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An Improved Efficient Secret Handshakes Scheme with Unlinkability. Author: Jie Gu and Zhi Xue Source : IEEE Comm. Letters 15 (2) (2011) Presenter: Yu-Chi Chen. Outline. Introduction Huang and Cao’s scheme The proposed scheme Conclusions. Introduction. A secret handshakes scheme
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An Improved Efficient Secret Handshakes Scheme with Unlinkability Author: JieGu and ZhiXue Source: IEEE Comm. Letters 15 (2) (2011) Presenter: Yu-Chi Chen
Outline • Introduction • Huang and Cao’s scheme • The proposed scheme • Conclusions
Introduction • A secret handshakes scheme • affiliation-hiding authentication • firstly introduced by Balfanz et al. • For example, two FBIagents, Alice and Bob, want to discover and communicates with other agents, but they don’t want to reveal their affiliations to non-agents.
Introduction • An unlinkable secret handshakes scheme • provide unlinkability • an adversary cannot link any two different instances of same party. • Given C, to guess C is AB, A’B’, or other.(blind signature) • unlinkabilityhas been widely considered in many applications.
Introduction • Jarecki et al.’s scheme • an unlinkable secret handshakes scheme • not efficient, but secure at present • Huang and Cao presented an unlinkable secret handshakes scheme • novel and efficient • Simple, so it can be published in IEEE-CL.
Outline • Introduction • Huang and Cao’s scheme • The proposed scheme • Conclusions
Bilinear pairing • Referred to as “bilinear maps” • e: G1× G2→G3 • G1, G2: (+, q) • G3: (×, q)
Bilinear pairing • Properties: • Computation: given P1 (P2) in G1 (G2), we can obtain e(P1, P2) in G3 • Bilinear: given aP1 and bP2, where a, b in Zq, then e(aP1, bP2) = e(P1, P2)ab • Non-degenerate: P1 (P2) is a generator of G1(G2), then e(P1, P2) ≠ 1.(or e(P1, P2) is a generator of G3)
Huang and Cao’s scheme This figure is copied from IEEE Comm. Letters 13 (9) (2009), page 731
Comments • Su found the scheme cannot provide authenticated key exchange security. • Youn and Park also found the scheme cannot provide authenticated key exchange security and affiliation-hiding.
Outline • Introduction • Huang and Cao’s scheme • The proposed scheme • Conclusions
Gu and Xue’s idea • The main weakness is that the outsider can use the public key (sP) to • succeed handshakes or • find which affiliation is for the user. • Straight solution: no public key.
Gu and Xue’s scheme This figure is copied from IEEE Comm. Letters 15 (2) (2011), page 260
Huang and Cao’s scheme This figure is copied from IEEE Comm. Letters 13 (9) (2009), page 731
Huang and Cao’s scheme This figure is copied from IEEE Comm. Letters 13 (9) (2009), page 731
Gu and Xue’s scheme This figure is copied from IEEE Comm. Letters 15 (2) (2011), page 260
Gu and Xue’s scheme • The scheme actually remedies the security loophole of Huang and Cao’s scheme. • However, it is very straightforward. • It does not violate the definition of USH. • Gu and Xue also attach the security analysis.
Outline • Introduction • Huang and Cao’s scheme • The proposed scheme • Conclusions
Conclusions • They propose an improved USH scheme. • They brief security analysis.