Cambodia: Good enough governance for sectoral growth?

1. Presented by Kai Kaiser, Senior Economist, Public Sector Group, World Bank (Stephane Guimbert, Sophal Ear, Verena Fritz) Applied Inclusive Growth AnalysisJoint Vienna Institute Day 4, July 2, 2009 Cambodia: Good enough governance for sectoral growth?

2. Growth Paradox? • Rapid Growth • Garments Success Story • Growth Sustainability Concerns • International Competition • Challenge of Diversification • Weak Governance • Weak Aggregate Indicators • Self-reported by firms …consolidation of ruling party/stability after 1998 …first LDC to join WTO (2004)

3. 1 growing with four fragile engines Contribution to growth (%)‏ Tourism: rapid growth. Initially mainly to Siem Reap and Angkor – gradually to Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville, with further potential Real estate / construction: very rapid growth, especially in Phnom Penh; talks of a bubble Garments: main (only?) export; mainly to US market; slow growth in 2007 with competition from Vietnam; further competition (inc. China) in the future? Crops: rain-fed; mainly rice Legacies of “extractive” forestry “dis-saving” in 1990s

4. Good enough governance for sectoral growth? reaching new heights?

5. Good enough governance for sectoral growth? weak governance

6. 2 corruption & governance Major obstacles to business, as reported by firms established in Cambodia Sources: Investment climate surveys in Cambodia

7. Growth Analysis Approach • CEM • Range of background papers • Complementary governance & political-economy analysis • Unbundle paradox? • Government-donor roundtable 2/2009 • What were drivers to growth? • What are challenges to sustainability? • What are binding constraints and policy options?

8. what is really binding? 2 Large informal economy • Entry costs (in terms of regulations and corruption)‏ • Limited benefits of formalization (weak coordination; limited access to finance)‏ No sustained diversification • Coordination / information (on markets, technologies)‏ • Incentives for innovators (both formal incentives – e.g. standards, trademarks – as well as informal – scaling up means becoming a target of corruption)‏ • Access to finance for locally-generated projects (in agriculture; for SMEs)‏ No capital-intensive or processing industry • Governance (high informal taxation of higher rents created by capital investment; property rights)‏ • Poor complementary inputs (electricity and water; skills; coordination issues)‏

9. Governance & Political-Economy Analysis Approach • Focus on selection of promising sectors • National plans, development partner efforts… • Understand sectoral governance & growth • Nature of state-elite & business relationships • Drivers of growth? • Strategies to manage business environment across value chain • Drawn on country specialist (Sophal Ear) • Process of discovery?

10. Sectoral governance for growth? 2 Successful Garments Emerging? Rice Stunted? Livestock

11. Garments • International Drivers • Quotas for labor standards (US brokered, until 2004 for garments; ILO monitoring still ongoing)‏ • Strong international presence in 300+ establishments (95% +) • Domestic Collective Action • Garment Manufacturers Association (GMAC) • Relationship w/ Ministry of Commerce, Labor Intensive Profile of Sector • International Chambers of Commerce • Open Issues • Sustainability concerns w/ international competition • Squeezing the golden goose? • Value chain limited to assembly

12. Rice • International Drivers • Increase in food prices • Future Everything but Arms (EU Zero Tariffs for LDCs) • Only Sanitary & Phytosanitary • Domestic Collective Action • Fragmented, Limited Collective Voice • Green Trade (state body) & National Cambodian Rice Millers now have export waver (100 tons+) • Status • Mainly domestic padi production, processed reflows from neighboring countries • Very limited finance into rice processing • Concerns about ability of Cambodian supply chain to deliver quality

13. Livestock • International Drivers • Increase in food prices • Malaysian investment (failed) • Domestic Collective Action • Very Fragmented, Limited Collective Voice • Some entry attempt by okhna • Status • Failure of previous venture (Mong Retth, Malaysians) • Procdution localized, dominate by cattle rustling, high transactions costs across value chain to Vietnam/Thailnd

14. A Strategy for Policy Actions in the Cambodia Setting • Potential Sector Profits/Rents Insufficient • Sum of poor governance manifests itself on various links of the value chain • Export opportunities/prices • Promote Demand Side/Collective Action • Business Organizations (Mandatory/Sectoral “Monopoly”) • External Drivers • Internal National Regimes • Pressure for domestic “compliance”

15. Good enough governance for sectoral growth? Open issues… Integrity of governance & growth narrative Limited selection of sectors (successful & unsuccessful) Replicability of garments wrt to different sectoral value chains Multi-sectoral state growth champions? Focal point acts to enforce credible business environment (pending systematic change) Captured/Self-serving institutions Capacity/incentives for this type of institutions Potential discovery of oil & gas Impacts on drivers of growth Concentrated rents & incentives for state

16. Cambodia Growth Conclusions • Binding constraints lens provides useful disciplining device in weak-institutional setting like Cambodia where everything can be perceived constraint • Limited binding constraints may be politically counterintuitive… • Temporal, Need to be forward looking, Balance path, perception of all eggs in one basket • Value of looking at sector constraints • Timing • Impacts of Global Economic Crisis…

17. Q & A Selected References World Bank, (2009), Sustaining Rapid Growth in a Challenging Environment”, www.worldbank.org/kh/growth Ear, Sophal, (2009), Sowing and Sewing Growth: The Political Economy of Rice and Garments in Cambodia, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Center for International Development Working Paper, No. 384 Guimbert, Stephane, 2009, Cambodia 1998-2008: An Episode of Rapid Growth, Working Paper (draft)