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The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: Does the Bush Administration Think It Can Fool

The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: Does the Bush Administration Think It Can Fool Mother Nature?. JOHN P. HOLDREN Teresa & John Heinz Professor of Environmental Policy and Director, Program on Science, Technology, and Public Policy

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The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: Does the Bush Administration Think It Can Fool

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  1. The Science and Politicsof Global Climate Change:Does the Bush Administration Think It Can Fool Mother Nature? JOHN P. HOLDREN Teresa & John Heinz Professor of Environmental Policy and Director, Program on Science, Technology, and Public Policy John F. Kennedy School of Government Professor of Environmental Science and Policy Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences HARVARD UNIVERSITY Presentation at Ohio State University Sponsored by Scientists and Engineers for Change Columbus, Ohio • 7 October 2004

  2. “Although scientific input to the government is rarely the only factor in public policy decisions, this input should always be weighed from an objective and impartial perspective to avoid perilous consequences. Indeed, this principle has long been adhered to by presidents and administrations of both parties in forming and implementing policies. The administration of George W. Bush has, however, disregarded this principle.” Scientists’ statement on “Restoring Scientific Integrity in Policymaking”, 18 February 2004

  3. “When scientific knowledge has been found to be in conflict with its political goals, the administration has often manipulated the process through which science enters into its decisions. This has been done by placing people who are professionally unqualified or who have clear conflicts of interest in official posts and on scientific advisory committees; by disbanding existing advisory committees; by censoring and suppressing reports by the government’s own scientists; and by simply not seeking independent scientific advice.” Scientists’ statement, 18 February 2004

  4. “Other administrations have, on occasion, engaged in such practices, but not so systematically nor on so wide a front. Furthermore, in advocating policies that are not scientifically sound, the administration has sometimes misrepresented scientific knowledge and misled the public about the implications of its policies.” Scientists’ statement, 18 February 2004 The 62 original signers hold, among them, 20 Nobel Prizes and 18 National Medals of Science. They include the president of Caltech; former directors of the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the National Bureau of Standards, FermiLab, and the Livermore Lab; and 3 former presidents of the American Association for the Advancement of Science;

  5. On June 21, 2004, 48 U.S. Nobel Laureates in science issued an open letter to the American public, saying in part: “The prosperity, health, environment, and security of Americans depend on Presidential leadership to sustain our vibrant science and technology; to encourage education at home and to attract talented scientists and engineers from abroad; and to nurture a business environment that transforms new knowledge into opportunities for creating quality jobs and reaching shared goals. President Bush and his administration are compromising our future on each of these counts. … And by ignoring scientific consensus on critical issues such as global climate change, they are threatening the earth’s future.” (emphasis added)

  6. The Bush administration denies these allegations and says they are partisan. • Who is right? • Is this, as the critics allege, an administration in which ideology and agenda, unfettered by facts, determine what the administration does and what the public is told? • Or are these criticisms nothing more than partisan electioneering?

  7. In seeking answers, there’s no substitute for taking your own look at the evidence & the arguments. So please see… • The scientists’ letters of 18 Feb 2004 and 21 June 2004: http://www.scientistsandengineersforchange.org • “Politics & Science in the Bush Administration”, US House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Minority Staff Special Investigations Division, 13 Nov 2003. http://reform.house.gov/min • “Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An Investigation into the Bush Administration’s Misuse of Science”, Union of Concerned Scientists, Feb 2004. http://www.ucsusa.org • “Statement of the Hon. John H. Marburger III on Scientific Integrity in the Bush Administration” and “Response to the UCS February 2004 Document”, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2 April 2004. http://www.ostp.gov • Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Hon. John H. Marburger III requesting clarifications of OSTP’s response to the UCS, 13 Apr 2004. http://reform.house.gov/min

