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Structure. Introduction including brief description of organisation for better understandingThe case: Prison Reform, in the larger context of Rule of Law development work and criminal justice reform work.As an introduction: General overview of ODIHR OSCE Rule of Law programmes: Criminal Justice Re
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1. Building collaborative relationships with governments A perspective from the OSCE
2. Structure Introduction including brief description of organisation for better understanding
The case: Prison Reform, in the larger context of Rule of Law development work and criminal justice reform work.
As an introduction: General overview of ODIHR OSCE Rule of Law programmes: Criminal Justice Reform and Fair Trials programme:
1. Background
2. Approach
3. Implementation
Case 1: Prison Reform work in Central Asia
Case 2: Prison Reform work in the Caucasus
3. Tactics? Viewpoint from different angle:
Intergovernmental organisation
The countries we work in are member states of the organisation.
We operate on request (by participating States) and assessed needs
Our missions get deployed based on
Invitation
consensus
4. …from Vancouver to Vladivostok The OSCE is the only regional, international organisation to unite the Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Asian communities. (1)
How did we come to 55:
Originals 34:
+ 14 - former USSR
+1 - Cz-Slo divorce
-1 - Reunification of FRG
+4 - Secessions from FRY
-1 - Susp of FRY
+2 - Andorra and Albania admitted
= 54 activesThe OSCE is the only regional, international organisation to unite the Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Asian communities. (1)
How did we come to 55:
Originals 34:
+ 14 - former USSR
+1 - Cz-Slo divorce
-1 - Reunification of FRG
+4 - Secessions from FRY
-1 - Susp of FRY
+2 - Andorra and Albania admitted
= 54 actives
6. Basic principles
CSCE/OSCE: comprehensive and co-operative approach to security
commitments not legally but politically binding
consensus among equal, sovereign states Unique organisation through
Comprehensive and cooperative approach to security
Participation of a wide range of states throughout the OSCE region
Principle of consensus, pS are equal and sovereign
In very specific instances decisions can be made without consensus (see also slides ahead, “decision-making (PC)”:
“Consensus minus one”: decided in Prague 1992 (MC); appropriate action can be taken without the consent of the Statae concerned in “cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violation” of OSCE commitments. Option first used in 1992, in regard to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, resulting in the suspension of then rump-Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
“Consensus minus two”: Stockholm 1992: the Min Council can instruct two pS that are in dispute to seek conciliation, regardless whether or not the pS object to the decision. So far not been made use of.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is uniquely positioned for conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction. There are at least three characteritics of the OSCE which contribute to this:
The Comprehensive View of Security. The OSCE takes a broad and comprehensive view of security, which includes the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and economic and environmental issues are considered as important as political and military issues (? three dimensions of security, next slide).
A Cooperative Approach to Security. Starting from the premise that security is indivisible, participating states have a common stake in security and should cooperate to prevent conflict, or to manage conflicts non-violently.
A Unique Status. The OSCE has no legal status, and all decisions are politically but not legally binding. Moreover the OSCE is the only organization in Europe to declare itself a regional arrangement iaw Ch VIII of UN Charter. (3) (Read Arts 52, 53, 54 of Charter of UN)
Unique organisation through
Comprehensive and cooperative approach to security
Participation of a wide range of states throughout the OSCE region
Principle of consensus, pS are equal and sovereign
In very specific instances decisions can be made without consensus (see also slides ahead, “decision-making (PC)”:
“Consensus minus one”: decided in Prague 1992 (MC); appropriate action can be taken without the consent of the Statae concerned in “cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violation” of OSCE commitments. Option first used in 1992, in regard to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, resulting in the suspension of then rump-Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
“Consensus minus two”: Stockholm 1992: the Min Council can instruct two pS that are in dispute to seek conciliation, regardless whether or not the pS object to the decision. So far not been made use of.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is uniquely positioned for conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction. There are at least three characteritics of the OSCE which contribute to this:
The Comprehensive View of Security. The OSCE takes a broad and comprehensive view of security, which includes the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and economic and environmental issues are considered as important as political and military issues (? three dimensions of security, next slide).
A Cooperative Approach to Security. Starting from the premise that security is indivisible, participating states have a common stake in security and should cooperate to prevent conflict, or to manage conflicts non-violently.
