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Log Analysis and Intrusion Detection

Log Analysis and Intrusion Detection. By Srikrishna Gudavalli Venkata Naga Vamsi Krishna Ravi Kiran Yellepeddy. Log Analysis (Windows And linux). What is log analysis? Describes an event (or) process activity in detail on the system. Examples : user authentication event log

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Log Analysis and Intrusion Detection

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  1. Log Analysis and Intrusion Detection By Srikrishna Gudavalli Venkata Naga Vamsi Krishna Ravi Kiran Yellepeddy

  2. Log Analysis (Windows And linux) What is log analysis? Describes an event (or) process activity in detail on the system. Examples : • user authentication event log • ftp authentication .

  3. Setup for LogAnalysis • Application Log Specific to particular application. eg:MS word,Windows Media Player • Security Log Specifically logs all the security features. • System Log Logs all the system related activities.

  4. Log Files • Lokasi bergantung, umumnya pada /var/log • Contoh/var/log/mail.log/var/log/messages/var/log/daemon.log/var/log/apache/access-log/var/log/apache/error-log/var/adm/utmp/var/adm/wtmp

  5. Log Analysis and Correlation • Syslogs, messages logs, other Unix host logs Security/Auth Log Mar 9 13:07:49 nile in.telnetd[1315]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:09:24 nile in.rlogind[1321]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:09:27 nile in.ftpd[1326]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:09:28 nile in.rshd[1329]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:09:28 nile in.telnetd[1333]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:09:31 nile in.fingerd[1334]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:12:13 nile in.fingerd[1352]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:12:13 nile in.rlogind[1357]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:12:14 nile in.rshd[1360]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:12:16 nile in.telnetd[1365]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:12:18 nile in.ftpd[1368]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:15:23 nile in.ftpd[1382]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:15:24 nile in.telnetd[1384]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:15:27 nile in.rshd[1396]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:15:28 nile in.rlogind[1398]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:15:29 nile in.fingerd[1400]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:26:43 nile login: ROOT LOGIN ON tty1Mar 9 13:37:15 nile in.ftpd[1447]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 13:37:44 nile in.fingerd[1448]: connect from 68.62.72.193Mar 9 17:17:19 nile in.telnetd[1521]: connect from 12.87.62.43Mar 9 17:17:26 nile login: LOGIN ON 0 BY pstephen FROM 43.detroit-16-17rs.mi.dial-access.att.netMar 9 17:50:13 nile in.ftpd[1556]: connect from 216.205.122.231Mar 10 11:12:02 nile in.ftpd[8929]: connect from 200.68.32.185Mar 10 11:13:07 nile in.ftpd[8965]: connect from 68.62.72.193

  6. Log Analysis and Correlation • TCPDump logs 11:30:27.181108 eth0 < pcp01103425pcs.aubrnh01.mi.comcast.net.17697 > nile.ftp: . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 4288 (DF)11:30:27.190617 eth0 > arp who-has ubr01-a-rtr.aubrnh01.mi.comcast.net tell nile (0:0:86:54:50:5b)11:30:27.198369 eth0 < arp reply ubr01-a-rtr.aubrnh01.mi.comcast.net is-at 0:5:5f:e9:10:54 (0:0:86:54:50:5b)11:30:27.207662 eth0 < ns02.pntiac01.mi.comcast.net.domain > nile.1025: 20012 1/2/2 PTR pcp01103425pcs.aubrnh01.mi.comcast.net. (174) (DF)11:30:27.218149 eth0 < ns02.pntiac01.mi.comcast.net.domain > nile.1025: 20013 1/2/2 A pcp01103425pcs.aubrnh01.mi.comcast.net (151) (DF)11:30:27.230334 eth0 < ns02.pntiac01.mi.comcast.net.domain > nile.1025: 20014 1/2/2 PTR pcp01103425pcs.aubrnh01.mi.comcast.net. (174) (DF)11:30:27.231013 eth0 > nile.ftp > pcp01103425pcs.aubrnh01.mi.comcast.net.17697: P 1:80(79) ack 1 win 32120 (DF) [tos 0x10] 11:30:27.253084 eth0 < pcp01103425pcs.aubrnh01.mi.comcast.net.17697 > nile.ftp: P 1:16(15) ack 80 win 4209 (DF)11:30:27.253122 eth0 > nile.ftp > pcp01103425pcs.aubrnh01.mi.comcast.net.17697: . 80:80(0) ack 16 win 32120 (DF) [tos 0x10]