  8. Here I’ll look at the particular case of climate-change science and policy (and its close connections to energy policy). For more detail on this topic, see, for example, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report – Summary for Policymakers, IPCC, 2001 http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/un/syreng/spm.pdf National Academy of Sciences, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, National Academy Press, 2001 http://books.nap.edu/html/climatechange/climatechange.pdf John P. Holdren, “The Energy-Climate Challenge”, Environment, vol. 43, no. 5, June 2001 http://www.aspeninstitute.org/aspeninstitute/files/Img/pdf/holdren.pdf John P. Holdren, “US Climate Policy Post-Kyoto”, Aspen Institute Congressional Program, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2003 bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/ClimatePostKyoto.pdf James E. Hansen, “Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb”, Scientific American, March 2004

  9. Truth in advertising It’s good to be aware of a speaker’s affiliations & biases. • I was one of the 62 signers of the February 18 scientists’ statement on “Restoring Scientific Integrity in Policymaking”. • I am one of the 25 participating members of Scientists and Engineers for Change (www.scientistsandengineersforchange.org) • I served the Clinton administration from 1994 to 2001 as a member of the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology – an unpaid, part-time position in which I chaired 5 major studies for the President on nuclear non-proliferation and energy strategies for the climate challenge. • I am a Democrat. • I am speaking today as an individual member of Scientists and Engineers for change, which paid for my trip, not as a representative of Harvard or the National Academy of Sciences or any other organization with which I am affiliated.

  10. Introduction to the energy-environment challenge • Energy in convenient and affordable forms is an indispensable ingredient of economic progress. • But many of the most difficult and dangerous environmental problems at every level of economic development • from the damage that the very poor do to their immediate environment and thus to themselves, • to the damage that the very rich do to global environmental systems and thus to everybody arise from the harvesting, transport, & processing of energy.

  11. The energy-environment challenge (continued) • Specifically, energy supply is the source of… • most indoor and outdoor air pollution • most radioactive waste • much of the hydrocarbon and trace-metal pollution of soil and ground water • essentially all of the oil added by humans to the seas • most of the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases that are altering the global climate.

  12. The energy-environment challenge (continued) • The environmental characteristics of the energy resources and technologies on which civilization depends today can generally be changed only slowly and at considerable cost. • Thus the dilemma of energy’s dual roles in economic prosperity and environmental disruption is not easily resolved. • In light of all this, it becomes clear that • Energy is the core of the environment problem. • Environment is the core of the energy problem. • The energy-environment-economy nexus is the core of the sustainable-prosperity problem, for industrialized & developing countries alike.

  13. Climate change is the most dangerous & difficult of all of energy’s environmental impacts • It’s the most dangerous because climate is the “envelope” within which all other environmental conditions and processes operate. That envelope is not just a matter of average temperature but of averages and extremes of • hot & cold • wet & dry • snowpack & snowmelt • winds & storm tracks • ocean currents & upwellings and not just how much & where, but also when.

  14. Why climate change is so dangerous(continued) • Distortions of this envelope of the magnitude in store are likely to so badly disrupt these conditions and processes as to impact adversely every dimension of human well-being that is tied to environment: • productivity of farms, forests, & fisheries • geography of disease • livability of cities in summer • damages from storms, floods, wildfires • property losses from sea-level rise • expenditures on engineered environments • distribution & abundance of species

  15. Why the problem is so difficult • The climate problem is so difficult because • the dominant cause of the disruption – emission of CO2 from fossil-fuel combustion – arises from the process that currently supplies nearly 80 percent of civilization’s energy • the technologies involved cannot be quickly or inexpensively changed or replaced in ways that would eliminate the problem.

  16. A closer lookat climate-change scienceand the energy-climate connection

  17. Fossil fuels drove most of the growth & were almost 80% of supply in 2000.

  18. Atmospheric CO2 grew from 290 to 370 ppmv over the same period.

  19. Evidence for recent unusual climate change The average temperature of the earth is rising: • up 0.7±0.2°C in last 140 years (instrumental records); • 19 of the 20 warmest years since 1860 have all occurred since 1980, the 12 warmest all since 1990; • 1998 was the warmest year in the instrumental record and probably the warmest in 1,000 years (tree rings, ice cores); 2002 was 2nd warmest; 2003 3rd warmest; • the last 50 years appear to have been the warmest half century in 6,000 years (ice core work by Thompsons at OSU); • compilation of worldwide ocean-temperature measure- ments shows significant ocean warming between the mid-1950s and the mid-1990s.