A Unique Status. The OSCE has no legal status, and all decisions are politically but not legally binding. Moreover the OSCE is the only organization in Europe to declare itself a regional arrangement iaw Ch VIII of UN Charter. (3) (Read Arts 52, 53, 54 of Charter of UN)
7. Three dimensions of security Politico-military dimension
Economic and environmental dimension
Human dimension The Different Dimensions of OSCE’s approach to security
a) The Human dimension
b) The Military aspects
c) The economic dimension
d) The co-operative approach:
i) Inter-institutional co-operation, through the Parliamentary Assembly
ii)The OSCE vis-ŕ-vis other I.O.s and agencies: External Co-operation
iii) Partnership for Co-operation:
(1) Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Marocco, Tunisia,)
(2) Other partners (Japan since 1992, the Republic of Korea (1994), Thailand (2000) and most recently Afghanistan (2003)The Different Dimensions of OSCE’s approach to security
a) The Human dimension
b) The Military aspects
c) The economic dimension
d) The co-operative approach:
i) Inter-institutional co-operation, through the Parliamentary Assembly
ii)The OSCE vis-ŕ-vis other I.O.s and agencies: External Co-operation
iii) Partnership for Co-operation:
(1) Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Marocco, Tunisia,)
(2) Other partners (Japan since 1992, the Republic of Korea (1994), Thailand (2000) and most recently Afghanistan (2003)
8. Helsinki Final Act... signed 1 August 1975 Helsinki Final Act encompasses 3 main sets of recs ? “baskets”:
Basket I: relating to politico-military aspects of security: principles guiding relations between and among participating States (the “Decalogue”) and military confidence-building measures (Zeitgeist)\
Basket II: concerned cooperation in a number of fields including economics, science and technology and environment
Basket III: dealt with “cooperation in humanitarian and other fields”. This formula covered human rights issues under the headings of “human contacts”, “information”, “cooperation in the field of culture” and “cooperation in the field of education”.
Helsinki Final Act encompasses 3 main sets of recs ? “baskets”:
Basket I: relating to politico-military aspects of security: principles guiding relations between and among participating States (the “Decalogue”) and military confidence-building measures (Zeitgeist)\
Basket II: concerned cooperation in a number of fields including economics, science and technology and environment
Basket III: dealt with “cooperation in humanitarian and other fields”. This formula covered human rights issues under the headings of “human contacts”, “information”, “cooperation in the field of culture” and “cooperation in the field of education”.
9. Helsinki Decalogue Sovereign equality of States
Refraining from the threat or use of force
Inviolability of frontiers
Territorial integrity of States
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
Non-intervention in internal affairs
Respect for Human Rights & fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
Equal rights & self-determination of peoples
Co-operation among States
Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law
Souveraenitaet und Gleichberechtigung
Unverletzlichkeit der Grenzen
Territoriale Integritaet der Staaten
Verzicht auf Intervention in innere Angelegenheiten
Menschenrechte: Recht auf eigene Meinung, Religion und Glauben
Gleichberechtigung und Selbstbestimmung der Voelker
Note apparently conflicting principles of sovereignty (RED) vs. human rights(GREEN) in Decalogue; compare to Arts 2.1, 2.7 of Charter of UN.
Samuel Johnson said, “Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel.” Will sovereignty continue to be “the last refuge of the scoundrel”?
Or is the bottom line “international law,” (BLUE) reinforced in the OSCE by “consensus minus one”?Souveraenitaet und Gleichberechtigung
Unverletzlichkeit der Grenzen
Territoriale Integritaet der Staaten
Verzicht auf Intervention in innere Angelegenheiten
Menschenrechte: Recht auf eigene Meinung, Religion und Glauben
Gleichberechtigung und Selbstbestimmung der Voelker
Note apparently conflicting principles of sovereignty (RED) vs. human rights(GREEN) in Decalogue; compare to Arts 2.1, 2.7 of Charter of UN.
Samuel Johnson said, “Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel.” Will sovereignty continue to be “the last refuge of the scoundrel”?
Or is the bottom line “international law,” (BLUE) reinforced in the OSCE by “consensus minus one”?
10. 1989 beginning of rapid transition across the CSCE area
CSCE institutionalization process, with:
permanent structures
operational capabilities
first Institutions
first field activities Start with permanent admin structures ? including Secretariat, a CPC, Off for Free Elections (later ODIHR). Avoidance of large bureaucracies: small offices; decentralised; seconded.
