1 / 10

Teacher incentives and local participation : Evidence from a randomized program in Kenya

Teacher incentives and local participation : Evidence from a randomized program in Kenya. Joost de Laat Michael Kremer Christel Vermeersch. What kind of teacher incentives?. Narrow incentives  easy to game Glewwe et al. ( 2003), Lavy (2004 ), Jacob and Levitt (2003)

macaulay-roberts
Download Presentation

Teacher incentives and local participation : Evidence from a randomized program in Kenya

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Teacher incentives and local participation: Evidencefrom a randomizedprogram in Kenya Joost de Laat Michael Kremer ChristelVermeersch

  2. Whatkind of teacher incentives? • Narrow incentives  easy to game • Glewweet al. (2003), Lavy(2004), Jacob and Levitt (2003) • Broader incentives using community information • Local communities may have broader information on teacher performance • Criteria may be harder to game • Repeated interactions and commitment problems.

  3. Communityparticipation in Kenyanschools: schoolcommittees • Conformation: • mandated by law • 15 members: 9 elected parent representatives, 2 District Education Board delegates, 3 sponsors, head teacher. • Electedyearlybyparentassembly • Roles: • oversee disbursement of capitation grants • design &implementation of school development plans • communicate with local education office about any issues • Suggesting promotions and transfer of teachers to MoE officials, no hiring

  4. Programgoals and content • Improving accountability: stronger collaboration between school, school committee, and local educational authorities • Incentives for teachers: prizes to be assigned by the school committee, based on broad criteria (50% of a month salary) • Knowledge of financial procedures & oversight: training of school committee

  5. Identification and data • Randomizedevaluation: • 34 treatment, 34 comparisonschools • Data: • Votingbehaviorforprizeallocation • Composition of schoolcommittee • Schoolcommitteeactivities • Teacher and studentattendance • Classroomactivities • Student scores onnationalexam

  6. Prizeallocation • Criteriavariedovertheyears • Year 2: • Important: male, seniorteachersand relatives/neighbors of committeemembers • Notimportant: Goodattendance • SC didnotrate males and relatives/neighborshigher in terms of quality • Year 3: • Important: goodattendance • Notimportant: male and relative/neighbor of SC members

  7. Results, overall • Teacherattendance: • no effectoverall (from 87% level) • negativeimpactontypes “wrongfully” favored • Teacherturnover: No overalleffect • Classroomobservations: • Someincrease in idle time • Increase in homeworkallocation • Pupilattendance: no effect • Test scores: no effect

  8. Results in final yearonly • Schoolcommittees more likelytomeetwithparents • Schoolcommittees more likelytodiscussteachingmatterswithteachers

  9. Composition of theschoolcommittee • Baseline: • 82% male, • Avg. 49 yearsold • Avg <8 years of education • 85% peasantfarmers • Programimpact: • No change in turnover • Increase in educationlevels (0.58 years) • Increase in averageage (1.54 years) • No changes in othercharacteristics

  10. Conclusions • Communitybasedevaluationisnot a panacea • Overall: littleto no impact • Someperverse incentives, especially at thebeginning • Took time for positive changestohappen • Relatedtotheyearly SC electioncycle? • No enough time toevaluatelongtermeffect

More Related