SOSC005 Government and Politics

1. SOSC005 Government and Politics Lecture 2 Political Development and Change

2. (A) Major Events before 80s • Relative low participation before 67, due to: • lack of channels • economic hardship • refugee society • lack of identification with HK • high-handedness towards public protests

3. Political Effect of 67 riots • Leftists became very unpopular. - more +ve impression towards colonial govt. - more -ve attitude towards Chi govt. & communism. • Welfare and labor reforms in 70s • Colonial govt. began to listen more to public opinion and more tolerant of protests in 70s— so-called consultative democracy (諮詢式民主)

4. Student movements and pressure group movements demanded social reforms from colonial govt. but seldom touched on issues of political reform. • Local educated youth began to become more concerned about HK. • Major political dividing line between Right (pro-KMT (國民黨) masses) & Left (pro-CCP masses).

5. (B) Politicization & Democratization in 80s & 90s • Sino-British negotiations in 82-84 politicized HK population. • Britain began to push limited democratization with District Board(區議會) elections in 82. • Political groups began to participate in partial elections and demand democratization.

6. Joint Declaration: • post-97 Legco “will be constituted by elections” • CE will be selected “by consultation or elections locally” • JCPDG (民主政制促進聯委會／民促會) pushed for a directly-elected CE and a fully-elected Legco. • Chinese govt. not favor rapid democratic devt in HK. HK business sector was also largely conservative.

7. Drafting process of the Basic Law (85-90) was a struggle b/w several forces and arrived at a formula of quite gradual democratization. Method of election for the CE & Legco was quite weighted in favor of business & professional sectors.

8. The British Dimension • Before 89, British thought that Chi govt. did not agree to rapid democratization in HK. • The concept of “through train” (直通車) • Britain cooperated with China and delayed democratization in HK, not going to antagonize China over issue of democracy in HK.

9. 89 Tiananmen Crackdown • HK people became more supportive of democracy and afraid of China • Confidence in HK weakened • Beijing became more wary of effect of HK on mainland politics • China’s int’l image was tarnished; British govt. was under pressure to do sth about HK.

10. Conservative Govt. was under pressure from opposition, media, from HK, and int’l community, on what protection it could give to HK people after 1997. • Britain changed its policy to more confrontational against China, on issue of democracy. Appointing Chris Patten (彭定康) as the last Governor was a result.

11. Patten’s Reform Package (a) lower the voting age from 21 to 18 (b) abolish all appointed seats (about 1/3) in District Boards and Municipal Councils (c) expand franchise of FC to all 2.7 million of working population of HK (d) Election Committee will be formed by all District Board members. (e) 20 directly-elected seats by “single-member constituency” system(單議席單票制)

12. China declared that Patten proposal had “three violations” (三違反): (a) violate Joint Declaration (b) violate Basic Law, (c ) violate secret agreement b/w Chi & British Foreign Ministers in 90. • Patten proposal was passed and elections in 94-5 were based on Patten’s formula. • China disbanded the elected councils in 97 and changed electoral formulas afterwards.

13. Political effects of Pattern Debate • Further hurt the relationship between the Central Govt and the democrats (b) Political scene in HK more polarized with more hostilities b/t different political forces (c ) China’s suspicions on former colonial officials, indirectly drove them to pick an outsider (C. H. Tung) as the first CE

14. (C) Debate on Democratization after 97 • Few debates on issue of democratization before 2003 • Non-elected nature of SAR government, and FC seats remained a subject of attack for democrats and other critics. • Non-elected nature created pressures to legitimize the govt. by performance.

15. Post-97 system unable to cope with: • rising demands from the public for participation • increasingly critical media and the masses • rising expectations on govt. performance • increased complexity of governing issues • various difficulties facing HK after 97. • Bad performance of SAR govt (and Tung) and econ downturn fueled demand for political reform by ‘03. • Article 23 debate as a triggering pt.

16. (D) Article 23 & Political Development of HKSAR • Article 23: 「香港特別行政區應自行立法禁止任何叛國、分裂國家、煽動叛亂、顛覆中央人民政府及竊取國家機密的行為，禁止外國的政治性組織或團體在香港特別行政區進行政治活動，禁止香港特別行政區的政治性組織或團體與外國的政治性組織或團體建立聯繫。」

17. Sep ‘02, SAR govt.’s proposals • Vagued Legislation • Fear of hurting HK’s freedom • Bad attitude of Regina Ip • Econ hardship by SARS • Govt’s inability to handle SARS • 500,000 march on Jul 1 03 • Article 23 legislation was dropped. Movement quickly transformed to demand direct election of CE by ‘07 and Legco fully-elected in ‘08

18. Article 45 of the Basic Law:「行政長官的產生辦法根據香港特別行政區的實際情況和循序漸進的原則而規定，最終達至由一個有廣泛的代表性的提名委員會按民主程序提名後普選產生的目標。」 • Article 68:「立法會的產生辦法根據香港特別行政區的實際情況和循序漸進的原則而規定，最終達至全部議員由普選產生的目標。」.

19. BL Annexes I and II only specify election methods for CE and Legco up to 07/08. • Changing it needs 2/3 of Legco members, CE, and to NPCSC (人大常委) for record or approval. • NPCSC verdict on 26/4/04 ruled that: • CE in ’07 won’t be elected by universal suffrage • proportion of functional and directly-elected seats won’t be changed in ‘08.