1991: Parl Assembly
1992: FSC; HCNM; Economic Forum; CiO function formalised; Secretary General
Autumn: first OSCE Mission of long-duration to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina (FRY) ? by 1994: eight missions
In 1992: CSCE declared itself to be a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VII of the UN Charter
With these developments: CSCE de facto evolved from being a process to being an organisation (therefore: 1995 “organisation”)Start with permanent admin structures ? including Secretariat, a CPC, Off for Free Elections (later ODIHR). Avoidance of large bureaucracies: small offices; decentralised; seconded.
1991: Parl Assembly
1992: FSC; HCNM; Economic Forum; CiO function formalised; Secretary General
Autumn: first OSCE Mission of long-duration to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina (FRY) ? by 1994: eight missions
In 1992: CSCE declared itself to be a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VII of the UN Charter
With these developments: CSCE de facto evolved from being a process to being an organisation (therefore: 1995 “organisation”)
11. Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, 1991
“The participating States (…) categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the OSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.”
12. OSCE “Tools” Political instruments
Chairman in Office
Institutions
Mechanisms
“Most important”: Field operations
13. OSCE Field Operations Monitor compliance with human dimension commitments
Point out weaknesses
Assist in finding solutions
Hier Einschub uber Feldarbeit (understanding modus operandi; strengths/weaknesses; practical effects (im Hinblick auf moegliche Beruehrungen im Feld zu spaeterem Zeitpunkt)
Frontline of OSCE’s work: active presence of the org. & vehicle through which political decisions are translated into action.
Address all phases of conflict cycle: early-warning, conflict prevention (preventive diplomacy), conflict management, post-conflict rehabilitation/reconstruction
No mandate same, but generally purpose 2-fold: a) facilitate political processes intended to prevent or settle conflicts, and b) ensure that OSCE pS is informed of developments in mission area/countries.Hier Einschub uber Feldarbeit (understanding modus operandi; strengths/weaknesses; practical effects (im Hinblick auf moegliche Beruehrungen im Feld zu spaeterem Zeitpunkt)
Frontline of OSCE’s work: active presence of the org. & vehicle through which political decisions are translated into action.
Address all phases of conflict cycle: early-warning, conflict prevention (preventive diplomacy), conflict management, post-conflict rehabilitation/reconstruction
No mandate same, but generally purpose 2-fold: a) facilitate political processes intended to prevent or settle conflicts, and b) ensure that OSCE pS is informed of developments in mission area/countries.
14. OSCE Institutions HCNM - High Commissioner on National Minorities
ODIHR - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
RFOM - OSCE Representative on Freedom of Media
PA - Parliamentary Assembly Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
High Commissioner on* National Minorities: on, not for - not an investigative role in the case of individual violations, rather to identify and to seek early resolution of ethnic tensions which might endanger the peace, stability or friendly relations between member states
Instrument of early warning ? Mandate: Provide “early warning” of, and eventually also “early action” on, ethnic tensions with conflict potential. also: instrument of conflict prevention
not an Ombudsman
Impartial third party
Negotiates at highest political level
“silent diplomacy”
The Concept of National Minority
Open concept (not given in mandate)
Existence of linguistic, cultural or ethnic characteristics which differ from majority
Group not only wishes to maintain, but also to reinforce that identity
ii) Belonging to a National Minority is an individual choice
d) The HCNM will not deal with any institution, group, etc. which directly or indirectly supports terrorism or violence; thus little involvement to date with ethnic Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo, who have been in armed conflict.
Key points to ethnic conflict resolution:
Minority self-assertion does not imply fracture of a current State nor require a territorial expression: “… it may very well be achieved through legislation promoting the development of … identity of the minority … culture, education or public affairs.” (98)
“The Copenhagen Document” (2nd Mtg of Conf on Hum Dim CSCE, 1990) makes clear that territorial autonomy (for a minority) is an option and not a right; nothing in that document implies any contravention of the principal of the territorial integrity of States, nor is there any necessity for a minority to be formally recognised by the State (OSCE Newsletter, Aug 99).Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
High Commissioner on* National Minorities: on, not for - not an investigative role in the case of individual violations, rather to identify and to seek early resolution of ethnic tensions which might endanger the peace, stability or friendly relations between member states
Instrument of early warning ? Mandate: Provide “early warning” of, and eventually also “early action” on, ethnic tensions with conflict potential. also: instrument of conflict prevention
not an Ombudsman
Impartial third party
Negotiates at highest political level
“silent diplomacy”
The Concept of National Minority
Open concept (not given in mandate)
Existence of linguistic, cultural or ethnic characteristics which differ from majority
Group not only wishes to maintain, but also to reinforce that identity
ii) Belonging to a National Minority is an individual choice
d) The HCNM will not deal with any institution, group, etc. which directly or indirectly supports terrorism or violence; thus little involvement to date with ethnic Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo, who have been in armed conflict.