  20. Evidence that climate is changing (cont) Observations over recent decades also show… • Evaporation & rainfall are increasing; • More of the rainfall is occurring in downpours; • Permafrost is melting; • Corals are bleaching; • Glaciers are retreating; • Sea ice is shrinking; • Sea level is rising; • Wildfires are increasing; • Storm & flood damages are soaring.

  21. Effects of climate change are not uniform. Precipitation in the 20th century increased overall, as expected with a global warming, but decreased in some regions.

  22. Percent of the Continental U.S. with Much Above Normal Proportion of Total Annual Precipitation From 1-day Extreme Events (more than 2 inches) Source: Karl, et.al. 1996.

  23. When permafrost T rises above the freezing point and the perma-frost melts, power lines, pipelines, and buildings built over the permafrost can topple, sag, and crack.

  24. Bleached coral head: Bleaching occurs when high water temperature kills the living organisms in the coral, leaving behind only the calcium carbonate skeleton.

  25. Soon Americans will have to settle for a Non-Glacier National Park.

  26. Sea-ice extent has dropped by ~1.5 million km2 since 1970.

  27. The gradual rise of sea level is evident in these data. (IPCC)

  28. The smoking gun • Essentially all of the observed climate-change phenomena are consistent with the predictions of climate science for GHG-induced warming, taking into account other natural & human influences. • No alternative “culprit” identified so far – no potential cause of the observed climate changes other than greenhouse gases – yields this “fingerprint” match. • A credible skeptic would need to explain both what the alternative cause of the observed changes is and how it could be that GHGs are NOT having the effects that all current scientific understanding says they should have. (No skeptic has done either thing.)

  29. IPCC, 2001 Computer models of climate match observations only if natural forcings (sun, volcanoes) and human ones (GHG, particulates) are included. The human forcings are responsible for most of the rapid warming 1970-2000.

  30. Consequences of continued “business as usual” The scientific-consensus “best estimates” from 2001 are that: • Continuing "business as usual" GHG emissions will lead to increases of 0.2‑0.4°C per decade in global‑average surface temperature, or 2‑4°C warmer than now by 2100.* Mid-continent warming will be 2-3x greater. • The earth will then be warmer than at any time in the last 160,000 years. Sea level will be ~50 cm higher than today (taking into account only the thermal expansion of sea water, not glacial melting). • This global‑average warming will entail major changes in climatic patterns: storm tracks, distribution of precipitation & soil moisture, extremes of hot & cold. • Because of the pace and magnitude of the changes in climatic patterns and because society’s interactions with the environment are attuned to the current climate, impacts on human well-being will be far more negative than positive. *The full range of 2001 IPCC scenarios (from lower emissions than my BAU to higher) gives 1.4-5.8°C increase by 2100.

  31. IPCC 2001 report on impacts (exact quote) “Projected adverse impacts based on models and other studies include • A general reduction in potential crop yields in most tropical and sub-tropical regions for most projected increases in temperature; • A general reduction, with some variation, in potential crop yields in most regions in mid-latitudes for increases in average-annual temperature of more than a few degrees C; • Decreased water availability for populations in many water-scarce regions, particularly in the sub-tropics; • An increase in the number of people exposed to vector-borne diseases (e.g. malaria) and water-borne diseases (e.g. cholera) and an increase in heat-stress mortality; • A widespread increase in the risk of flooding for many human settlements (tens of millions of inhabitants in settlements studied) from both increased heavy precipitation events and sea-level rise; • Increased energy demand for space cooling due to higher summer temperatures.”