  7. Log Analysis and Correlation • Intrusion Detection Log (RealSecure)

  8. Log Analysis and Correlation • Intrusion Detection Log (SNORT Summary) Apr 16 02:45:37 lisa snort[7483]: IDS13/portmap-request-mountd: 200.190.13.181:1372 -> 172.16.1.107:111 Apr 16 07:17:06 lisa snort[7483]: IDS128/web-cgi-phf: 200.190.8.220:55220 -> 172.16.1.107:80 Apr 16 14:54:20 lisa snort[7483]: IDS171/Ping zeros: 24.201.15.148 -> 172.16.1.101 Apr 16 14:54:20 lisa snort[7483]: IDS171/Ping zeros: 24.201.15.148 -> 172.16.1.105 Apr 16 14:54:20 lisa snort[7483]: IDS171/Ping zeros: 24.201.15.148 -> 172.16.1.107 Apr 17 06:02:32 lisa snort[8255]: IDS198/SYN FIN Scan: 195.116.152.104:0 -> 172.16.1.101:111 Apr 17 06:02:32 lisa snort[8255]: IDS198/SYN FIN Scan: 195.116.152.104:0 -> 172.16.1.107:111 Apr 17 09:45:28 lisa snort[8255]: IDS198/SYN FIN Scan: 195.116.152.104:0 -> 172.16.1.105:111 Apr 19 08:00:19 lisa snort[3515]: IDS/DNS-version-query: 212.25.75.196:1723 -> 172.16.1.101:53 Apr 20 01:26:00 lisa snort[3515]: IDS212/dns-zone-transfer: 24.234.45.60:4075 -> 172.16.1.107:53 Apr 20 03:49:38 lisa snort[3515]: IDS/DNS-version-query: 216.123.23.5:4349 -> 172.16.1.101:53 Apr 20 03:49:39 lisa snort[3515]: IDS/DNS-version-query: 216.123.23.5:4350 -> 172.16.1.107:53 Apr 20 21:48:55 lisa snort[12353]: IDS246/large-icmp: 129.142.224.3 -> 172.16.1.107 Apr 20 21:48:55 lisa snort[12353]: IDS246/large-icmp: 129.142.224.3 -> 172.16.1.107 Apr 20 22:48:13 lisa snort[12632]: IDS159/Ping Microsoft Windows: 216.228.4.204 -> 172.16.1.101 Apr 20 22:48:13 lisa snort[12632]: IDS159/Ping Microsoft Windows: 216.228.4.204 -> 172.16.1.101 Apr 20 23:00:33 lisa snort[12657]: IDS171/Ping zeros: 216.228.4.133 -> 172.16.1.101 Apr 21 11:01:27 lisa snort[12777]: IDS/DNS-version-query: 207.236.55.76:4039 -> 172.16.1.101:53 Apr 21 11:01:28 lisa snort[12777]: IDS/DNS-version-query: 207.236.55.76:4044 -> 172.16.1.107:53 Apr 22 08:36:29 lisa snort[743]: IDS/DNS-version-query: 212.244.222.100:1368 -> 172.16.1.101:53 Apr 22 08:36:29 lisa snort[743]: IDS/DNS-version-query: 212.244.222.100:1328 -> 172.16.1.107:53 Courtesy of The Honeynet Project

