The Achievements of the Pacific “Whiting Conservation Cooperative” Rational Collaboration in a Sea of Irrational Compe

1. The Achievements of the Pacific “Whiting Conservation Cooperative” Rational Collaboration in a Sea of Irrational Competition Gil Sylvia Marine Resource Economist Oregon State University Heather Munro Munroe Consulting

2. Allocation to three sectors Olympic style fishing Overcapitalization Significant loss in regional and national fishery benefits Significant failure in meeting the objectives of the PFMC’s Groundfish Management Plan Pacific Whiting Management in 1996

3. Allocation to (Four) Fleet Sectors Olympic Style Fisheries in only two sectors Overcapitalization in only two sectors Significant loss in regional and national fishery benefits to only two sectors One sector is achieving (most) of the PFMC’s Groundfish Management Objectives Pacific Whiting Management in 2003

4. What happened before, during and after 1997? What led to the transformation of one sector while other sectors engaged in “irrational” competition? Can we apply principles to other fishery management challenges? Cooperation versus “Cooperatives”: Are Coops a substitute for ITQ’s?  The Story of the Pacific“Whiting Conservation Cooperative”

5. A true “hake” (1 major and 2 minor stocks) Largest stock of fish south of Alaska Ecologically important “Average” stock size 1-4 MMT “Average” harvest 250 TM Range of potential harvest 100-500 TMT Biology and Natural HistoryMerluccius Productus

6. Average fish size: two pounds Moderately productive/long lived (15-20 yrs) Variable recruitment (.1-8 billion annually) Myxosporidean parasites-protease enzymes Mid water-long annual migrations Biology and Natural HistoryMerluccius Productus

13. Sporadic small harvests back to 1880 Considered nuisance/trash fish 1950’s small domestic harvest animal food 1966 Soviet Union/Japan (H&G and fillet blocks, meal) 1970’s and 1980’s additional European and Asian vessels History of the FisheryForeign Domination 1880-1980

14. 1976 MFCMA—allocative preference for US fishermen 1978—first foreign/domestic joint venture Soviet Union paid $.05/lb 1980’s Japanese begin producing surimi using protease inhibitors History of the FisheryDomestication 1980-1989

15. Open Access (until 1994) Total Allowable Catch (TAC) Season opening—transitioning later (April 15, May 15, June 15) Minimum mesh size Bycatch management/monitoring/quotas Area closure S of 42 N for at-sea sector Sector allocation (1990’s) History of the FisheryRegulatory Development

17. 1990—first factory trawler harvests by Alaskan pollock fleet overcapitalization of factory trawler fleet testing ability to make surimi from whiting 1991– fishery totally domesticated at sea component harvests 91% of TAC factory trawlers harvest 60% TAC History of the FisheryAllocation Wars 1990-1996

18. Olympic race for the resource among all sectors Seasons begin to decrease maximize harvest and throughput per vessel bycatch problems 10% reduction in potential TAC decrease in product quality decrease in product recovery History of the FisheryAllocation Wars 1990-1996 (continued)

19. PFMC “shocked” at rapid capitalization 1991 Council tries to force vessels to either harvest or process – Commerce Disapproves plan 1992 Council allocates 98,000 mt to at sea processors and 80,000 shore based with reserve 1993 Council proposes 74% quota in favor of “shore-based priority” Commerce disapproves one day before season opening Approves 70% to at sea sector History of the FisheryAllocation Wars 1990-1996 (continued)

20. Fall 1993 -- Industry Committee develops allocation plan Three years 60% allocated open competition 40% onshore 1994 Groundfish Limited Entry Factory trawlers are “shocked” -- don’t qualify Ten factory trawlers buy their way back in 10 –11 permits per factory trawler Buy out 109 groundfish permits @ $15 M total Four companies: Glacier Fish Company(1), Tyson Seafood Group (3), American Seafoods (5), Alaskan Ocean (1) History of the FisheryAllocation Wars 1990-1996 (continued)

21. 1994-1996: “Irrational” competition continues Whiting season continues to shorten 1996 New approved five year allocation scheme 42% on-shore, 24% motherships, 34% factory trawlers, tribal allocation off the top Formation of the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative

22. Factory Trawlers develop common understanding of problems and opportunities Recognize advantages for cooperating and voluntarily allocating quota within their sector Lengthening season Reducing bycatch Improving product recovery, quality, and “full utilization” Meeting individual company needs Problem is Antitrust Laws Formation of the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative (continued)

23. Investigated the formation of legal cooperative behavior initial investigation for Alaskan pollock The Fisherman’s Cooperative Marketing Act provides antitrust exemptions for the fishing industry intended for “small” producers insufficiently integrated Formation of the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative (continued)

24. 1996: Discussions with Anti-Trust Division -Justice Dept potentially could allow limited harvesting arrangements if demonstrated “competitive” increased efficiency (lower production costs) increased production (higher product recoveries) potential price decrease Formation of the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative (continued)

25. Based on preliminary discussions with Antitrust: the four companies allocated shares in “one afternoon” “Membership Agreement” of WCC transfer shares without constraint full time observer coverage report catches to private centralized reporting service penalty agreements for exceeding shares other private rights of action for violating the Agreement Formation of the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative (continued)

26. May 27, 1997 Anti Trust Division issues favorable decision Season performance before and after May 27 decision: multi-vessel companies immediately transferred excess capacity out of the fishery “efficient” operators leased shares from “inefficient” operators product recovery rates increased from 17.2% to 20.6% increased revenues of $5.1 Million (Profits $1-2 million) reduced yellowtail bycatch from 2.47kg/mt to .99 kg/mt total utilization of allocated strict total catch limit Evaluating Success of the Whiting Conservation Cooperative

27. Longer seasons Reduced bycatch Higher product recoveries 24% recovery?? $10 M annual additional revenue ($2-4 M profits) Cooperative research (landings levy) Evaluating Longer Term Success of the Whiting Conservation Cooperative

28. Pacific Whiting Fishery Season Length

31. Pre-recruit surveys Hydro-acoustic stock research Bycatch reduction management and research Future research and management projects optimal timing of harvest? higher product recoveries higher surimi quality and prices higher TAC/OY balanced against opportunity costs of harvesting pollock Cooperative Management and Research Activities of the WCC

32. Potential victim of own success? more profit, and/or increased quota, and/or available cheap permits, then profitable for new entrants into fishery without compensating existing members Growing bycatch constraints Ex: widow rockfish may be only 1/3 amount available in 2004 (200 mt) compared to 2003 Risks toWhiting Conservation Cooperative

33. Problem of “large numbers” and transaction costs Integrated versus non-integrated seafood sectors shorebased processors cannot secure rights to the fish Antitrust impediments Overcapacity problem Ineffective institutions limited entry not very limiting Ban on ITQ’s Why Are Other Pacific Whiting Sectors Still Engaging in “Irrational” Competition?

34. WCC succeeded due to: small numbers/well known players relatively secure allocation defined rights (license holders) integrated industry mutual understanding of costs/benefits similarity in operations (and harvest histories) win-win for all players and smart managers and lawyers Conclusion

35. “Cooperative behavior” in managing a club good is a feature of fishery systems that allocate relatively secure rights IFQ’s, Cooperatives, and other institutional structures, are not mutually exclusive—they are complementary or mutually reinforcing given common needs and interests of the rights holders Whether Coops are a better approach than e.g., ITQ’s etc. depends on fishery management objectives, legal constraints, other factors –need empirical research Conclusion