario 2 – Crypto-Locker (1st incident) • Scenario 3 – Zeus/Crypter(2nd incident) • Attempted Financial transactions
Ransomeware – Police Warning http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/02/13/metropolitan-police-malware-warning/
Ransomeware – Cryptolocker http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/10/12/destructive-malware-cryptolocker-on-the-loose/
Ransomeware – Defences? • Backup (specific to current threat) • Anti-virus • Yes, really • User Education • Logging, detection, intelligence gathering • Strong password infrastructure – 2FA
Organic Growth Networks • If your network diagram looks like this:
Network Design • Already discussed how to do it badly • DMZ / Perimeter • Separation • Geo-graphical • Function • User Base • BYOD/Guest • Resilience/Redundancy
Network Design • Better, not perfect….
Uncommon Defence – Honeypots • Take attackers attention from production systems • Easy identification of malicious activity • Intelligence lead defence • High vs Low interaction ‘pots • Research capabilities http://www.honeynet.org/about
Honeypots – Honeyd • Old, but sill useful • Emulate network / hosts / services • Logging http://www.honeyd.org/
Honeypots – LaBrea • Tarpit • Slow attackers to allow blue team time to work • Race condition on ARP requests • Careful! http://labrea.sourceforge.net/labrea-info.html
Honeypots – Nepenthes / Dionaea • (primarily) emulates vulnerable Windows Services • Malware collection and attack flow analysis • Becoming less useful as attack patterns change http://dionaea.carnivore.it/
Honeypots – Kippo • Unsecure SSH • (restricted) shell environment • Full Logging • And replay….. • http://iwatchedyourhack.org/ https://code.google.com/p/kippo/
Honeypots – Glastopf(?) • Web Application Attack Vectors • Google hits • Provides vulnerable platforms based on attack requests http://glastopf.org/
Honeypots – Thug • Client-side Attack vectors • Spam-traps etc. http://buffer.github.io/thug/
Honeypots – Manual Honeytraps • Dummy DNS Entries • robots.txt • http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2013/08/setting-honeytraps-with-modsecurity-adding-fake-robotstxt-disallow-entries.html • Fake HTML comments • http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2014/01/setting-honeytraps-with-modsecurity-adding-fake-html-comments.html • Can get offensive – (IANAL……)
Sandbox – Cuckoo • File / URL analysis • Great for research and/or incident response • Relies on virtualisation images • Install requirements..… http://www.cuckoosandbox.org/
Honeypot identification • PenTest reports….. • Both tester and testee • Various tools • Dionaea - Nmap scripts • http://blog.prowling.nu/2012/04/detecting-dionaea-honeypot-using-nmap.html • Kippo – Metasploit SSH aux module • auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_version
Legal issues - Strike Back • IANAL!!!! • Personal thoughts only….. • Aggressive Network Self-Defense
Demo / Lab • Keep your fingers crossed…..