  9. Log Analysis and Correlation [**] WEB-MISC 403 Forbidden [**] 07/29-23:59:17.752579 0:0:C5:75:67:2C -> 0:AA:0:B7:E9:56 type:0x800 len:0x246 209.235.0.178:80 -> 63.222.202.8:1550 TCP TTL:43 TOS:0x0 ID:22555 IpLen:20 DgmLen:568 DF ***AP*** Seq: 0x85B19798 Ack: 0x4E439F5C Win: 0x7D78 TcpLen: 20 48 54 54 50 2F 31 2E 31 20 34 30 33 20 46 6F 72 HTTP/1.1 403 For 62 69 64 64 65 6E 0D 0A 44 61 74 65 3A 20 4D 6F bidden..Date: Mo 6E 2C 20 33 30 20 4A 75 6C 20 32 30 30 31 20 30 n, 30 Jul 2001 0 33 3A 35 38 3A 35 38 20 47 4D 54 0D 0A 53 65 72 3:58:58 GMT..Ser 76 65 72 3A 20 41 70 61 63 68 65 2F 31 2E 33 2E ver: Apache/1.3. 31 39 20 28 55 6E 69 78 29 20 6D 6F 64 5F 73 73 19 (Unix) mod_ss 6C 2F 32 2E 38 2E 33 20 4F 70 65 6E 53 53 4C 2F l/2.8.3 OpenSSL/ 30 2E 39 2E 36 61 20 6D 6F 64 5F 70 65 72 6C 2F 0.9.6a mod_perl/ 31 2E 32 35 20 6D 6F 64 5F 67 7A 69 70 2F 31 2E 1.25 mod_gzip/1. 33 2E 31 39 2E 31 61 20 50 48 50 2F 34 2E 30 2E 3.19.1a PHP/4.0. 36 0D 0A 43 6F 6E 6E 65 63 74 69 6F 6E 3A 20 63 6..Connection: c 6C 6F 73 65 0D 0A 43 6F 6E 74 65 6E 74 2D 54 79 lose..Content-Ty 70 65 3A 20 74 65 78 74 2F 68 74 6D 6C 3B 20 63 pe: text/html; c 68 61 72 73 65 74 3D 69 73 6F 2D 38 38 35 39 2D harset=iso-8859- 31 0D 0A 0D 0A 3C 21 44 4F 43 54 59 50 45 20 48 1....<!DOCTYPE H 54 4D 4C 20 50 55 42 4C 49 43 20 22 2D 2F 2F 49 TML PUBLIC "-//I 45 54 46 2F 2F 44 54 44 20 48 54 4D 4C 20 32 2E ETF//DTD HTML 2. 30 2F 2F 45 4E 22 3E 0A 3C 48 54 4D 4C 3E 3C 48 0//EN">.<HTML><H 45 41 44 3E 0A 3C 54 49 54 4C 45 3E 34 30 33 20 EAD>.<TITLE>403 46 6F 72 62 69 64 64 65 6E 3C 2F 54 49 54 4C 45 Forbidden</TITLE 3E 0A 3C 2F 48 45 41 44 3E 3C 42 4F 44 59 3E 0A >.</HEAD><BODY>. 3C 48 31 3E 46 6F 72 62 69 64 64 65 6E 3C 2F 48 <H1>Forbidden</H 31 3E 0A 59 6F 75 20 64 6F 6E 27 74 20 68 61 76 1>.You don't hav 65 20 70 65 72 6D 69 73 73 69 6F 6E 20 74 6F 20 e permission to 61 63 63 65 73 73 20 2F 63 67 69 2D 62 69 6E 2F access /cgi-bin/ 61 64 63 79 63 6C 65 2F 61 64 63 79 63 6C 65 2E adcycle/adcycle. 63 67 69 0A 6F 6E 20 74 68 69 73 20 73 65 72 76 cgi.on this serv 65 72 2E 3C 50 3E 0A 3C 48 52 3E 0A 3C 41 44 44 er.<P>.<HR>.<ADD 52 45 53 53 3E 41 70 61 63 68 65 2F 31 2E 33 2E RESS>Apache/1.3. 31 39 20 53 65 72 76 65 72 20 61 74 20 74 68 65 19 Server at the 62 61 62 79 63 6F 72 6E 65 72 2E 63 6F 6D 20 50 babycorner.com P 6F 72 74 20 38 30 3C 2F 41 44 44 52 45 53 53 3E ort 80</ADDRESS> 0A 3C 2F 42 4F 44 59 3E 3C 2F 48 54 4D 4C 3E 0A .</BODY></HTML>. • Intrusion Detection Log (SNORT Raw Log)