  32. IPCC 2001: the benefit side (exact quote) “Projected beneficial impacts based on models and other studies include: • Increased potential crop yields in some regions at mid-latitudes for increases in temperature of less than a few degrees C; • A potential increase in global timber supply from appropriately managed forests; • Increased water availability for populations in some water-scarce regions, e.g., in parts of South East Asia; • Reduced winter mortality in mid- and high-latitudes; • Reduced energy demand for space heating due to higher winter temperatures.”

  33. But… • Most studies to date of adverse & beneficial impacts of climate change have focused on just a doubling of pre-industrial CO2 (for comparability among models). • Alas, under BAU, we’ll careen past a doubling around mid-century, heading for a tripling by 2100 and a quadrupling soon after. • At these higher levels of forcing and resulting climate disruption, early positive impacts are reversed and negative ones become overwhelming.

  34. The two globes summarize computer simulations performed by the Princeton Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Lab to compare the warming expected under a doubling of CO2 from the pre-industrial level with the warming expected from a quadrupling. Note that N hemisphere mid-continent average warming in the 4xCO2 world is 15-25°F! This is a roasted world. T changes for 2x CO2

  35. IPCC (2001) also identified possible “surprises”* • Large increases in the frequency of highly destructive storms (data & analysis since 2001 suggest this is real and underway) • Drastic shifts in ocean current systems that control regional climates (e.g., Gulf stream / Western Europe) (recent measurements suggest that this, too, is already underway) • Multi-meter sea-level rise, over a period of centuries, from melting of Greenland ice or disintegration of West-Antarctic ice sheet (recent measurements show Greenland ice melting much faster than previously thought) • Runaway greenhouse effect from decomposition of methane clathrates, drastically increasing the severity of all expected impacts as well as the probability of big surprises (no evidence of this yet – SOME good news, at least). * “Surprise” means the science as of 2001 suggested low likelihood or was too uncertain to assign a likelihood.

  36. A word about controversy, uncertainty, & prudence UNCERTAINTIES REMAIN Significant uncertainties remain about the climate-change issue, and debates about them persist. But the argument among the knowledgeable is no longer about whether climate is changing or whether human GHG emissions are playing a major role, but about… • the precise magnitude of the climatic changes to be expected by 2030, 2050, or 2100 if civilization does not change course; • the details of the character, geographic distribution, and timing of the damages to human well-being to be expected, and the probability that much bigger than “expected” damages will result from pushing the climate over a threshold or “tipping point”; • the feasibility, costs, and leverage of various potential remedies; and • the appropriate character and timing of national and international policies to reduce the risks from anthropogenic disruption of global climate.

  37. Controversy…(continued) UNCERTAINTIES ARE TWO-SIDED • Yes, it could be that the climate changes occurring under a continuation of BAU would be less disruptive, and the adverse impacts on human well-being less severe, than the “consensus” portrayals presented here -- which are from the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the US National Academy of Sciences. • But it could also turn out that the climate changes under business as usual would be more disruptive, and the impacts on human well-being more severe, than the “consensus” estimates suggest. (Recent results suggest this is more likely than the reverse.) • The assertion of the “skeptics” that the IPCC’s scientific reports have been biased by political pressures toward overstating the problem is nonsense. The principal political pressures on the IPCC have been in the other direction.

  38. Controversy… (continued) BURDEN OF PROOF • The “skeptics” routinely brandish some single contrary piece of evidence or analysis -- often a newly reported one that has not yet been subjected to the scrutiny of the scientific community -- and declare that this new result invalidates the mainstream view. • That’s not how science works. Contrary results appear regularly in all scientific fields. But when a strong preponder-ance of evidence points the other way (as in the case of climate-change science), isolated apparent contradictions are given due scrutiny but not, initially, very much weight. • That’s because it’s far more likely that the “contradiction” will turn out to be explainable as a mistake, or otherwise consistent with the preponderance of evidence, than that the preponderance of evidence will turn out to have been wrong.

