Philosophy E166: Ethical Theory

Philosophy E166: Ethical Theory Week Four: Hobbes on Relativism and Determinism

The Science of Moral Philosophy Includes Differences among Humans • For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind. Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and aversions, which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men are different: and diverse men differ not only in their judgement on the senses of what is pleasant and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable or disagreeable to reason in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in diverse times, differs from himself; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil…

Differences Resolved in the Science According to Laws of Nature • “… from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, private appetite is the measure of good and evil: and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way or means of peace, which (as I have shown before) are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature, are good; that is to say, moral virtues; and their contrary vices, evil. Now the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy; and therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature is the true moral philosophy.”

The Natural Law and the Civil Law • “The law of nature and the civil law contain each other and are of equal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other moral virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature (as I have said before in the end of the fifteenth Chapter), are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience. When a Commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before; as being then the commands of the Commonwealth; and therefore also civil laws: for it is the sovereign power that obliges men to obey them. For the differences of private men, to declare what is equity, what is justice, and is moral virtue, and to make them binding, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them; which ordinances are therefore part of the civil law. The law of nature therefore is a part of the civil law in all Commonwealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the civil law is a part of the dictates of nature. For justice, that is to say, performance of covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a dictate of the law of nature. But every subject in a Commonwealth hath covenanted to obey the civil law…”

Definitions • Instead of “compatibilism” I will sometimes use the phrase “metaphysical compatibilism” both (1) to indicate opposition to “metaphysical libertarianism” and (2) to distinguish this use of the term “compatibilism” from the other ways that I have been using it throughout the first several weeks. • A “metaphysical compatibilist” is somebody who thinks that belief in the existence of free will is not logically incompatible with belief in the truth of universal determinism. • In opposition to metaphysical compatibilismare two forms of incompatibilism – • metaphysical libertarianism, the view that free will exists and because of that universal determinism is false, and • hard determinism, the view that universal determinism is true and because of that free will does not exist.

Were Martin Luther and John Calvin Compatibilists? • Sometimes said that Hobbes’s compatibilism was not that original, since Calvin and Luther, among others, had much the same view. • I see no evidence at all of compatibilism in Luther, much less Hobbes’s version of it.

The Theological Views of Luther and Calvin • Both Luther and Calvin were theological determinists – they believed that God was all-powerful and because of that everything was determined in advance. • they believed that Christians do not choose their own salvation – that it is determined in advance whether or not a given person will be saved from damnation. • The collection of such persons was known as “the Elect” – those “elected” by God by God’s grace to receive salvation. • This determinism was based on the idea that because human nature was fallen no human beings had it within them to accept God’s gift of salvation on their own. • Each person was seen as being enslaved to Satan without the intervention of God.

Luther’s Riders Metaphor • “In a word, if we be under the god of this world, without the operation and Spirit of God, we are led captives by him at his will, as Paul saith…. So that, we cannot will anything but that which he wills…. Thus the human will is, as it were, a beast between the two. If God sit thereon, it wills and goes where God will…. If Satan sit thereon, it wills and goes as Satan will. Nor is it in the power of its own will to choose, to which rider it will run, nor which it will seek; but the riders themselves contend, which shall have and hold it.” (Bondage of the Will, Atherton translation, sec. 25.)

“Natural Freedom” in Luther? • Some writers claim to find evidence in Luther of a belief in what they call “natural freedom.” • An example might be the freedom to choose between brushing your teeth first and flossing your teeth first. • What is at stake isn’t damnation but something of no particular interest to God or Satan. • I don’t find it, but I remain open to finding it. • If such a belief in “natural freedom” can be found in Luther’s writings, that fact alone would not by itself decide between labeling him as a libertarian and labeling him as a compatibilist. • If we think, additionally, that the will for Luther is only compelled to act when it is compelled to act by God or Satan on matters of moral importance, that would seem to be a reason to regard Luther not as a compatibilist at all but rather as a metaphysical libertarian.

