GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF SMALL STATE SECURITY

1. GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF SMALL STATE SECURITY Alyson JK Bailes, University of Iceland NBSS Security Workshop, Stavanger, 24 May 2012

2. SOME HEALTH WARNINGS • Still a novice in the established field of small state studies • Not guaranteed to be orthodox • In particular, looking for a connection to studies in conflict, regime change and security sector reform • - and trying to find bridges from our last NBSS workshop and forward to the one on identity

3. REMINDER: WHAT IS A SMALL STATE? • We are using the ‘relational’ approach ie a state that is objectively smaller than most neighbours or than the regional average • - and that feels at a disadvantage In terms of power and self-assertion • Great scope for variation in other regions, but • - in the greater Europe and in this project, an upper limit of 10 m inhabitants makes sense • (We do not cover micro-states)

4. PRIMA FACIE, BEING SMALL MEANS • Limited tools of power (military, economic) • Smaller, less expert elites (inc diplomats)  Less influence, more reliant on rules of the game BUT ALSO: • Chance of non-threatening image  ‘pure’ when giving advice/assistance, credible mediator • Can try to make international environment more friendly through good ideas (‘norm entrepreneur’), flexibility, innovation • .. Or play off larger actors against each other??

5. SPECIFIC SECURITY CHALLENGES • Traditional military: risk of takeover (domination, political blackmail) - becoming a target as result of strategic location, natural resources, just plain ‘empire-building’….. - NB also use as forward base/proxy by one power against another (Cuba, Taiwan) • Also risk of state ‘capture’ by mercenaries, terrorists, drugs gangs, corrupt business

6. WHAT ABOUT THE CONFLICTAGENDA? • Easily caught in other people’s conflicts, but also: - can be internally divided, to point of armed violence by or against government (blurred line between civil disorder and ‘real’ conflict); • can provoke/attack neighbours, if also small. In either case, highly exposed to, but maybe also more in need of, intervention – state, UN, other… (At extreme, can fall into ‘benign occupation’ + post-conflict tutelage: E Timor, Kosovo)

7. AND ‘SOFTER’ SECURITY CHALLENGES Not necessarily proportionately worse/weaker because of size, but - • Economic vulnerability: as first workshop • Infrastructure and Supplies: one-sided dependence more likely, lack of redundancy • Natural Disasters, Disease, Climate: threshhold of viability + self-help sooner breached, hence again  intervention

8. SOME DISTINCTIONS • Security profile clearly varies with location (eg special features of many island states), region, neighbours (size and intent), roles of outside powers, level of development, etc • BUT ALSO state history and evolution: i) For a long-established or ‘natural’ state entity, strategic challenges and options center on ‘neighbours good or bad’, plus availability of protectors….

9. ii) For a new or ‘made’ state - (emerging from an empire of some kind and/or state breakup): • Friends with former ‘owner’ or against? • Friend or enemy with (new) neighbours? • Maintain, or reject and re-make security policyand culture (internal+external)…..to reflect what identity and values? On which model? With which advisers and suppliers?

10. NOW THE CLASSIC OPTIONS • Seek a protector state • In same region or outside • Explicit security pact or ‘bandwaggoning’ • Military/strategic and/or economic help COSTS inc.‘invisible’ ones – loss of freedom/ ’innocence’, agenda importing/mimicking, poss. conflict with values + identity-building • Also balancing: can overlap, or in form of ‘ganging up’ with small/medium neighbours

11. …..AND ADD INSTITUTIONS • UN + its agencies as general protector of small: may be enough if few security threats • Regionalinstitutions (NATO, EU, OSCE, CBSS, Norden – and non-European equivalents) • Post-colonial networks (for aid and identity) • Functional networks eg NAM, small island states, new agenda coalition, specialized security-relevant treaties

12. WHAT CAN INSTITUTIONS DO? • Provide direct security functions: shelter for hard threats, rules/tools/resources for facing soft ones • Provide an enhanced framework for handling big partners and ganging up with smalls • Provide an add-on to identity, or even deliver a ready-made identity for new states • ? Give chance to ‘escape smallness’ BUT they have own costs (process, intrusion…)

13. IS THE WORLD GETTING MORE HOSPITABLE TO SMALL STATES?? • Small states have multiplied because of empire and state break-up, in turn driven ia by end of colonialism + of bipolar system • Rise/multiplication of security-related institutions, esp regional, has changed ideas of statehood + made it easier for smalls to meet the standard – with less brutal risks, but a deeper price, than relying on a big helper • Will this last in a more multipolar world???

14. Seek a protector state • In same region or outside • Explicit security pact or ‘bandwaggoning’ • Military/strategic and/or economic help • Balancing

15. …..AND ADD INSTITUTIONS • UN + its agencies • Regional institutions • Post-colonial networks • Functional networks