  10. Log Analysis and Correlation • Correlating data from multiple sources • Normalizing • Same events may have different names depending upon the source • Translating IDS codes • Cisco NetRanger: 4052 • ISS RealSecure: Chargen_Denial_of_Service • Use to build a chain of evidence

  11. Log Analysis and Correlation • Correlating data from multiple sources • Deconfliction • Same event shows up multiple times with same names • Certain types of denial of service attacks • Some penetration attacks • Use care not to remove individual steps in an attack scenario • Same event repeated so rapidly that the logging device reports a large number of the same event in a very short (sometimes sub-second) period of time • Multiple rapid events that make an attack scenario such as a port scan • Deconflicted events are used with normalized data to create an event timeline

  12. Log Analysis and Correlation • Correlating data from multiple sources • Creating chain of evidence and event timelines • Using deconflicted and normalized events on multiple data sources, chart the chain of events into an event timeline • Carefully note the timebase of various data sources and correct to a common timebase • Note events and attack scenarios – correlate connected events into scenarios • Document every assumption with evidence and, if possible, corroboration using both forensic and traditional investigation

  13. Log Analysis and Correlation • Forensic handling of deleted or modified logs • Useful only in certain types of systems • Recovering deleted logs • System must support recovery of ambient data • Recovering altered logs • Logging source must delete old log and create a new one when the log is altered • System must support recovery of ambient data