Hobbes’s Originality • Thus, I don’t find a precedent for Hobbes’s compatibilism in Luther’s views. • Circumstances under which Hobbes set out his views give some reason for thinking that they could be wholly original. • For one thing, Hobbes was perhaps alone in the England of his day in embracing materialism; Hobbes’s religious views were entirely unorthodox, as was what I described as his embrace of a kind of psychological egoism. • Given the degree to which his determinism and his views about human freedom were connected to these other unorthodox views, it would thus not be too surprising that his conclusions about freedom and determinism would also be iconoclastic.

Hobbes’s Case for Compatibilism • (1) Why he thought that determinism was true • (2) What his account was of what I will call “negative liberty” • (3) What his account was of the ability to choose, or what I will call “positive liberty” • (4) Why he thought that the two forms of liberty were compatible with determinism • (5) Why he thought that liberty and necessity, conceived this way, were compatible with morality

Why Hobbes Thought that Determinism Is True • Hobbes believed that human actions are determined and the human will is determined because everything is determined. • But this is not obvious – libertarians like Bramhall reject this belief. • So what is Hobbes’s argument for it? It is: • (a) nothing can begin without a cause, and • (b) all causes necessitate.

The Argument that Nothing Can Begin Without a Cause [The point] that a man cannot imagine anything to begin without a cause, can [in] no other way be made known but by trying how he can imagine it. But if he try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at one time as at another, that is, he has equal reason to think it should begin at all times; which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but was eternal. (At §33 (at p. 39) of Of Liberty and Necessity.)

The Argument that Causes Necessitate • [L]et us in this place suppose any event never so casual, as, for example, the throwing ambs-ace [i.e., of two ones] upon a pair of dice, and see if it must not have been necessary before it was thrown. For seeing it was thrown, it had a beginning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it, consisting partly in the dice, partly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the hand, the measure of force applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the table, and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting which was necessarily required to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown. For if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been sufficient.--At §34 of Of Liberty and Necessity

Hobbes’s Fallacious Argument • The same also may be proved in this manner. Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. It is necessary that tomorrow it shall rain or not rain. If therefore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain; otherwise there is no necessity that the proposition, it shall rain or not rain, should be true. (Later in §33 of Of Liberty and Necessity.)

Formalization of Hobbes’s Fallacious Argument  (It will rain or it will not rain) Therefore,  it will rain or  it will not rain. (“” means “it is necessarily true that”)

Missing Premise Needed  (it will rain or it will not rain) Therefore,  it will rain or  it will not rain. • Obviously, the argument requires a missing premise (where “→” means “if … then …” or “only if” or “implies”):  (it will rain or it will not rain) →  it will rain or  it will not rain

Why the Missing Premise is False  (it will rain or it will not rain) → ( it will rain or  it will not rain) • But this is not supportable, if it is supposed to be an instance of a more general statement form (“p” is a placeholder for a sentence):  (p or not-p) → (p or  not-p) • For consider the case where I substitute “I exist” for “p”:  (I exist or I don’t exist) → ( I exist or  I don’t exist) • Since it is obviously not true that  I don’t exist, since I do exist, then it follows that my existence is necessary. But it obviously is not necessary – I am a contingent being.

Hobbes’s Account of Liberty • Bramhall considers liberty in the case of the will • to be “liberty from necessitation,” • not “liberty from compulsion” (See Bramhall’s discourse, §19, p. 8; and Hobbes’s reply in Of Liberty and Necessity, §19, pp. 30-31). • Hobbes replies that: • there is no “liberty from necessitation” but • there is “liberty from compulsion”

A Definition of “Liberty” in Of Liberty and Necessity, §29 • “I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner: Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent.”

A Definition of “Liberty” in Chapter XIV of Leviathan • “By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments; which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him according as his judgement and reason shall dictate to him.”

A Definition of “Liberty” in Chapter XXI of Leviathan • “Liberty, or freedom, signifieth properly the absence of opposition (by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion); and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational.”

Chapter XXI of Leviathan: “Liberty” Applicable to Water and Nonhumans • “For whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained with walls or chains; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks or vessels that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space; we use to say they are not at liberty to move in such manner as without those external impediments they would.”