Key points to ethnic conflict resolution:
Minority self-assertion does not imply fracture of a current State nor require a territorial expression: “… it may very well be achieved through legislation promoting the development of … identity of the minority … culture, education or public affairs.” (98)
“The Copenhagen Document” (2nd Mtg of Conf on Hum Dim CSCE, 1990) makes clear that territorial autonomy (for a minority) is an option and not a right; nothing in that document implies any contravention of the principal of the territorial integrity of States, nor is there any necessity for a minority to be formally recognised by the State (OSCE Newsletter, Aug 99).
15. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
16. Why prison reform as case? governments are more willing to engage in prison reform than in other areas that are closer to the centre of power (judicial reform, police reform etc)
relatively “easy” reform area to engage governments
cost argument
prison reform as an entry point with a view to expand to other, more sensitive areas of the criminal justice system
17. OSCE ODIHR Rule of Law programmes Criminal justice reform programme
Fair Trials programme
18. Background
Approach
Programme objectives
Results / output
Activities / input
Indicators
Strategy / Methodology
Assumptions and risks
Implementation
19. Case 1 Prison Reform in Central Asia
Background
Overcrowding
Cost factor
Political will
„Competition to reform“: regional competition and cooperation
20. Concrete results Transfer of prison administrations from the Ministries of Interior to Justice
Demilitarisation
Humanisation
Reduction of number of inmates
Reduction of torture and ill-treatment (at least in post-trial)
Abolishment of death penalty
21. Case 2 Prison reform in the Caucasus:
The creation of a public and institutionalised monitoring board of civil society representatives to monitor places of detention
(case study Armenia)
22. Key aspects Context
Desired outcomes (goals and objectives)
Strategy employed – tactic/methodology of project implementation
23. How did it work? The process Start:
request by government to help creating monitoring system
Two draft laws to comment: from MoJ and a coalition of NGOs
Assessment (by RoL Unit):
Sense?
Prospects for impact?
Political will?
Decision
24. First actions – preparing the ground Assessment visit to country
Separate Meetings with MoJ and Civil Society coalition
Roundtable with civil society
Consensus among two entities about core issues
Differencies about way ahead
25. Framework conditions: Minimum conditions setting agenda:
Monitoring board
Staffed with civil society representatives
Established by and linked to Ministry of Justice
Independence
This was the frame and non-negotiable to MOJ
26. Next steps Creating alliance of international actors for support
Creation of standing expert team to comment and serve as resource to the process
Opinion on draft law
Harmonisation process in focus
27. Next steps Submission of legal expert opinion to stakeholders
Roundtable (Dec. 2002) bringing together governmental and non-governmental as well as international actors
28. Results of roundtable Basic agreement on issue
New draft to be prepared
Harmonising both positions in one single draft
Drafting of road map
Open communication links for constant negotiation and dialogue
OSCE: Political support and advice
29. Next steps New draft legal basis (January 2003) – sent out to all stakeholders
March: drafting of detailed roadmap setting actions and timelines
Two-phased roadmap: pre- and post-establishment of board
30. Continuation of process Drafting process
Political process in country
Constant presence of mission on ground: dialogue/negotiations with both sides, lobbying – providing information to ODIHR
31. Formal creation of board Adoption of draft law in August
Shortcomings: key provisions kicked out – restricted operational capacity and authority given to board
Alarm bell: quick response needed
Amendments (October 2003) re-introducing recommended minimal standard provisions
32. After enactment of decree Selection process (Oct 03 – Feb 04)
Nomination process (Feb – April 04)
Appointment process (April 04)
Appointment ceremony in April 04
Board established – first phase of mission accomplished
33. Phase II: post-creation of board First monitoring visits carried out
Training series initiated in July 04
Practical training concept:
Knowledge transfer
„Shadowing“ approach: on-the-job training with short-term resident expert
Debriefings and evaluations
34. Process ongoing
35. Review development of tactic Targets affected:
Behavious and mentality change
Institutional change
Individual change
Actual outcomes – further reaching effects:
Reduction of ill-treatment
Higher awareness
Input to reform process through reports
36. Lessons learned What worked – what not
What do differently
Recommendations