Diplomacy and Global GovernANCE Service in an Age of Worldwide Interdependence

1. Are Foreign Services Obsolete? A European View Diplomacy and Global GovernANCE Service in an Age of Worldwide Interdependence Thomas Nowotny Johns Hopkins SAIS, 10/03/11

2. The Diplomatic Service in an Age of Worldwide Interdependence • Diplomacyand the diplomaticserviceasweknowittoday, basicallyermerged in the 16th/17th century, togetherwith the emergenceof the nationstate. • Itthusreflects the politicalprioritiesofthesestates in thisoldworldof a constant per capitaproductivity • In thisera, relationsbetweenstatesreflected the competitionof a „zerosumgame“;withthiscompetitionbeingcarried out bymilitarymeansmainly • The number and size of the so called „commons“ was limited • I proposethatthis „pathdependence“, thatthese genes insertedintodiplomacyat ist creation , still determinemuch – toomuch – of the formal and informal rulesandof the administrative set – upofdiplomacy

3. Still deeply enrooted?? The traditional guiding principles • Kim Jong Il (1985 ): Economic self – sufficiency…independence in politics and self –reliance …ensures rich lives for the people • Leopold von Ranke. According to his “priority of foreign policy”, this policy should be determined mainly by the aim of a state to assert itself in an hostile environment. “ The degree of independence determines a state’s position in the world.. Its inner affairs have to become subordinated to this aim of asserting itself, this should be the supreme Law” • Such views are still widely current not just in academia. They still can guide public policy ( eg the US Security Doctrine of September 2002) • They even are imbedded in that international law which continues to provide the legal base for diplomatic activities: namely the Vienna Diplomatic Convention of 1961

4. The principle of “non – interference” in denial of reality • Article 41 of the Vienna Diplomatic Convention stipulates that diplomats ” have the duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of the receiving state” • In its strict interpretation this rule would imply that in the host state, the activities of diplomats are limited to contacts with the ministry of foreign affairs of this host state • This would also imply a function of diplomats not just as privileged but even as the sole legitimate tools and carriers of interstate relations and communications ( “gate keepers” who completely control access ) • In fact though, and with and without diplomats, states are constantly and ever more intensely intervening in the “internal affairs” of other states. Permitting the collapse of “Lehmann Brothers” was, for example a very, very massive US intervention in the “internal affairs” of European states

5. The great discontinuity We no longer live in the world of the 16th/17th century. The world of the 21st century is in no way similar to the world of the 16th and 17th century which saw the birth of modern diplomacy and which shaped its norms and structures“World Gross National Product” and World population over the last 2000 years

6. A change not just in quantity Mutual dependence of states has become very stringent, especially in economic terms. The volume of trade grew faster than the volume of all goods produced. Even more rapid was the increase in global trans - frontier direct investment

7. “Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments”Frederick the Great, King of Prussia • Armed might and war thus would have been the only true currency in diplomacy. But this currency has become devalued. • Since 1914 all wars had an end different from the one envisaged who started it. • The equation: wealth equals the size of productive territory, this equation is valid no longer. • Instead, wealth and “power” derive from the position in, and the use of the web of global interdependence. These things are negatively affected by war • The web of mutual dependence is thus not stabilized by some “balance of ( military ) power”. • But something must be there to stabilize it. It is abstruse to view this world as rule – less and “anarchic” just because we lack an elected world government

8. The notion of a basically “anarchic” world” stabilized just by some “balance of power” stands in stark contradiction to our every – day experience. Obviously, we do not inhabit a world in which states are completely “sovereign” to do as they please; and in which relations between them would be determined not by cooperation but competition; with this competition carried out by military means mainly.buying a car, making a telephone call, having a savings accountthe main preoccupations: physical security, having a job, healthWe are shareholders in “global commons” that need care ( atmosphere, world monetary system ); and we feel threatened by “common bads” such as terrorism, communicable disease we are imbedded in, and dependent on, a net of a rather predictable trans - border cooperation

9. Without such predictable interdependence the globe could not carry the load of 7 billion humans, living, on the average, in increasingly comfortable circumstances . We may term “progress” this advance from a state of war - prone competition to a state of predictable interdependence. But there are two caveats. the process is not an automatic one. It has to be accompanied and guided by many level politics ( example: wealth, environmental protection ) in absence of such adequate politics, the process can be reversed as it had been in the first part of the last century

