Techniques of Clandestine Arms Deliveries

1. Techniques of Clandestine Arms Deliveries

2. Interdiction Principles • Detect close to the Point of Departure • Disruption of network operating capability • Use clandestine shipment profiling mechanisms • Document cross-examination and extraction National coordination / multi-layered approach • Targeted sanctions against known actors • International cooperation, support and information sharing

3. Detection of deliveries as close to the Point of Departure (POD) as possible

4. Disruption of network operating capability

5. Deployment of clandestine shipment profiling mechanisms for use by arms export, transport and traffic control, customs and law enforcement agencies.

6. Apply document cross-examination and extraction (DOCEX) techniques

7. National coordination and multi-layered approach

8. Targeted national and international sanctions against known actors

9. International cooperation, support and information sharing

10. Arms Transfers Profiling and Indicators System (ATPIS) • A proposed system that could assist the process of arms transfer analysis. • Produces a ‘Risk Rating’ based on past evidence of known illegal shipment routes, techniques and trends, which are updated on a regular basis. • CD based / limited distribution.

11. Market Dynamics

12. Market Dynamics

13. Market Dynamics

14. Market Dynamics

15. Profiling and Profile Indicators Air movement Maritime movement Land movement End users Brokers/Freightforwarders

16. Profile Indicators

17. Air Transportation Profile Indicators Aircraft type:

18. Air Transportation Profile Indicators Country of aircraft registration:

19. Air Transportation Profile Indicators Flight plan routing indicators:

20. Maritime Transportation Profile Indicators Flag of convenience? Vessel type and size? Shipping company size?

21. Land Transportation Profile Indicators

22. End-User Profile Indicators • End-User Certificates (EUC) • Forged? • Obtained from original entity after issue? • For countries with a higher risk?

23. Broker / FreightForwarderProfile Indicators • Exports involving brokers? • Especially if combined with ‘off-shore ‘transportation sources • Brokers based ‘off-shore’

24. Types of Clandestine Delivery • Post-Delivery Onward Diversion (PDOD) • Point of Departure Diversion (PDD) • Circumvention and Concealment (C&C)

25. Post-Delivery Onward Diversion (PDOD) • Genuine End-User Certificate • Acting on behalf of people in the End-User State • Intent is then to move items onwards from the End-User State • “Grey Market”

26. Point of Departure Diversion (PDD) • Fake or abused End-User Certification • Ammunition not delivered to End-User suggested on fake Certification • Likely to minimise exposure by working through local agents

27. Circumvention and Concealment (C&C) • Popular in the “Ant Trade” • Concealment generally involves hiding items in among other goods

28. Documentation • Main types of documentation: • End user and export licence documentation • Arms transport and transfer documentation

29. End User and Export Licence Documentation • A lack of sufficient end user verification is the greatest expediting factor for illicit delivery. • Lack of a standardised format. • Simplicity of certain EUCs lend themselves to forgery.

30. Arms Transport and Transfer Documentation • Examples: • Bill of Lading • Airway Bill • Cargo manifest • Flight Permission Request

31. Checks of Documentation • Matching end user weapon and ammunition requests with end user inventories. • Cross-referencing import and transportation documentation. • Foreign third party brokering licence control checks. • Examining extra-territoriality claims and actual brokering locations.

32. Case Studies

33. Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 • 08 March 1995. Ukrainian Airline applies for Flight Plans from Bratislava in the Slovak Republic to Ecuador. • 12 March 1995. Flight ADB801 makes a technical stop at Lajes in the Azores, declaring the cargo as ‘Hospital Truck and Special Equipment’. • 12 March 1995. Customs officials at Lajes discover cargo is, in fact, rocket launchers.

34. Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995

35. Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 The Explanation

36. Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 Request for further landing permission in Dominican Republic

37. Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 The Answer: Denial of flight permission

38. Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 The explanation again

39. Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 Request to continue flight with declaration of true cargo

40. Sudan, 2006 • Near Juba, November 2006. • An 28 – Short-Haul Flights only. STOL Capability. • ER-AKO (Previously Moldovan registered and now registered in Sao Tome).

41. Sudan, 2006 • S9-PSV owned by DALLEX Trade, registered in London, but a known shell company. • Leased to GOLIAF Air. New clandestine delivery company? • Delivery took 20 minutes!

42. Chad • Chad Army mainly equipped with FN weapons – why do they need AK variants? • Known diversion point to Sudan (Dhafur). • EUC again very easy to ‘obtain’. Financial inducements allegedly been accepted since April 1994: • Chad EUC used to supply weapons to Liberia and Sierra Leonne. • Chad EUC used for export from Bulgaria to Yemen.

43. Questions