  39. Controversy… (concluded) PRUDENCE • All science is contingent. It is always possible that persuasive new evidence and analysis will come to light that will change the mainstream view. • But the greater the consistency and coherence of the existing body of evidence and analysis, the lower the likelihood that the principal conclusions derived from it will be overturned. The consistency and coherence of the evidence and analysis supporting the mainstream view of climate-change risks presented here are substantial. • Supposedly prudent decision-makers, on whose decisions the preservation and expansion of their own and the public’s well-being depends, are gambling against large odds if they bet that the mainstream position is wrong. • A mere 50% chance that the mainstream view is right would justify far more risk-reduction effort than is underway today.

  40. Options:What actions could reduce the magnitude of climate change & its impacts?

  41. WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION? • POSSIBLE APPROACHES • REDUCE EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES • REMOVE GHGs FROM THE ATMOSPHERE (by growing more trees, or phytoplankton, or by technological means) • COUNTERACT THEIR CLIMATIC EFFECTS (by “geotechnical engineering”) • ADAPT TO GHG-INDUCED CLIMATE CHANGE (dams, dikes, changed patterns of agriculture…) • COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS • Doing 2-5 cannot avoid the need for 1. Adaptation becomes costlier & less effective as degree of climate disruption grows. Emissions reductions are essential.

  42. Scenarios How much deflection from business as usual carbon emissions is required? How big a change in our energy-supply system be needed to achieve this?

  43. Stabilizing at 2xCO2 (green curve) is by no means “safe”, but achieving this much will be very difficult and more might not be possible.

  44. How much C-free energy is needed to stabilize atmospheric CO2 below 550 ppmv? • In 2000, the world was getting 100 exajoules of energy per year from carbon-free sources (biomass, nuclear, hydro. wind, solar), compared to 350 EJ/yr from fossil fuels. • To stay below a doubling of the pre-industrial concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, under the assumption of “business as usual” growth of population and prosperity… • We’d need 600 EJ/yr of C-free energy by 2050 and 1500 EJ/yr by 2100, if energy efficiency continued to improve at the long-term historical rate of 1%/yr. • In addition to nuclear & renewables, fossil-fuel technologies that capture & sequester the CO2 could contribute to the C-free energy. • Even if energy efficiency improved 1.5%/yr, over the whole world and the whole century, we’d need 350 EJ/yr of C-free energy in 2050 and 800 EJ/yr in 2100. • These are huge increases in advanced energy technologies.

  45. An Ounce of Prevention. . . • The costs of delay in initiating reductions are likely to be substantial. They depend strongly on the choice of climate-change goals. • The lower the stabilization target deemed prudent, the higher the costs of delay in starting to move toward it. • For higher targets, moderate early action will cost far less than waiting until only drastic action can meet the target. • Early action can be considered to be an insurance policy against costly catastrophe. • Because of thermal lag in the climate system, we are already committed to another 0.5-0.6 C of global ΔT from today’s GHG concentrations.

  46. The Kyoto Protocol • Is a protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). • Commits most industrial countries to reduce their overall emissions of GHG by 5-8 percent below 1990 levels in the “commitment period” 2008 to 2012. • Binds these parties to make “demonstrable progress” toward achieving these commitments by 2005. • Overall emissions are to be computed on a “net” basis, accounting for afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation as well as emissions from energy supply and other industrial activities.

  47. Criticisms of the Kyoto Protocol • It demands too much of the industrialized countries in the short run and too little of them in the long run. • Getting emissions down to 5-8% below 1990 levels by 2012 will be difficult and costly (because of long capital-stock turnover times and long delays for the results of increased R&D to reach the market. • Even if achieved, these reductions will only make a tiny dent in the challenge of reducing emissions enough (by 4- to 5-fold) over the course of the century to stabilize atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 550-650 ppmv. • It doesn’t demand anything of the developing countries. • It focuses too much on targets & timetables and too little on mechanisms for moving in the right direction. • How to count & credit “sinks” remains to be worked out. • Penalties for noncompliance and mechanisms for enforcement are not specified.

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