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Chapter 14. Strategy. Table 14.1 Simultaneous Entry Game. Solved Problem 14.1 (Page 483). Figure 14.1 Whether an Incumbent Pays to Prevent Entry. Figure 14.2 Noncredible Threat. Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria.
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Chapter 14 Strategy
Table 14.1 Simultaneous Entry Game © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Solved Problem 14.1 (Page 483) © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Figure 14.1 Whether an Incumbent Pays to Prevent Entry © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Figure 14.2 Noncredible Threat © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Table 14.2Entrant’s Best Response and Profit © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Figure 14.4Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Figure 14.5 Incumbent Commits to a Large Quantity to Deter Entry © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Figure 14.6 Incumbent Loss if it Deters Entry © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Solved Problem 14.3 (Page 496) © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Figure 14.7Investment Game Tree © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Figure 14.8Raising-Costs Game Tree © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Application (Page 503) Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Figure 14.9 Advertising © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Figure 14.10 Shifts in the Marginal Benefit of Advertising © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Table 14.3 Advertising Game © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
Cross-Chapter Analysis (Page 515) Magazine Subscriptions © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