  14. Web Server Log Analysis

  15. Different types of log files • Access • Error • Referral • Other SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  16. Access logs • Domain name • Date, time • Server command processed and result • URL of visitor • Bytes transmitted SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  17. Sample access log data • rm258.fav.usu.edu [31/May/1995:09:03:23 +0600] "GET /NEI.html HTTP/1.0" 302 396 • rm258.fav.usu.edu [31/May/1995:09:03:28 +0600] "GET /xculture/nei/nei.html HTTP/1.0" 200 2114 • rm258.fav.usu.edu [31/May/1995:09:03:30 +0600] "GET /gifs/sedlbutton.gif HTTP/1.0" 200 1336 • 129.71.83.161 [31/May/1995:09:20:32 +0600] "GET /RELs.html HTTP/1.0" 304 0 • Leslie-Francis.tenet.edu [31/May/1995:09:36:06 +0600] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 1867 • ls973.ulib.albany.edu [31/May/1995:09:40:52 +0600] "GET /viii1.html HTTP/1.0" 404 244 SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  18. Errors reported in your logs • Clients that time out (or leave in frustration!) • Scripts that don’t produce any output • Server bugs • User authentication or configuration problems SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  19. Sample error log data • [Thu May 30 07:25:32 1996] send timed out for bamberg.sedl.org • [Thu May 30 07:57:41 1996] send timed out for kenya.sedl.org • [Thu May 30 08:23:11 1996] send timed out for ppp092.kyoto-inet.or.jp • [Thu May 30 09:15:52 1996] access to /usr/local/www/htdocs/scimath/compass/vol03 failed for 170.211.67.51, reason: File does not exist • [Thu May 30 09:57:56 1996] send timed out for dd10-048.compuserve.com • [Thu May 30 10:47:25 1996] read timed out for ncia110b.ncia.net SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  20. Referral logs • Who links to your site? • Who downloads your pages? SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  21. Sample referral log data • http://www.isisnet.com/ ->/change/welcome.html • http://www.ipl.org/ref/RR/EDU/Research-rr.html ->/welcome.html • http://www.tenet.edu/snp/main.html ->/policy/networks/toc.html • http://www.tenet.edu/new/main.html ->/policy/networks/toc.html • http://guide-p.infoseek.com/NS/Titles?qt=teacher+training ->/resources/SCIMAST/announcement.html • http://www.tenet.edu/new/main.html ->/policy/networks/toc.html • http://www.tenet.edu/new/main.html ->/policy/networks/toc.html • http://www.nwrel.org/national/regional-labs.html ->/welcome.html SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  22. Common log format • Output by most standard servers • Needed by most third-party log analyzers • hoohoo.ncsa.uiuc.edu/docs/setup/httpd/Overview.html SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  23. Extended/custom log formats • Log whatever you wish in whatever order you wish • Useful if you will read them regularly! • But can’t work with the analyzers • Now in IIS v4, NSCP v3, others. SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  24. What you can learn from your log files • Hits per day • Domain origins • The path people take in and around your web • Problem areas SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  25. HITS • (How Idiots Track Success) • Nobody uses this word anymore • Doesn’t really measure individual users, just access • Catching servers and proxies mess up these statistics SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  26. Domain origins • Where users are coming from -- sometimes • Just because they are from ibm.net doesn’t mean they work at IBM! • Forgotten accounts, friends and family using the account • Hacked user names • Proxies don’t help here either SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  27. The path people take in and around your web • Search engines help sometimes • Which search site was the most popular front door • Who links to you and why • Is there a pattern or a random walk? SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  28. Problem areas to deal with • Broken links (locally) • Broken outbound links • Time outs (sunspots?) SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  29. What you can’t learn from your logs • Who are these people, anyway? • No specific user names • Is it a bot or a real human? • How long did they view a page? • Most people don’t spend much time on your web • Where did they go visit next? SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  30. What technologies are available? • Built-in analyzer tools • Sites that capture user info • Secure sites with registration • Build your own from perl • Third-party tools SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  31. Built-in tools • WebSite, website.ora.com • IIS with Site Server, www.microsoft.com/iis • Netscape servers, www.netscape.com • Easy to use but limited SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  32. WebSite Professional v2 • Win NT, 95 • Best web server for learning about logs, best docs • QuickStats module for instant analysis: • single report but nice set of information • shows today, last two days requests and unique hosts • IP addresses of visitors, average requests/hour SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  33. IIS Site Server • NT Server v4 w/SP3 only • Lots of preconfigured reports • Two versions, Express and Full (customized reports) • backoffice.microsoft.com/products/siteserver/express/ SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  34. Netscape v3 web servers • Various NT, Unix versions • Reports for a few variables but nothing too extensive • Best to use a third-party tool here SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  35. Sites that capture user info • WebCounter, www.digits.com -- third-party hit counter • Someone else does the programming and debugging • But beyond your control SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  36. Secure sites with registration • You know your users • But many won’t register, or forget their passwords • Requires scripting, database integration, more maintenance SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  37. Build your own from perl • Needs some in-house support • Works best with Unix-based webs • Examples: • refstats, members.aol.com/htmlguru/refstats.html • surfreport, bienlogic.com/SurfReport/ SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  38. Third-party tools • WebTracker, www.CQMInc.com/webtrack • WebTrends, www.webtrends.com • net.Genesis, www.netgen.com • MarketWave, www.marketwave.com • IIS Assistant, www.go-iis.com SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

  39. Third-party tools (con’t) • Can make very pretty reports • Customizable • Make sure they support your particular log format • Not that expensive, mostly run on Windows SD'98 (c) David Strom, Inc.

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