Chapter XXI of Leviathan: Internal Distinguished from External Impediments • “But when the impediment of motion is in the constitution of the thing itself, we use not to say it wants the liberty, but the power, to move; as when a stone lieth still, or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness.” • What he means in §29 of Of Liberty and Necessity when he writes of impediments “not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent.”

Negative Liberty and Positive Liberty • I will call such an absence of impediments “negative liberty” – using Isaiah Berlin’s phrase, but recognizing that Berlin’s use gives it a political sense. • What then is present in the case of the human will when there is such an absence? • I will call that – again using a phrase of Berlin’s but in a way different from his way – “positive liberty.”

Positive Liberty • Again in Chapter XXI of Leviathan, Hobbes writes that “according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, a freeman is he that, in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to.”

Traditional Conception of Will vs. Hobbes’s • The traditional account of human psychology, which Bramhall uses, is that there is a distinction in the soul between a person’s desires and a person’s faculty of will, through which those desires are acted upon. • Desires were thought by Christian philosophers to be a part of the human body while the will was conceived to be a part of the human soul. • But Hobbes could not make such a distinction, since as a materialist, he did not allow that there was a soul. • He takes “the will” not to name a separate faculty in a human being but rather just one of a human being’s desires.

Hobbes on Deliberation and the Will • In §§27 of Of Liberty and Necessity: • “… I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate succession of contrary appetites [desires], the last is that which we call the will, and is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other appetites [desires] to do and to quit that come upon a man during his deliberation are usually called intentions and inclinations, but not wills; there being but one will, which also in this case may be called the last will, though the intention change often.” • Again: “the last [desire] is that which we call the will.”

Hobbes on the Voluntary • Hobbes writes in §28 of Of Liberty and Necessity (pp. 37-38): • “those actions which a man is said to do upon deliberation are said to be voluntary and done upon choice and election, so that voluntary action and action proceeding from election is the same thing; and that of a voluntary agent it is all one to say he is free, and to say he has not made an end of deliberating.”

Bramhall Thought Liberty and Necessity, So Conceived, Were Incompatible with Morality • There are still questions of the compatibility of liberty and determinism so conceived with sin and punishment. • Bramhall wrote: “if there be no liberty, there shall be no day of doom, no last judgment, no rewards nor punishments after death. A man can never make himself a criminal if he be not at liberty to commit a crime. No man can be justly punished for doing that which was not in his power to shun. To take away liberty hazards heaven, but undoubtedly it leaves no hell.” (In §12 of Bramhall’s discourse, p. 4.)

Why Hobbes Thought that Liberty and Necessity Were Compatible with Morality • Hobbes begins his reply by quoting a long passage from Paul’s letter to the Romans (chap. 9, verses 11-21). • Paul discusses the story of Jacob and Esau. • In the story, elder son Esau accepted younger son Jacob’s offer to exchange a bowl of stew for Esau’s birthright as the eldest son. • As a result, Jacob received the honor of leading the Jewish people – Jacob’s name became “Israel,” and the people “the Israelites” – and Esau received nothing. • Paul writes that, according to the story, all this was decided in advance.

Romans 9: 11-19 • For the children [Esau and Jacob] being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth; It was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger…. What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. For the scripture saith unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will?

Romans 9: 20-21 • Verse 20: Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? • Verse 21: Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?

The Conclusion Hobbes Draws from the Passage in Romans • “[T]he power of God alone without other help is sufficient justification of any action he does. That which men make amongst themselves here by pacts and covenants and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men are counted and termed rightly just or unjust, is not that by which God Almighty’s actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his counsels are to be measured by human wisdom.” (§12 of Of Liberty and Necessity, p. 22.)

The Reply to Hobbes that Hobbes Rejects • “God almighty does indeed sometimes permit sin, and that he also foreknows that the sin he permits shall be committed, but does not will it nor necessitate it.”

Why Hobbes Rejects the Reply • Such distinctions, he writes, “dazzle my understanding. I find no difference between the will to have a thing done and the permission to do it, when he that permits can hinder it and knows it will be done unless he hinder it.” • He goes on to write: “This I know: God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just and consequently no sin; and because whatsoever can sin is subject to another’s law, which God is not.”

Philosophy E166: Ethical Theory