10. Their growing interdependence and their being under competition by other and new “global actors ( such as TNC or NGOs ), has not made states less relevant. On the contrary: they impact more broadly and deeply on the lives of their citizens than they did before. They continue to be the sturdiest “anchors” of the global system; as the have the most diverse and most efficient tools for implementing global norms; and as they continue as that “polity” which holds the asset of the widest and deepest degree of legitimacy with its constituents. note: the absence of the state – state failure is still the most serious threat to the global system

11. As tools of a state’s policies, diplomats now move in an global environment that has changed dramatically • Inescapable interdependence; permeability of borders, delocalization • Rising volume and growing diversity of transactions that cross borders • Multilateralization of international relations • Coexistence of both growing conformity and growing diversity among states ( contrary to the fictions of international law, not all “sovereigns” are truly and effectively equal ) • “de – Westernization”?? • Globalization of information and of the evaluation of information • New “global actors” active in all three realms of global governance: agenda setting, rule making, rule enforcement ( NGOs, ISO, TNCs ) • New methods in the creation and in the implementation of norms (“governance” instead of “government”)

12. In their own states, the base, the frame and the conditions for their work have changed too • Loss of the states monopoly to rule/ control transborder transactions • But even within the public administrations, foreign ministries and their diplomats no longer hold the monopoly in representing public policy in an international context • Growing role of the heads of government; summit diplomacy • Splintering of a once coherent “foreign policy” of a state into divergent “foreign policies” which no longer need to have a common denominator • Growing load of service for other governmental, semi- governmental and even private institutions • In particular: growing load and complexity of consular work • Effective democratization. The once rather independent foreign policy elites come under more intense public scrutiny and control • New media

13. The transition still incomplete: from competitors in a “zero sum game” to catalysts of globalizationDiplomats and diplomatic services have not fully adjusted yet to the new settings and the new tasks. Not infrequently, this failure has made them not just useless but even counterproductive • Filling top positions in international organizations: preference for weak candidates, and for co – nationals ( both in order to widen the scope for national influence ) • Disproportionate investment in quest for merely symbolic prestige ( eg UN General Assembly ) • Pursuit of a narrow national interest at the expense of the broader public good ( reform of the UN Security Council; failure in the EU to agree on a common European patent as Spain and Italy insist on the use of their language )

14. Diffidence towards the new global actors ( eg in the UK all colleagues talk about their encounter with the Queen – politically irrelevant; and very few about their contacts with “Amnesty International”) • Overestimating their relevance as carriers of information and shapers of public perceptions ( misguided efforts to prioritize “public diplomacy”) • Life style and protocol frequently impedes access to truly relevant institutions and persons in their host state • Set up still largely determined by traditional bilateral diplomacy and not fully geared to multilateral diplomacy

15. With all of these impediments: diplomats still rather central in global governance • Look behind the scenes. Who prepares for the big “world conferences” (such as the “world summits” )? Writes the speeches for the participants and the summing up texts and protocols? Who is involved the tedious night – long to search for common ground? Who mainly is involved in the subsequent follow - up and monitoring? Certainly, not diplomats only; but diplomats to a very large extent. • Two reasons for the continued prominence of diplomats: demand side and supply side • Demand side: create trust; empathy; also think with the head of the other; instrumentalize the goals and desires of the other; keep options open; be ready to subordinate the desired to the possible; know a lot, and be aware of the unknown; stand ready to navigate in fog. • Supply side: Rather high qualifications through enticing work and work conditions; through a strict selection process and intense on job training; inter – cultural awareness and operability; standardized rules of behavior and communication

16. Yet while still needed, diplomatic services will have to adapt - and profoundly so. An incomplete list of suggestions • Expansion of the multilateral at the expense of the bilateral and closer meshing of these two spheres ) • Strengthening of the role and the capacity of the center ( ie the foreign ministries ) • Specialization of the diplomatic staff in various fields of activity, integration of technical experts • New and less formal forms of local presence (roving ambassadors, special emissaries, small “administrative anchors” in regions and small nations). Virtual embassies. • Constructive adaptation to the loss of the monopoly in official trans -border transaction; emphasis of the service function in relation to other public authorities/bodies. Better integration of such other institutions into the work both at the central office and at embassies • Full use of the electronic revolution both in the administration, in actual work and in “public diplomacy” ( but beware of providing propaganda )

17. Effective ways of participating in the emergence of informed opinion on policy relevant issues (closer cooperation with think – tanks and academia, specialized magazines ) • Feminization of the service • Adaptation of protocol and traditional if informal rules ( eg precedence) • Long term: a new base in international law supplanting the Vienna Convention • More financial resources. Maintaining the career character of the service

18. Thank you for your attention! Contact: Thomas Nowotny, thomas.nowotny@tmo.at